



Research Article

Legislative Committee System and Institutional Performance in Nigeria's National Assembly: An Institutional Analysis

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Abstract

This study examines the legislative committee system and institutional performance in Nigeria's National Assembly through a comparative institutional lens. It argues that although committees are firmly embedded in the constitutional and parliamentary framework of the National Assembly, their practical contribution to legislative performance remains uneven. The paper adopts a qualitative research design based on document and thematic analyses, drawing on constitutional provisions, parliamentary documents, institutional publications and relevant scholarly literatures. The analysis shows that committees are central to legislative organisation because they structure specialisation, reduce plenary workload and provide the main channels for oversight, hearings, investigations and detailed scrutiny of public policy and expenditure. The study further finds that the effectiveness of the committee system is constrained by overlapping mandates, weak coordination, limited operational support, inadequate access to information and uneven follow-through on oversight outcomes. Comparative evidence suggests that the committee system performs best where jurisdictions are clearly defined, committee leadership is meaningful and the wider legislature enjoys sufficient autonomy to make scrutiny consequential. The paper concludes that the weakness of Nigeria's committee system lies less in the absence of formal powers than in the underdevelopment of the institutional and political conditions required to make those powers consistently effective. It recommends jurisdictional rationalisation, stronger committee support systems, firmer follow-up procedures and greater legislative autonomy as necessary steps toward improving committee performance and democratic accountability in Nigeria.

Keywords

Legislative Committee System, Institutional Performance, National Assembly, Parliamentary Oversight, Legislative Governance, Nigeria

1. Introduction

Legislative committees are among the most consequential internal institutions of modern representative government. Comparative legislative scholarship treats them as core organisational sites through which legislatures process bills, gather

information, specialise members, scrutinise executive action and reduce the transaction costs of plenary decision-making [21]. Their significance is especially pronounced in constitu-

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tional systems where legislatures must simultaneously perform lawmaking, representation and accountability functions. In such settings, committees reduce the practical limitations of plenary deliberation by allowing smaller groups of legislators to examine technical matters in greater depth, organise information flows and structure legislative engagement with ministries, departments and agencies [13, 21].

In Nigeria, these issues are institutionally significant because the National Assembly is constitutionally structured as a bicameral legislature, where the House of Representatives serves as the lower chamber of that legislature. The committee system is embedded in the architecture of federal lawmaking: Section 62 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amended, authorises each chamber of the National Assembly to appoint committees for the effective discharge of legislative functions, while Sections 88 and 89 empower the National Assembly and its committees to investigate matters relating to legislative competence, including the exposure of corruption, inefficiency and waste in the administration of laws and public funds [7]. The House itself also states that its members are distributed into standing and special committees, which undertake legislative assignments and report their findings and recommendations to the chamber for final decision [15].

Yet the constitutional centrality of committees does not automatically translate into institutional effectiveness. Nigerian legislative politics has long been shaped by the tension between formal constitutional authority and practical constraints such as executive dominance, weak enforcement capacity, internal coordination problems and uneven oversight outcomes [1, 9]. This raises an important analytical question: if legislative committees are constitutionally designed to improve specialisation, scrutiny and accountability, why has their practical contribution to institutional performance remained contested? Put differently, to what extent has the committee system of Nigeria's National Assembly functioned as a genuine instrument of legislative strengthening rather than merely a formal procedural arrangement?

This study, therefore, examines legislative committee systems and institutional performance in Nigeria's National Assembly through a comparative institutional lens. It focuses on the constitutional basis, functional logic and operational realities of committee work in Nigeria while drawing on broader legislative studies to situate the Nigerian case within established debates on committee strength, oversight capacity and legislative autonomy [13, 21]. The paper argues that although Nigeria's committee system is constitutionally robust in design, its institutional performance has been weakened by structural, political and administrative constraints that inhibit its ability to deliver the full benefits associated with effective committee systems in more institutionalised democracies. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the literature on legislative committees, institutional performance and oversight. This is followed by the theoretical

framework and methodology. The analytical section then examines the constitutional and institutional foundations of committee systems, assesses their contribution to legislative performance and identifies the principal constraints on their effectiveness. The paper concludes with recommendations to strengthen the committee system as a vehicle for legislative autonomy, accountability, and democratic consolidation in Nigeria.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Legislative Committees and Democratic Governance

The mainstream literature on legislative studies treats committees as the institutional machinery through which legislatures make detailed work possible. Rather than seeing them as merely procedural subdivisions, scholars present committees as mechanisms for specialisation, information processing, agenda filtration and executive scrutiny. Martin argues that committees matter because they allow legislatures to delegate work to smaller units while retaining collective control over final decisions, thereby increasing the legislature's capacity to shape policy and hold the executive accountable [21]. This position is consistent with wider work in legislative studies, which views internal organisation as one of the key explanations for differences in legislative performance across regimes [13, 21].

The more important point in the literature, however, is not simply that committees exist, but that their strength varies and that this variation has consequences. Fortunato, Martin and Vanberg show that committee leadership affects the degree of legislative scrutiny applied to bills, indicating that internal committee design influences substantive review rather than merely administrative handling [13]. Chiru reaches a related conclusion from coalition settings, showing that the allocation of committee chairs is tied to oversight incentives and monitoring strategies within legislatures [6]. Together, these studies suggest that committee effectiveness depends not only on formal jurisdiction but also on who controls committees and how those committees are embedded in broader political competition.

A recent work also pushes the debate beyond the traditional assumption that more committees automatically improve oversight. Chaudoin argues that decentralised oversight can generate inefficiency where multiple committees pursue overlapping jurisdictions or conflicting incentives, producing fragmentation rather than stronger control [5]. What follows from this literature is a more precise analytical proposition: committees enhance democratic governance only when their mandates are coherent; their leadership is institutionally meaningful, and their informational and procedural resources are sufficient [5, 13, 21].

2.2. Committee Systems in Comparative Perspective

In the African context, legislative committees have increasingly become important instruments for oversight, accountability and policy scrutiny. In South Africa, parliamentary committees play a visible role in executive oversight and public accountability, while in Ghana and Kenya, committee systems are central to legislative scrutiny, budget review and sectoral monitoring. These experiences show that the effectiveness of committee systems in Africa depends not only on formal constitutional provisions but also on institutional capacity, political independence, technical expertise and access to reliable information. This comparative African experience strengthens the relevance of examining Nigeria's National Assembly committee system within the broader debate on parliamentary institutional performance. Comparative scholarship shows that committee systems differ not only across regime types but also within them. Some legislatures rely on committees as central engines of policy work, while others maintain committee structures whose practical influence is limited by party control, executive dominance or weak institutionalisation [21].

A recurring insight in the comparative literature is that committee design is inseparable from power distribution. Fortunato et al. show that the partisan control of committees affects the seriousness of bill scrutiny [13], while Chiru demonstrates that committee chair allocation can serve as a mechanism of coalition oversight [6]. Comparative African evidence reinforces this point by showing that legislative autonomy conditions committee performance. Ochieng' Opalo finds in the Kenyan case that more independent legislatures are better able to constrain presidents, implying that internal committee authority is unlikely to be effective where the legislature itself lacks broader institutional independence [27]. The implication for Nigeria is clear: committee proliferation, chair allocation, weak coordination and executive pressure are not isolated anomalies but recurring variables in how legislatures succeed or fail [5, 21, 27].

2.3. Empirical Studies on Nigerian Legislative Committees

The Nigerian literature broadly agrees that committees are indispensable to legislative functioning, but it is less unified on how effective they have been. Fashagba's work remains important because it moved the discussion beyond constitutional formalism and argued that committees are central to legislative efficiency by enabling detailed scrutiny that plenary sessions cannot sustain [12]. The Nigerian narrative later shifted from defending the relevance of committees to interrogating their actual performance. Hamalai examines committee performance in the National Assembly and places legislative oversight at the centre of the committee system, arguing that the significance of committees lies less in their existence than in their ability to perform legislative functions effectively

[14]. In the same vein, Chukwunyere links committee oversight to accountability outcomes [9], while Amadi shows that committee-centred oversight remains crucial to good governance but is weakened by persistent implementation and capacity problems [1].

A related strand of Nigerian scholarship focuses on specific committees, especially the oversight-oriented ones. Sule shows that even committees with strong formal mandates, such as the Public Accounts Committee, face operational constraints that limit how far they can translate audit and appropriation authority into real accountability outcomes [32]. Ope points in the same direction by showing how the backlog of audit queries weakens oversight performance [28]. More recent NILDS work on the 10th House of Representatives also shows that overlapping mandates, committee duplication and weak jurisdictional boundaries can reduce oversight effectiveness [26]. Thus, Nigerian committee weakness is increasingly being explained not only by external political pressure but also by internal organisational incoherence.

Broader studies of the Nigerian legislature reinforce this institutional context. Arowosegbe argues that the National Assembly possesses extensive constitutional powers but has not consistently attained the transformative status expected of it [2]. Fagbadebo likewise shows that constitutional provisions for oversight have not translated into the level of accountability intended by their framers [11]. These studies situate committee weakness within a wider problem of legislative underperformance rather than treating committees as isolated institutional failures.

From the reviewed literature, it is evident that existing studies have examined legislative committees, oversight functions and parliamentary performance. However, limited attention has been given to how the committee system specifically shapes institutional performance in Nigeria's National Assembly. This study, therefore, addresses this gap by examining the committee system as a core institutional mechanism through which legislative effectiveness, oversight capacity and parliamentary accountability are enhanced. Comparative studies explain well why committees matter, how leadership and chair allocation affect scrutiny, and why fragmented committee systems can underperform [5, 6, 13, 21]. The Nigerian studies explain reasonably well that committees are central to oversight and that their effectiveness is weakened by operational, political and structural constraints [1, 9, 14, 26, 32]. What remains less developed is a study that integrates these strands and treats the committee system of Nigeria's National Assembly as a broader institutional mechanism of legislative performance, rather than discussing committees only through isolated oversight functions or single-committee case studies. This study addresses that gap.

3. Theoretical Framework

This study is anchored on the Separation of Powers theory. The theory is the most appropriate framework for analysing

legislative committee systems and institutional performance in Nigeria because the central question in this paper is not merely whether committees exist, but whether they enable the legislature to exercise its constitutionally assigned powers with sufficient autonomy and effectiveness. In classical constitutional thought, the doctrine of separation of powers is designed to prevent the concentration of authority by distributing governmental powers among distinct branches of government. Montesquieu's formulation remains foundational in this regard, while later scholarship clarifies that separation of powers is not simply about institutional differentiation in form, but about preserving the functional capacity of each branch to check the others and prevent domination [22, 23].

The relevance of this theory to legislative committees becomes clearer once committees are understood as operational instruments through which legislative power is exercised in practice. Legislatures do not carry out lawmaking, investigation and oversight through plenary sessions alone; they rely heavily on delegated institutional subunits, especially committees, to investigate public administration, review policies, scrutinise budgets and gather evidence. In the Nigerian case, this role is constitutionally recognised. Section 62 of the Constitution empowers each chamber of the National Assembly to appoint committees and delegate functions to them, while Sections 88 and 89 empower the legislature to conduct investigations into the conduct of public authorities and the administration of public funds [7]. This means that committees are not peripheral administrative devices; they are institutional extensions of legislative authority itself.

The theory is especially suitable because Nigeria operates a presidential system in which the executive and legislature derive authority separately and are expected to function as coordinate institutions rather than fused branches. Shugart and Carey explain presidentialism in terms of the separate origin and survival of executive and legislative authority [31]. More recent comparative work has continued to treat this as a defining element of presidential systems and as a major determinant of executive–legislative relations [10, 31]. The implication for this study is straightforward: in a presidential democracy, the legislature must possess working internal mechanisms strong enough to support its checking role, and legislative committees are among the most important of those mechanisms.

Applied to this study, the Separation of Powers theory suggests that the effectiveness of a legislature's committee system should be assessed by the extent to which it enables the legislature to perform its constitutional functions independently and coherently. A fragmented, weakly coordinated or poorly resourced committee system does not merely represent an organisational defect; it signifies a weakening of the legislature's checking capacity within the broader constitutional order [22]. The theory, therefore, allows the study to interpret committee weakness, not as an isolated procedural failure but as a wider sign of incomplete institutional balance within Nigeria's presidential democracy.

4. Methodology

The study adopted a qualitative institutional analysis design. Data were derived from secondary sources, including constitutional provisions, legislative documents, journal articles, books, policy reports and relevant parliamentary records. The method was considered appropriate because the study sought to examine the institutional role, structure and performance implications of legislative committees in Nigeria's National Assembly. The analysis was conducted thematically, with emphasis on oversight, law-making, representation, accountability and institutional capacity. This approach is appropriate because it allows the study to interpret formal rules alongside practical institutional realities and to identify how committee systems are structured and expected to function within Nigeria's Fourth Republic [3, 8, 29].

The analysis combines document analysis with thematic analysis by organising the materials into key themes such as constitutional authority, committee structure, oversight, mandate overlap, capacity constraints and institutional performance. The study is situated within the period of the Fourth Republic from 1999 to the present in order to assess committee systems within Nigeria's longest uninterrupted democratic era, with particular attention to recent institutional and scholarly materials. A major strength of this method is that it connects formal constitutional design with practical institutional performance through triangulation across legal, parliamentary and scholarly sources, although its main limitation is the absence of interviews with legislators, clerks or committee staff [3, 4, 20].

5. Analysis and Discussion

5.1. Constitutional and Institutional Basis of Legislative Committees in Nigeria

The committee system in Nigeria is constitutionally embedded rather than procedurally incidental. Section 62 of the 1999 Constitution authorises each chamber of the National Assembly to appoint committees for matters that, in its judgment, would be *"better regulated and managed by means of such a committee,"* and also permits the delegation of functions to those committees, subject to constitutional limits on final legislative decision-making. Sections 88 and 89 further empower the legislature to investigate the conduct of public authorities and obtain evidence for that purpose, especially where the objective is to expose corruption, inefficiency and waste [7]. Read together, these provisions establish committees as operational arms of legislative authority in lawmaking, inquiry and oversight, rather than as merely auxiliary bodies within parliamentary routine.

Institutionally, committees constitute the working structure through which the National Assembly organises its internal operations and manages legislative complexity. In practice,

the House of Representatives distributes members across standing and special committees, which “conduct Legislative assignments on behalf of the Chamber and report their findings along with recommendations to the entire House for a final decision” [15]. This shows that committees are not only constitutionally permitted but also institutionally indispensable to the daily functioning of the legislature. Their relevance lies in the fact that they create specialisation, reduce the burden on plenary, and provide the organisational channels through which bills, oversight matters, petitions and investigations are processed before broader chamber consideration. The Legislative Agenda of the 10th House reinforces this institutional understanding by calling for “improved funding to Committees for oversight” and “timely and unrestricted access to the documents, reports and data relevant to oversight” [17]. Analytically, therefore, the basis of legislative committees in Nigeria is dual: constitutional and institutional.

5.2. Committee Structure and Functional Design

The thematic analysis shows that the committee system remains a central institutional mechanism through which Nigeria’s National Assembly organises legislative work, strengthens oversight and enhances policy scrutiny beyond plenary deliberations. Official guides and committee manuals identify multiple committee forms within the National Assembly, including standing, special, ad hoc, joint, conference and committee-of-the-whole arrangements, each created to serve distinct procedural and functional purposes [24, 25]. The House of Representatives similarly notes that members are distributed into special and standing committees based on their experience and that these committees undertake assignments for the chamber and return reports for final decision by the House [15]. This structure suggests that the functional design of committees is intended to combine specialisation with legislative control: committees examine matters in detail, but the plenary retains final authority.

In practice, however, the effectiveness of this design depends on whether the committee organisation promotes coherence rather than fragmentation. The Standing Orders of the House and official listings of the 10th House show a very extensive committee structure [16, 18]. At the same time, recent NILDS analysis warns that overlapping mandates among committees in the House can undermine oversight effectiveness by creating duplication, blurred responsibility and coordination problems [26]. Thus, the analytical issue is not simply that Nigeria has committees, but that the functional design of the committee system must balance breadth with clarity.

5.3. Committee Systems and Legislative Efficiency

One of the strongest institutional justifications for committee systems is efficiency. In legislative studies, committees are

valued because they divide labour, concentrate expertise and allow detailed examination of matters that plenary cannot handle with the same depth or speed. Rather than requiring the full chamber to process every technical issue directly, committees filter proposals, organise information and return more refined outputs for final legislative decision, thereby strengthening legislative capacity and reducing the practical burdens of large assemblies [21].

In Nigeria, that efficiency logic is built into both constitutional and parliamentary practice. The constitutional wording that matters may be “better regulated and managed by means of such a committee” which indicates that committees were intended to serve as efficiency-enhancing institutional devices rather than mere procedural subdivisions [7]. The House of Representatives reinforces this role by stating that committees “conduct Legislative assignments on behalf of the Chamber and report their findings along with recommendations to the entire House for final decision” [15]. Together, these formulations show that committees are designed to reduce plenary congestion, improve specialisation and make legislative work more manageable.

However, the Nigerian case also shows that efficiency is not produced automatically by simply multiplying committees. Research on committee performance in the National Assembly indicates that committees are central to the performance of legislative and especially oversight functions [14], but more recent analysis of the 10th House warns that overlapping mandates can weaken effectiveness by creating duplication, blurred responsibility and coordination problems [26]. The reform agenda of the 10th House confirms this diagnosis by calling for better information access, improved funding and performance metrics for committee work [17]. Analytically, therefore, Nigeria’s committee system appears efficient in design but only partially efficient in operation.

5.4. Oversight Performance and Accountability Functions

Oversight is one of the most important functions through which legislative committees justify their institutional relevance. In Nigeria, this role is constitutionally grounded in Sections 88 and 89 of the 1999 Constitution, which empower the National Assembly to investigate the conduct of public authorities and the administration of public funds for the purpose of exposing corruption, inefficiency and waste [7]. Institutional guidance materials reinforce this mandate. The Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre explains that legislative oversight is intended to sustain good governance and accountability through effective oversight [30], while Hamalai similarly treats oversight as a core responsibility through which the committee system gives practical meaning to legislative control [14]. Empirical studies, however, suggest that the oversight value of committees in Nigeria is substantial in principle but uneven in practice. Chukwunyerere finds that committee oversight is closely linked to accountability outcomes, but effectiveness

depends on the seriousness and consistency with which committees carry out their functions [9]. Sule reaches a related conclusion in his study of the Public Accounts Committee, showing that even one of the legislature's most empowered oversight committees is constrained by problems of implementation, resource adequacy and institutional follow-through [32]. A more recent work identifies the backlog of audit queries as a continuing challenge to effective accountability enforcement [28], while Amadi similarly emphasises that oversight remains central to good governance but is weakened by capacity and performance limitations [1]. Nigerian committees do perform accountability functions, but their oversight impact is often strongest at the level of scrutiny and exposure, and weaker at the level of enforcement and sustained compliance.

5.5. Structural and Political Constraints on Committee Effectiveness

The effectiveness of legislative committees in Nigeria is constrained first by internal structural weaknesses. Recent institutional analysis of the 10th House of Representatives shows that overlapping committee mandates can undermine oversight effectiveness by creating duplication, blurred responsibility and coordination problems [26]. The House's own Legislative Agenda also acknowledges these weaknesses by calling for *"improved funding to Committees for oversight," "timely and unrestricted access to the documents, reports and data relevant to oversight,"* and stronger performance metrics for committee work [17]. These formulations suggest that the problem is not a lack of constitutional authority, but the fact that committee jurisdictions, information systems and operational support have not been sufficiently aligned with the scale of their responsibilities.

Committee effectiveness is also constrained by the wider political environment in which legislative oversight operates. Empirical Nigerian studies show that committees often struggle to convert scrutiny into sustained accountability because follow-through, implementation and enforcement are uneven. Chukwunyere finds that the oversight work of Senate committees was linked to accountability outcomes but remained dependent on how consistently committees performed their functions [9], while Sule points to resource adequacy and the implementation status of committee recommendations as key constraints on effectiveness [32]. More recent work adds that the backlog of audit queries continues to weaken oversight performance [28]. Committee weakness in Nigeria is therefore both structural and political.

5.6. Comparative Lessons from Other Democracies

A comparative experience suggests that effective committee systems depend less on numerical size than on clarity of

mandate, meaningful leadership roles and strong scrutiny routines. In comparative legislative studies, committees are most effective where they are used to organise specialisation and structured review rather than simply to multiply parliamentary units [21]. Fortunato, Martin and Vanberg similarly show that committee leadership affects the depth of legislative scrutiny, which means that internal committee design has real consequences for how seriously bills and executive actions are reviewed [13]. In the United Kingdom, official parliamentary guidance describes select committees as a highly flexible means of scrutiny capable of conducting detailed policy review, accountability hearings and longer inquiries [33], while the Institute for Government identifies them as one of Parliament's main tools for holding government to account [19].

Comparative African evidence adds a second lesson: committee performance depends heavily on the broader independence of the legislature. Ochieng' Opalo finds that greater legislative independence constrains presidential rule making more effectively in Kenya [27]. This matters for Nigeria because even well-designed committees may underperform if internal fragmentation, executive pressure or weak enforcement dilute the legislature's broader checking role. Taken together, these comparative cases suggest that Nigeria's reform challenge is twofold: to improve the internal architecture of committees and to strengthen the wider institutional autonomy of the National Assembly.

6. Recommendations

The National Assembly should undertake a deliberate rationalisation of committee jurisdictions so that overlapping mandates are reduced and responsibilities are more clearly defined. A committee system that is too expansive without clear boundaries will continue to encourage duplication, weaken coordination and make effective oversight more difficult. Streamlining committee assignments and clarifying reporting lines would improve coherence and reduce avoidable institutional friction.

Committee operations should be strengthened through practical support mechanisms rather than formal powers alone. This means better funding for committee work, more reliable access to official documents and data, improved research and clerical assistance, and a stronger internal record-management system. Oversight performance should also be tied to clear measurable outputs so that committee work can be assessed on the basis of hearings conducted, reports submitted, compliance tracked and outcomes achieved.

The National Assembly should establish firmer internal procedures for following up committee findings and recommendations. Hearings and reports should not be treated as end-points. There should be a structured process for monitoring implementation, tracking responses from ministries and agencies and escalating persistent non-compliance where necessary. Without follow-through, oversight will continue to ex-

pose problems without producing sufficient institutional correction.

Committee leadership and membership should be guided more by competence, jurisdictional relevance and legislative experience than by convenience or excessive political balancing. Committees perform best when members have enough continuity and subject familiarity to understand the sectors under their supervision. Greater attention to expertise and stability in committee assignments would improve the quality of legislative review and reduce superficial oversight.

Finally, the wider autonomy of the legislature should be protected if committee reform is to produce meaningful results. Committees cannot function effectively where the larger legislative environment is weakened by internal fragmentation, weak enforcement culture or persistent external pressure. Strengthening the institutional independence of the National Assembly will give committees a firmer basis for turning scrutiny into accountability and will improve the legislature's capacity to perform its constitutional role more credibly.

7. Conclusion

This study examined the legislative committee system and institutional performance in Nigeria's National Assembly from an institutional perspective. The analysis established that committees constitute an essential part of the organisational structure through which the legislature performs its law-making, oversight, investigative and accountability responsibilities. By dividing legislative responsibilities among specialised units, committees enable more detailed consideration of bills, public policies, government expenditure and the activities of ministries, departments and agencies than would ordinarily be possible through plenary deliberations alone.

The study further established that the existence of constitutional powers and elaborate committee structures does not, by itself, guarantee effective legislative performance. The effectiveness of Nigeria's committee system continues to be affected by overlapping jurisdictions, inadequate coordination, limited access to relevant information, insufficient technical and administrative support, and weak mechanisms for ensuring implementation of committee recommendations. These weaknesses reduce the capacity of committees to translate investigations, hearings and oversight activities into sustained institutional accountability.

The study therefore argues that the central challenge confronting Nigeria's legislative committee system is not the absence of formal authority but the institutional conditions required to make existing authority effective. A more functional committee system requires clearer jurisdictional boundaries, stronger technical and research support, improved information access, effective monitoring of committee recommendations and greater continuity and competence in committee leadership and membership. These measures would enhance specialisation, reduce duplication and strengthen the capacity of committees to hold public institutions accountable.

Ultimately, the institutional performance of the National Assembly is closely connected to the effectiveness of its committee system. Strengthening committees would improve not only the internal efficiency of the legislature but also its capacity to exercise meaningful oversight, contribute to accountable governance and maintain an effective system of constitutional checks and balances. The study therefore concludes that a coherent, adequately supported and institutionally autonomous committee system is fundamental to strengthening legislative performance and democratic accountability in Nigeria.

Abbreviations

IOGADS	Institute of Governance and Development Studies
NILDS	National Institute for Legislative and Democratic Studies
PAC	Public Accounts Committee
PLAC	Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre
UK	United Kingdom

Author Contributions

Folarin Olusola Olugbenga: Conceptualization, Methodology, Formal analysis, Investigation, Resources, Writing – original draft, Writing – review and editing

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

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