

Nietzsche's Conception of Place: Blueprint for an Architecture of the Future

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Abstract: In today's 'Hypermodern' world, where space-time compression and digital technological innovations are the dominant modes of existence, Nietzsche's ideas can still offer alternative perspectives and ways of life. One of the main issues that spatial design disciplines have to face within hypermodernity is the growing deterritorialization of events and human interactions, the insurmountable distancing between bodies in space. Digital technology creates 'spaces of flows' that transcend communities, regions, places, localities and persons, inaugurating an exponential dematerialization of social and human relations. Although there are strong indications that Nietzsche's nomadic way of life and thinking would perhaps endorse the digital turn, I would like to argue in the present paper that if we read his textual corpus closely, attentively and slowly, a new possibility emerges: the great value of embodied thinking. My basic working hypothesis is that thinking through the body needs proximity: real Places of the Outside, whether natural or urban, in order to unfold itself. Nietzsche can be used against digitalization and hypermodern 'non-places'. More specifically, it seems that an important topic has been relatively neglected so far within the vast secondary literature of Nietzsche Studies: his concept, idea or notion of place. This paper aims to offer an introductory analysis of Nietzsche's conception of place, as elaborated mainly in *Ecce Homo*. I will try to show the close relationship between place and inspiration, *Stimmung* and the body, arguing in favor of a new philosophy of locality. I will then suggest that this new idea of place has potentially very interesting consequences, and could open up new, radical questions for contemporary and future architectural theory and practice.

Keywords: Affekt, Attunement, Geophilosophy, Inspiration, Leib, Ort, Rhythm of Metabolism, Stimmung

1. Introduction: Basic Working Hypothesis and Aim of the Paper

Nietzsche's labyrinthine way of thinking has an inherent, structural capacity to produce new questions and challenge our established notions. In today's 'hypermodern' world [18], where space-time compression and digital technological innovations are the dominant modes of existence, Nietzsche's ideas can still offer alternative perspectives and ways of life. One of the main issues that spatial design disciplines have to face within hypermodernity is the growing deterritorialisation of events and human inter-actions, the insurmountable distancing between bodies in space. It seems that place, as ground, earth or territory with a specific character and genius loci, no longer functions as a stable focus or point of reference in a globalised world. Digital technology creates

'spaces of flows' that transcend communities, regions, places, localities and persons, inaugurating an exponential dematerialisation of social and human relations. Although there are strong indications that Nietzsche's nomadic way of life and thinking would perhaps endorse the digital turn, I would like to argue in the present paper that if we read his textual corpus closely, attentively and slowly, a new possibility emerges: the great value of *embodied thinking*. If we expect Nietzsche to act as a donor of stimuli to the *homo digitalis* of the contemporary era, place and the body would be the basic concepts that need revisiting. My basic working hypothesis is that thinking through the body, in a Nietzschean sense, needs proximity: real places or spaces of the outside, whether natural or urban, in order to unfold itself. Nietzsche can be used against digitalisation and hypermodern non-places [1]. More specifically, it seems that an important topic has been relatively neglected so far within the vast secondary

literature of Nietzsche studies: his concept, idea or notion of place.

This paper aims to offer an introductory analysis of Nietzsche's conception of place, as elaborated mainly in *Ecce Homo*. I will try to show the close relationship between place and inspiration, *Stimmung* and the body, arguing in favour of a new philosophy of locality. I will then suggest that this new idea of place has potentially very interesting consequences, and could open up new, radical questions for contemporary and future architectural theory and practice. In *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft*, Book 4, § 280, Nietzsche writes: "*There is and probably will be a need to perceive what our great cities lack above all: still, wide, extensive places for thinking*" [22].¹ What is the meaning of this enigmatic suggestion? What are these 'places of thinking' (*Orte zum Nachdenken*)? How should we interpret this observation? Usually, we tend to see Nietzsche's way of thinking as structured metaphorically, but what if we take his suggestions in a literal, pragmatic sense? How could we imagine an 'architecture for the perceptive' (*Architektur der Erkennenden*)? My final claim will be that if we take Nietzsche's original conception of place into consideration, then a radical architecture of the future can perhaps be delineated: an affective, bodily, regional, eurythmic, empathetic, and attuned architecture of moods.

2. Nietzsche's Concept of Place in *Ecce Homo*: An Interpretation

Nietzsche, due to the dual psychological and poetic texture of his work, does not generate genuine expectations of a subject's comprehensive treatment. Why have any coherent theory of place? Why should Nietzsche need to elaborate any concept about place in general? And, most importantly, is it certain that, if found in his textual corpus, he has developed a sense of place that is of interest to architectural thought and action, to the architect's creative endeavours? Of the two hundred and seventeen (217) references to the word 'place' (*Ort*) in his overall work, I could not easily find anything relevant to the possible concerns and interests of architects. Most uses of the word had either a metaphorical intention or the usual, common meaning: Nietzsche used it to simply express 'location', 'site', as a distinct point in natural or human-made space. There seems to be one important exception, however: a strange work of his, considered his autobiography, entitled *Ecce Homo*, in Latin, meaning 'Behold the Man'. The subtitle is: *How One Becomes What One Is (Wie man wird, was man ist)*. The title of the book refers to the Latin words used by Pontius Pilate when he presented Christ to the crowd before crucifying him. It is an outrageous book. When I re-read it carefully, I realised that there is a latent aspect of Nietzsche's thought in this work that does not seem to have received much attention from his scholars. I would argue that this aspect can be called the hidden, repressed and forgotten theory of Nietzsche on place.

I will try to outline it below, as much as possible, in the limited context of this study, through a careful analysis of *Ecce Homo*.

This book is supposed to be an 'autobiography' of Nietzsche. In fact, in my opinion, it is something much more: a reconstruction of the self. Nietzsche is the most 'architectural' philosopher. He builds himself through writing. Writing *produces* the experience, it does not simply reproduce or represent its recollection. In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche reconstructs himself, re-builds his ego, looking back on the past, prioritising and selecting important moments, re-commenting on his books and deeds, and his life choices. One could argue that it is a moral work, and didactic: it shows what it means to become a creative subject, to stand out and differentiate yourself from the masses, the common, 'normal' people, the bourgeois. It reveals the sacrifices that this process of creation entails: devotion, the transcendence of the ego, the passion for truth, or, better, for thought. This book is a summary of Nietzsche's philosophy of creation. In this sense, it is not just an autobiographical narrative of simple events or happenings in his life, but a condensation of the unbreakable, necessary (regulatory), normative unity of life/thought. According to Giorgio Colli, in his writings of 1888, "...the themes are handled in a purely personal way, as Nietzsche's thought identifies itself with Nietzsche's person [...] this mutual interpenetration of thought and person also explains the sudden decision to write an autobiography, *Ecce Homo*" [4]. *Ecce Homo* is therefore reminiscent of an *Apology*, with Nietzsche in the place of Socrates, who is being tried, and again in the place of Plato, who is writing it. The book was written in October, November and December 1888, under tense excitement, with constant oscillations, additions and revisions, as recorded in Nietzsche's correspondence with the publisher C. G. Naumann [19, 20].² Since Nietzsche collapsed shortly afterwards, it is perhaps his spiritual testament. Nietzsche wanted to be translated into French by August Strindberg. [3].³ The manuscript was first published only in 1908, twenty years later, in a luxurious edition, under the graphic design and editing of Henry van de Velde.

Various scholars have dealt with the meaning and significance of *Ecce Homo*.⁴ According to Aaron Ridley,

² *Nietzsche Chronicle*, available at: <https://www.dartmouth.edu/~finchro/> [accessed: 27.3.2020]. For the extremely complex history of *Ecce Homo*'s conception (*Ur-Ecce Homo*), elaboration, and evolution of its composition in six distinct phases, see the exhaustive analysis and documentation provided by the amazing philological work of Colli/Montinari in: Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Case of Wagner, Twilight of the Idols, The Antichrist, Ecce Homo, Dionysus Dithyrambs, Nietzsche Contra Wagner*, The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, edited by Alan D. Schrift, Duncan Large, and Adrian Del Caro, Volume Nine, Translated by Adrian Del Caro et al., Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 2021, 553-561.

³ See Nietzsche's crucial letter to August Strindberg from 8.12.1888: Nietzsche Source — Digitale Kritische Gesamtausgabe Werke und Briefe (eKGWB), BVN-1888, 1176 [accessed 14.8.2021].

⁴ My references to *Ecce Homo* follow the publication: Friedrich Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe*, ed. Giorgio Colli, Mazzino Montinari, 15 volumes, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag and de Gruyter, Munich 1988, as it is transcribed in the digital version: Friedrich Nietzsche, *Digital*

¹ GS-<http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/FW-280> [Accessed: 12.8.2021]. My translation.

Nietzsche unnecessarily 'dramatises' the process of producing his ego as a normative ideal: in fact, he offers us only a "self-help manual" [26]. Mazzino Montinari, a much more serious connoisseur of Nietzsche, speaks of a 'propaganda text', in which Nietzsche is transformed again, wearing a new mask of demystifying himself [19], in stark contrast to the exaggerated titles of the book's four sections, which are: "Why I Am So Wise", "Why I Am So Clever", "Why I Write Such Good Books", and "Why I Am a Destiny". Joachim Köhler takes the opposite view: Nietzsche, in the image of the saviour Christ rejected by the crowd and awaiting his crucifixion, "no longer wears masks – he is them, changing them almost by the hour. Previously he had invented his characters, later he hid behind them, and now, finally, he crept inside them. Could he no longer endure living inside himself? [...] In *Ecce Homo* Nietzsche lays his cards on the table..." [14]. I agree with Köhler: in *Ecce Homo* we have the truest, most sincere Nietzsche we can find in his works. The fact that he is imaginatively identified with other persons (Christ or Dionysus) does not diminish the sincerity, the 'truth' of this identification. The most serious scholar of *Ecce Homo*, however, is Sarah Kofman, in the two volumes in French that she has dedicated to this text, entitled *Explosion I* and *Explosion II* (1992, 1993). Kofman deconstructs the two myths that accompanied the text: that it is an 'autobiography', and, in addition, one written by a crazy person. She also shows how textuality as such constitutes the pluralistic identity of the ego 'Nietzsche'. She reads Nietzsche not through Heidegger, but through Freud [17]. In my opinion Kofman has *three fundamental interpretive propositions*. 1. This 'autobiography' is a work of mourning, in which Nietzsche rejects his masks and places of refuge, in order to form the centre and the unity of himself as fate. This is an excellent point: I would call this a work of abstraction and concentration, schematisation, moulding and compaction. 2. *Behold the Man* is the most de-personalised autobiography. The 'I' or 'ego' is an accumulation of exploding forces. 3. The work is a parody of the Christian event in which Christ is transformed into a symbol of paganism, Dionysus. It is about highlighting a carnival multiplicity, so the text is 'satirical' [13]. Nietzsche writes in support: "I am a disciple of the philosopher Dionysus; I would rather be a satyr than a saint" [26]. I would not like to comment further on these fruitful remarks by Kofman. Let me just briefly summarise four additional interpretations of *Ecce Homo*.

According to Andreas Urs Sommer, the various draft titles

Critical Edition of the Complete Works and Letters, based on the critical text by G. Colli and M. Montinari, Berlin, New York, de Gruyter, 1967-, edited by Paolo D'Iorio, available at: <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB>. I also use two English translations: 1. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings*, Edited by A. Ridley, J. Norman, Transl. by J. Norman, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005 and 2. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Case of Wagner, Twilight of the Idols, The Antichrist, Ecce Homo, Dionysus Dithyrambs, Nietzsche Contra Wagner*, The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, edited by Alan D. Schrift, Duncan Large, and Adrian Del Caro, Volume Nine, Translated by Adrian Del Caro et al., Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 2021.

of *Ecce Homo*, along with the numerous revisions of the arguments, show that this peculiar text is not an autobiography, but a positive 'auto-genealogy', where the 'interconnectedness of Nietzsche's thought and life' works "as a strategy of underpinning and elevation" of his philosophical ideas [36]. David Parry, in his juxtaposition between Vico, Descartes and Nietzsche's autobiographical writings, traces the peculiar 'I' being constructed in all of them. He writes: "The tranquil and solitary 'I' of Descartes is replaced by the ecstatic 'I' of the Nietzschean 'great health' [...] Although Nietzsche's method may be understood as 'genetic', the genesis is Nietzsche's physiology, not, like Vico's, his history" [30]. Under this light, Nietzsche's *Ecce Homo* is a radicalised version of modern Cartesian subjectivity, where the focus is on the repeated oscillation between health and illness, ascent and decline: physiology replaces method [30]. Carl Pletsch, on the other hand, prefers to compare Nietzsche with Kierkegaard, claiming that a common feature runs through their respective literary testaments as autobiographies: *auto-interpretation*. Both these writers interpret themselves as geniuses and construct their narrated lives as a *heroic, even mythical journey*, creating 'fictions of themselves' in anticipation of their future readers and biographers [31]. This prominent fictional element of *Ecce Homo*, along with its prefaces to Nietzsche's previous books, create a 'mysterious mixture', according to Nicholas More, that is in need of careful interpretation. More contends that *Ecce Homo* is a satire, a parody of autobiography and philosophy, following the typical features of this genre: wit and exaggeration over logic and argumentation. His argument seems convincing to me. The ancient source of satire is *Menippus*, where an atmosphere of joyful relativity creates a carnival sense of the world. Extreme hyperbole, unreliable narrators and illogical shifts in intention complete the picture. More believes that behind the satirical character of Nietzsche's *Ecce Homo* lies a secret influence, Petronius, and an ironic doubling [21]. He writes: "Irony depends on a surface meaning and a second, often opposed meaning. We see this in *Ecce Homo's* pregnant title, by which Nietzsche configures himself with a serio-comically blasphemous reference to the words with which Pilate introduced Jesus prior to the Nazarene's crucifixion, thus marking Nietzsche himself as sufferer and mocker, the presented and the presenter" [21].

I will now, after describing the general framework of *Ecce Homo's* project, proceed to my own interpretive proposal. In my re-reading of the work, I gradually began to realise, as I mentioned earlier, that this book takes the textual place of an unrecognised philosophical problem for Nietzsche: the problem of the *importance of place* for human life. This problem is inextricably linked to the body, and the importance of the body (*Leib*). After all, the term *Leib* occurs two hundred and ninety-two (292) times in the text of the entire Nietzschean corpus, while the term *Körper* appears only one hundred and ten times (110). Everyone who knows the significance of this distinction in the phenomenological philosophy of the 20th century (Husserl, Heidegger) will

understand the pioneering importance of these Nietzschean conceptual determinants. Karsten Harries, while reviewing Eric Blondel's major work on the relationship between body and culture in Nietzsche, writes: "*Nietzsche attempts to think the body as interpreting thought, and tries to 'articulate the body's saying (dire) as the conditions of possibility for culture in general'*" [11]. The body articulates a 'reality of drives', the vital ground of the outside world that operates as the crucial turning point from metaphysics to genealogy [11]. For me there are thus two central conceptual indexes of Nietzsche's later work: the *place* and the *body*. There is a correlation between them. The elevation of the body (and its physiology) is aimed at opposing idealism and Christianity. The emergence of *place* aims to oppose the abstract character of '*space*' cultivated by scientific 'positivism' ('scientific' philosophy), from Newton to Kant: double polemics. Of course, Nietzsche has already shown his particular tendency to comment and highlight the issue of place through his letters to his friends, for example to Franz Overbeck (April 14, 1887) or Heinrich Köselitz (April 19, 1887).⁵ The problem of choosing a place to live and work, and Nietzsche's relationship with it, a relationship of love or hate, seems to be of vital importance to the philosopher-poet, to the extent that it becomes an obsession. Multiple such references can be traced in his correspondence. But it is in *Ecce Homo* that these sporadic remarks acquire the character of a more systematic exposition of a 'worldview', a way of life and thought.

What I would call the *meteorological, atmospheric, topological, and geographical metaphor of thought* already strikes the mind of the suspicious reader in the *Preface*. Stephan Günzel calls this predominance of geographical landscape and mountaineering metaphors in Nietzsche, a 'geophilosophy', borrowing the term from Deleuze and Guattari. He rightly observes that Nietzsche's depiction of these theatrical, allegorical landscapes (or should we say 'virtual territories?'), focuses less on their visual attributes, and more on tactile and somatic descriptions: climate, temperature, humidity [9]. Nietzsche constantly talks about the health of humanity: how it depends on the 'strong air of the heights', the special atmosphere that blows in his texts (especially in *Zarathustra*), which is a product of philosophical life in the snow, ice and the high mountains. This atmosphere allows free breathing and merges with a musical metaphor: the 'halcyon tone' of an 'infinite fullness of light', which has the tempo of a tender adagio [26]. In the first part of the text, which consists of eight (8)

paragraphs [hereinafter: §], entitled 'Why I Am So Wise', these initial predispositions are gradually developed and unfolded in an impressive fusion of their metaphorical meaning with the *literal, real reference to places*: Basel, St. Moritz, Naumburg, Genoa, Weimar, Sils-Maria, Bayreuth. Nietzsche constructs here a new *topological ethics*, based on the bipolar life (health)/disease, and the physiology of the body. He medicalises thought, reduces psychological behaviour to physiology, which is now organically related to meteorological-geographical 'metaphors' as *literal references*: the sun/shadow contrast (§1), the instinct (§2), humanity as an 'out of tune instrument' (§4) (again the musical metaphor of attunement), metabolism (§6), hygiene (§6) and cleanliness (§8), come to complement this original view of real places [26]. Let's look at four typical quotes [26, 28]:

In my thirty-sixth year I reached the lowest point of my vitality...at the time – it was 1879 – I gave up my professorship in Basel, lived through the summer in St. Moritz like a shadow and the next winter, the most sun-starved of my life, as a shadow in Naumburg [...] the following winter, my first in Genoa, that sweetening and inspiration which is practically dependent on extreme lack of blood and muscle brought forth Dawn. The perfect brightness and cheerfulness, indeed, exuberance of spirit mirrored by the said work, is, with me, consistent not just with the deepest physiological weakness, but even with an excess of a feeling of pain. (§ 1).

And basically, how can one recognise that someone has turned out well! [...] what does not kill him makes him stronger. He instinctively collects his own sum from everything he sees, hears, experiences: he is a principle of selection, rejecting a great deal. He is always in his own company, whether dealing with books, humans or landscapes: he honours by choosing, he allows, by placing trust. He reacts to any kind of stimulus slowly, with that slowness inculcated by long circumspection and studied pride – he scrutinises the approaching stimulus and has no intention of going to meet it [...] well then, I am the opposite of a decadent: for I have just described myself. (§ 2).

Perhaps the best example was Heinrich von Stein, who died unforgivably young, and who once [...] turned up in Sils-Maria for three days, telling everyone that he had not come on account of the Engadine. This excellent human being [...] was during these three days as though transformed by a gust of freedom, like one who is suddenly raised to his height and takes wing. I always told him the good air up here does that, it is the same with everyone, not for nothing are we 6000 feet above Bayreuth – but he didn't want to believe me... (§ 4).

The patient has just one great cure – I call it Russian fatalism, that fatalism without revolt with which a Russian soldier, for whom the campaign is getting too hard, finally lies down in the snow. Taking nothing more, taking nothing more on, taking nothing more in – not reacting at all anymore [...] The great good sense of this fatalism [...] as

⁵ My references to Nietzsche's letters follow the publication Friedrich Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Briefe: Kritische Studienausgabe*, ed. Giorgio Colli, Mazzino Montinari, 8 volumes, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag and de Gruyter, Munich, 1986, as it is transcribed in the digital version: Friedrich Nietzsche, *Digital Critical Edition of the Complete Works and Letters*, based on the critical text by G. Colli and M. Montinari, Berlin, New York, de Gruyter, 1967-, edited by Paolo D'Iorio, available at: <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB>. For the letter to Franz Overbeck see: <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/BVN-1887,831>. For the letter to Heinrich Köselitz, see: Nietzsche Source — Digitale Kritische Gesamtausgabe Werke und Briefe (eKGWB), BVN-1887,834 [accessed 14.8.2021]

something that supports life in the most life-threatening circumstances, is the reduction of metabolism, its slowing down, a sort of will to hibernation. A few steps further with this logic and you have the fakir, who sleeps in a grave for weeks... (§6).

Nietzsche exposes here the healthy ethics of an 'aristocratic', noble lifestyle of absolute loneliness and a safe distance from external stimuli, where good physiology, the health of the body, is paradoxically closely related to *time* and *place*, geographical location, and atmosphere. While, on the one hand, Nietzsche emphasises the process of being cut off from the stimuli of his environment (books, people, landscapes), the control of reactions, as a condition of good physiology, and the overcoming of disease (§2), on the other hand, it is precisely this sensual contact with the outside place-world, the fatalistic surrender or immersion in it (the example of the Russian soldier and the fakir of §6), that acts therapeutically, restoratively, and beneficially, in the creative life, and in health. Jeremy Fortier writes: "[...] for Nietzsche, good health is associated with forgetting of oneself, while ill health is associated with returning to oneself" [6]. We are presented with a dialectic of intensity, of constant vacillation between openness, 'being-outside-yourself' (*Ausser-sich-sein*), and withdrawal, a 'return to myself' [6]: a strange *dialectic of contradiction*. This rapid shift from psychological analysis to the 'physiological'-medical interpretation, and from there to the topographic sensitivity that characterises *Ecce Homo* is impressive.

This paradoxical fusion is exacerbated in the second part of the text, entitled 'Why I Am So Clever', which consists of ten (10) paragraphs. It is most important for Nietzsche's theory of place. It starts with a thought about the importance of physiology and *reality*, for well-being, in contrast to German idealism and theology: the right function of good nutrition, habits, climate, diet and location becomes the object of elaboration, with impressively detailed analyses. For example: "*In a climate that is very agaçant, tea first thing is not to be recommended: start by ordering a cup of strong, fat-free cocoa one hour before. Sit as little as possible; give no credence to any thought unless it is born in the fresh air when you are on the move – while your muscles are celebrating a festival as well. All prejudices proceed from the bowels*" [26, 28]. Quality of thought, virtue, strength, location, physiology and corporeal movement are therefore inextricably, indissolubly linked. In paragraph 2, Nietzsche moves on to a specific thematisation of the issue and question of place, as it relates to climate and creativity. It is worth quoting an extensive passage, because it is very difficult to summarise the density of the Nietzschean text [26, 28]:

Most closely related to the question of nourishment is the question of place and climate. Nobody is free to live everywhere [...] The influence of the climate on metabolism, slackening or accelerating it, is so great that a mistake in place or climate can not only alienate people from their task, but can completely rob them of it [...] The tempo of metabolism (Das tempo des Stoffwechsels) stands

in direct relationship to the fleetness or lameness of the spirit's feet; for the "spirit" itself is just a form of this metabolism. If you list the places where there are or have been brilliant human beings, where happiness included wit, refinement and malice, where genius almost from necessity made its home, they all have excellent dry air: Paris, Provence, Florence, Jerusalem, Athens – these names prove something: that genius is conditional upon dry air; a clear sky – in other words, on rapid metabolism and the possibility of repeatedly supplying oneself with great and even massive amounts of strength.

This is an impressive excerpt. One could say that Nietzsche adopts a kind of *environmental determinism* here: climate and place, considered together as an inseparable whole, influence the *rhythm of the body's metabolism*, defining the context, the necessary background, and the indispensable condition of thought and creativity. In fact, the 'spirit' is considered a subset of the metabolism, which depends on the level of humidity and meteorological conditions. Nietzsche complains that he spent much of his life in unsuitable, forbidden, destructive places for his physical and bodily constitution (*Un Glücks-Orte, verbotenen Orten*).⁶ I would call Nietzsche's view a kind of '*climatological regionalism*', where the basic assumption is that place has a decisive influence on the rhythm of the human body. If this influence is negative, then a protection from the place, a distance, an economy in the 'abuse of extraordinary energies' [26] is desperately required. Nietzsche further develops the entanglement of the negative effect of the place with the organism's instinct of self-preservation and self-defence, which he defines as 'taste' (*geschmack*), in paragraph eight (§8), where he writes [26, 28]:

Suppose I were to step outside my house and find, instead of peaceful, aristocratic Turin, a small German town: my instinct would have to put up barricades to press back anything that intrudes on it from this flattened and cowardly world. Or I might find the German city, this built-up depravity, where nothing grows, where every last thing, good or bad, is hauled in. Wouldn't I have to turn into a hedgehog at that point?

Here Nietzsche revisits the pattern of environmental control (see 'Why I Am So Wise', §2) as a filter of protection against negative stimuli. The importance that Nietzsche attributes to place as a field of influence is shown in the final, tenth paragraph of this section (§10). Here he juxtaposes diet, place, and climate, the 'petty things' of a 'casuistry of selfishness', as he calls it, with the fantasies and illusions of the opposing concepts (*begriffe*): God, the soul, virtue, the beyond, truth, and eternal life [26]. Nietzsche contrasts these 'lies' with the basic concerns of earthly life (*Grundangelegenheiten des Lebens*).⁷

Is it possible that the effect of the place on the body and its metabolism is positive? This is a very important question. A quick look at the third part of *Ecce Homo*, entitled 'Why I Write Such Good Books', may provide an answer. What is

6 <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/EH-Klug-2> [accessed: 21.4.2020].

7 <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/EH-Klug-10> [accessed: 21.4.2020].

striking in this section, is the emphasis on the great importance of place for Nietzsche, which confirms my argument so far. As he analyses and evaluates all his published books up to 1888, the German thinker always refers to the place (and time) in which he conceived and wrote them, in great detail, as if they bear the seal, or the stigma of the unity of the *chronotope* in which they were created. Books become ‘places’ and locations to record thought, but also *indicators* of where that thought took place. I argue that place in Nietzsche is *never a simple location*, never a *simple background* for an activity: place is so organically amalgamated into the creative action of Nietzsche’s body and mind (either negatively or positively) that it is the protagonist; almost, we could say, *a character of his thought*. Nietzsche’s place attachment (or detachment) is always passionate, it has the intensity and poignancy of an erotic attraction or repulsion. Place in Nietzsche is an agent, something extremely alive, dynamic, organic, changeable, and mercurial, that actively participates in the life and thought of the creative subject. Each place has a unique personality. The importance of Nietzsche’s workplaces has been thoroughly documented in *The Good European. Nietzsche’s Work Sites in Word and Image* [16]. Perhaps it would suffice to cite some descriptions by Nietzsche himself [26, 28]:

[The Birth of Tragedy] [...] nobody would ever dream that it was begun amidst the thunder of the Battle of Wörth. I thought through these problems before the walls of Metz, in cold September nights, in the middle of my service as a medical orderly.

[Human, All Too Human] The beginnings of this book belong to the weeks of the first Bayreuth festival; one of its preconditions was a deep alienation from everything that surrounded me there [...] So where was I? I did not recognise a thing, I hardly recognised Wagner. In vain I leafed through my memories. Tribschen – a far distant Blessed Isle: not a shadow of similarity...Enough, in the midst of it all, I left for a few weeks, very suddenly [...] at Klingenbrunn, a town hidden deep in the Bohemian forest, I carried around my melancholy and contempt for Germans like a sickness.

[Dawn] [...] in the whole book there is not one negative word, no attack, no malice – rather, that it lies in the sun, round, happy, like a sea-creature sunning itself between the rocks. Ultimately, it was me, that sea-creature: nearly every proposition in the book is thought up, caught up in that tumble of rocks near Genoa, where I was alone and still shared secrets with the sea.⁸

[Thus Spoke Zarathustra] That day, I walked along Lake Silvaplana through the woods; I came to a halt at a mighty boulder soaring into a pyramid not far from Surlei. That’s where this this thought came to me [...] I spent the winter that followed in the charming, peaceful bay of Rapallo

near Genoa, carved out between Chiavari and the foothills of Porto Fino [...] a cold winter and unseasonably wet; a small albergo, situated right by the sea, so that at night, the high sea made sleep impossible, offered more or less the opposite of what could be desired [...] In the mornings, I set off for the heights in a southerly direction along the glorious road to Zoagli, past pines and looking down on the panorama of the sea; in the afternoons, as often as my health permitted, I walked round the whole bay from Santa Margherita right up to Porto Fino. This place and its surroundings were dearer to my heart [...] in autumn of 1886, I happened to be on this coast again [...] on these two pathways, the whole of the first book of Zarathustra came to me, especially Zarathustra himself, as a type: more correctly, he overcame me...

Is there more evidence for the site-specific sensitivity of Nietzsche’s thought than the above passages? Of course they represent a small portion of all the relevant quotes from *Ecce Homo*, but they are enough for here. What philosopher bothers to give such extensive descriptions of the environment in which they conceive their works? Why do they do it? Does the concept of place acquire organic significance for Nietzsche’s argument about the need for self-preservation, the renewal of the energies of the organism (*Organismus, Kraftersatz*), the enhancement of life and the ‘natural instincts’, and the strength of the body (*Kraftsteigerung des Leibes*), in contrast to putting the ‘salvation of the soul’ first as an ideal [26]?⁹ I think we have to answer in the affirmative: the use of the *conceptual index of place* has a polemical significance against the ‘soul’ and the ‘spirit’, ‘idealism’ and Christianity. ‘Place’ is integrated with the index ‘body’. It is enough to look at paragraphs seven and eight (§ 7, 8) of the fourth, last, part of *Ecce Homo*, entitled ‘Why I am a Destiny’. Nietzsche, at fever pitch, concentrates his combative opposition to the Christian ideal of unselfish morality as anti-nature: “ [...] people taught contempt for the very first instincts of life [*Instinkte des Lebens*]; they made up a ‘soul’ [*Seele*], a ‘spirit’ [*Geist*], to bring shame upon the body [*Leib*]” [26, 28].¹⁰ God was conceived as the opposite concept to life, his ‘true world’ of the beyond was then opposed and contrasted to the only real world, the Earth, and, consequently, the immortal soul devalued the body. According to Nietzsche, the only important things in life are nutrition, residence, the dwelling place (*Wohnung*), spiritual diet, weather, and cleanliness: not the salvation of the soul but health and hygiene [26].¹¹ This sums up the importance that Nietzsche imputes to the local conditions of embodied existence, to the material environment of life. Nietzsche’s concept of ‘place’ has become a fully developed philosophical theme in *Ecce Homo*.

8 For more biographical and anecdotal information on Nietzsche’s special residence in Genoa see: Joachim Köhler, *Zarathustra’s Secret. The Interior Life of Friedrich Nietzsche*, 166-169.

9 <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/EH-M-2> [accessed: 22.4.2020].

10 <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/EH-Schicksal-7> [accessed: 22.4.2020].

11 <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/EH-Schicksal-8> [accessed: 22.4.2020].

3. Place, Creative Inspiration and *Stimmung*: Structural Interrelations

There are two key questions: What is the relationship between place and creativity in Nietzsche's thinking? Is there a functional or structural connection between them? In this third section of the paper I will attempt to answer this through a synthetic interpretive logic, starting with *Ecce Homo* and extending to other texts by Nietzsche. In this peculiar autobiography, we saw that a thread begins to emerge which illuminates and guides the question of whether place can have a beneficial effect and influence on the 'great health' (*grosse Gesundheit*), as Nietzsche calls it, which is geographically and topologically related to an "ideal Mediterranean" [26]. Nietzsche gives an affirmative answer in the important section on the development and genesis of *Zarathustra*, especially in the fourth paragraph. It is probably the first time that place, as an environment of creation and its factor, is evaluated positively. Let's read the following passage carefully [26, 28]:¹²

The following winter, under the halcyon sky of Nice that shone into my life for the first time, I found the third Zarathustra [...] many hidden spots and heights in the landscape of Nice have become sacred to me by unforgettable moments; that decisive section bearing the title "On Old and New Tablets" was thought up as I climbed laboriously from the station to Eza, that wonderful Moorish aerie – my muscular agility has always been at its greatest when my creative energy is in full flow. The body is inspired: let's leave the "soul" out of it [Der Leib ist begeistert: lassen wir die 'Seele' aus dem Spiele].. You could often have seen me dancing; that was when I could walk in mountains for seven, eight hours with no notion of fatigue.

'The body is inspired', in an indissoluble unity of place and creative energy. Here is the proof of my initial working hypothesis: there are two hidden, suppressed, neglected, forgotten pivotal conceptual indicators in *Ecce Homo*: place and body. There is a kinaesthetic correlation between them, *for the sake of creative inspiration*. But should we interpret this interrelationship in the light of the immediately preceding paragraph (§3), where Nietzsche develops his notion of 'inspiration'? I quote, at length [26, 28]:¹³

You hear, you do not seek; you take, you do not ask who gives; like lightning, a thought lights up, inescapable, unhesitating as to its form – I never had a choice. A rapture whose immense tension occasionally erupts in a flood of tears, while your step involuntarily races then slackens; you feel completely outside yourself, with the most distinct consciousness of countless faint shivers and tingles right down to your toes; you have a feeling of deep bliss where what is most painful and upsetting does not have a contradictory effect but instead acts as conditioned, demanded, as a necessary colour within such a superfluity

of light; an instinct for rhythmic connections that spans forms of vast extent – the length, the requirement for a wide-spanned rhythm is almost the measure for the power of inspiration, a sort of compensation for its pressure and tension [...] All this takes place completely involuntarily, but as though in a tumult of feeling free, of being unrestricted, of power and divinity...

Inspiration is presented here as an ecstasy of the human body oriented towards the outside, a kind of 'opening' to the environment, the place. The body is inspired. According to Nietzsche, inspiration has two main features or attributes, which I reconstruct as the deterministic necessity of a quasi-natural phenomenon (metaphors of lightning, torrent, storm), and the *architectural metaphor* of the freedom of a rhythmic instinct of spatial relations and connections (*ein Instinkt rhythmischer Verhältnisse*) that bridges, like an arch. It has contradictory properties: necessity and freedom, nature and architecture. The body surrenders to the place, to its 'power', as we would call it, 'dissolves' to the outside, and, at the same time, the physiology of the rhythm of this co-stimulation, this *attunement*, gives birth to a constructivist impulse, a *counter-instinct of order* that connects and affiliates, balancing this external pressure. It is like seeing the Dionysian-Apollonian struggle, as shown in *The Birth of Tragedy*,¹⁴ adapted to a psychology or physiology of creativity. We observe a constant movement, a dialectical oscillation between *the outside and the inside, the place and the body, the opening and the closing*, analogous to the one we had previously identified between the process of being cut off from the stimuli of the environment, the control of reactions, as a condition of good physiology, and the sensual contact with the outside world, of the fatalistic abandonment or immersion in it, which acts equally therapeutically, restoratively, and beneficially, in favour of the creative life and health. The coherence of Nietzsche's thought here is striking. It is a latent coherence, of course, which requires a tense reading and interpretive predisposition. Now, we can readily see how the sequence of this dialectical oscillation has been reversed in the description of the process of inspiration by Nietzsche: first the body consolidates with the place, dissolves in the outside, sinks into a reservoir of electric energy, loses its ego, is charged, and then, through the rhythmic instinct, attempts to absorb this energy shock, the pressure of the outside environment, to transform and solidify it into creative correlations of spaces and forms. The incorporation and the attunement of the duality place-body is thus a necessary step, the first structural moment, in the creative process. However, and this is especially worth emphasising, the 'Dionysian' stage cannot offer creative crystallisation, rhythm, tone, or symbolism. The second moment, that of 'Apollonian' delineation, is the rhythmic shaping and schematisation of body-place coordination. It is clearly a process of distancing oneself from affective wild

¹² <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/EH-ZA-4> [accessed: 22.4.2020].

¹³ <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/EH-ZA-3> [accessed: 22.4.2020].

¹⁴ *The Birth of Tragedy*: BT: Nietzsche Source — Digitale Kritische Gesamtausgabe Werke und Briefe (eKGWB), GT-1 [accessed 15.8.2021].

excitement, abstracting from stimuli, and regaining control. The primary, raw experience is mediated, and processed. But what exactly is this ‘rhythm instinct’? What purpose does it serve? We can find an answer if we refer to the fourth paragraph (§4) of the section ‘Why I Write Such Good Books’, in *Ecce Homo*, where Nietzsche talks about the ‘art of style’ (*Kunst des Stils*). There, we read [26, 28]:¹⁵

To communicate a state, an inner tension of pathos (innere Spannung von Pathos), through signs, including the tempo of these signs (tempo dieser Zeichen) – that is the meaning of every style. Every style is good that really communicates an inner state (innerer Zustand) – that does not mix up signs, the tempo of signs (Zeichen), gestures (Gebärden) – all laws of rhetorical punctuation are the art of gesture [...] I was the first to discover how to make the art of great rhythm (grossen Rhythmus), the great style (grosse Stil) of rhetorical punctuation into the expression of an immense ebb and flow of sublime, superhuman passion.

The supreme purpose of ‘rhythmic instinct’ is therefore the birth of the art of ‘great style’, which is based and founded on the ‘great rhythm’ of bodily gestures that communicate internal states of passion externally, through signs. The place-inspired body is filled with tensions of passion, which it transforms through the ‘rhythmic instinct’ into style. I argue that the ‘rhythm of style’ is somehow reduced to that initial ‘rhythm of metabolism’, which binds and anchors the body to the place that surrounds it. It would be worthwhile here to compare a characteristic quote from the twenty-eighth paragraph (§28) of *Beyond Good and Evil*, where Nietzsche talks about the difficulty of translating the ‘rhythm of its style’ from one language to another. The above translation is impossible, because this rhythm is reduced to the rhythm of the metabolism of its people, and therefore it is intimately related to the unique peculiarities of the place that gave birth to it, as a form of expression, as a system of signs. His thinking is completely coherent. I quote: “*But how can the German language, even if it is in the prose of Lessing, imitate the tempo of Machiavelli, who, in his The Prince, lets the dry, fine air of Florence breathe and cannot avoid presenting the most serious matter in an irrepressible Allegrissimo*”.¹⁶ Another important passage, from the *Twilight of the Idols*, further clarifies this process of physical, metabolic, topological and rhythmic redefinition of creativity. This is the tenth paragraph of the “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man” [26, 28].¹⁷ Nietzsche writes:

Apollonian intoxication chiefly holds the eye aroused so that it receives the power of vision. The painter, sculptor, epic poet are visionaries par excellence. By contrast, in the Dionysian state (Zustande) the whole system of affects

(Affekt-System) is aroused and heightened: so that it unleashes all its methods of expression at once, and at the same time drives out the power of representation, reproduction, transfiguration, transformation, every kind of mimicry and playacting. The essential thing remains the ease of metamorphosis, the inability not to react [...] It is impossible for the Dionysian human not to respond to any suggestion, he ignores no signal from the affects (Zeichen des Affekts) [...] Music as we understand it today is likewise a complete arousal and unleashing of the affects, but even so, it is just the leftovers of a much fuller world of expressive affects (Ausdrucks-Welt des Affekts), a mere residuum of Dionysian histrionics [...] To make music possible as a special art form, a number of senses had to be immobilised, above all the muscular sense (relatively, at least: for to a certain extent all rhythm still speaks to our muscles).

Here, the process of inspiration is clarified under the category of ‘Dionysian’ intoxication, as described in *Ecce Homo*. The word *Affekt* replaces the term *Pathos*, while the terms *Zustand*, *Zeichen* and *Rhythmus* remain common in both passages. We see the same fatalistic surrender of the ego to the outside (impotence of non-reaction), the same seizure and activation of the body as a whole organism, the same emphasis on the muscular sense, the rhythm, the gesture, and movement. The ‘big rhythm’ that the late Nietzsche aims at is therefore derived from a holistic stimulation of the bodily scheme, of corporeal empathy, which does not primarily reward vision and oculo-centrism, but the *overall affective system of the human organism*. The word *Affekt*, as an influence and effect, as a passion of moods, compresses this ‘dancing’, theatrical, bodily philosophy of creativity [26]. The totally activated body will deliver its topological charge by expressing an inner mood, an affective state, through a correspondingly total art-gesture, the art of great style. Let us remember here the aphorism of Ludwig Wittgenstein from 1932-1934 [§ 26-26e]: “*Remember the impression made by good architecture, that it expresses a thought (Gedanken). One would like to respond to it too with a gesture*” [37]. If we replace the word ‘thought’ with the concept of ‘mood’ or ‘affective state’, we have the *Nietzschean philosophy of architecture*. But beware: Nietzsche, in his Letter 1097 to Carl Fuchs, in August 1888, from Sils-Maria, emphasises how this affective bodily condition must be mediated by a process of regulation, eurhythmy, order, and schematisation. He writes: “*Rhythm in the ancient mind is, morally and aesthetically, the rein placed on passion*”.¹⁸ The great style cannot come exclusively from a Dionysian state: the modern, pathological ‘rhythm of the affect’ (*Affekt-Rhythmik*) must be dominated by the ancient ethos of the ‘rhythm of time’ (*Zeit-Rhythmik*).¹⁹ Empathy must be tamed and harnessed by *abstraction* [27], to use Wilhelm Worringer’s familiar conceptual dichotomy [39].

15 Nietzsche Source — Digitale Kritische Gesamtausgabe Werke und Briefe (eKGWB), EH-Bücher-4 [accessed: 15.8.2021].

16 Beyond Good and Evil: BGE: Nietzsche Source — Digitale Kritische Gesamtausgabe Werke und Briefe (eKGWB), JGB-28 [accessed: 15.8.2021]. My translation.

17 TI: <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/GD-Streifzuege-10> [accessed: 22.4.2020].

18 <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/BVN-1888>, 1097 [accessed: 15.8.2021]. My translation.

19 <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/BVN-1888>, 1097 [accessed: 23.4.2020]. My translation.

What is Nietzsche looking for in raising the issue of place, as codified in *Ecce Homo*? Can place contribute positively to the creative process? I argue that the answer should be in the affirmative. Nietzsche seems to be looking for binding environments, of a pungent character and *genius loci*, that will have a stimulating effect on the body, its physiology, mood and metabolism. He is looking for places with a strong personality, which, through great style, will give birth to a corresponding bodily rhythm in order to trigger inspiration. This inspiration will then undergo a transformation into external rhythmic relationships that rise like an arch over large spaces of forms. This constant dialectic of the inside (temperament, mood) with the outside (place), of the body with the environment, is inscribed in what is called the 'hygienic geography' of the late Nietzsche.

According to Stanley Corngold's article entitled "Nietzsche's Moods", the concept of *Affect* replaced, in Nietzsche's later work, the word and concept of *Stimmung* [27], meaning 'mood', which the German thinker 'rejected', due to the need for a harder, harsher language for the 'will to power' [5]. Martha Kendal Woodruff rightly claims that we can detect an intermediary step in this process: Nietzsche's turn from '*Stimmung*' to '*Leidenschaft*' (Passion), in the Middle Writings. In the *Joyful Science*, for instance, passion is seen as a positive 'material' to be transformed into joy, into a higher affective realm. All affects as passions are therefore embodied and evolving, requiring a new philosophical method: genealogy [38]. As Corngold observes, the early Nietzschean romanticism of moods shows the anti-intellectualism of a constant outward movement, where consciousness is always emotionally and affectively attuned, as it suffers the external pressure of world events [5]. However, let us note that the weather, and meteorological (stormy conditions), oenological and biological metaphors for the correlation of internal and external elements and conditions of the experience of place [5] are common to both terms, *Affekt* and *Stimmung*, proving a greater coherence between early and later Nietzsche than Corngold admits. The term *Stimmung*, however, has more (negative) psycho-theological overtones, and Nietzsche's use of this term in many passages,²⁰ especially in the middle period of his work, shows that he is fully aware of the fact. The use of the term *Stimmung* by the early (and middle) Nietzsche shows its connection with the previous intellectual tradition in Germany, the Romantic-Idealist thought-matrix (Kant-Schiller-Goethe-Hölderlin) [5].²¹ In fact, Nietzsche reaches the point, in *Human, All Too Human*, of defining the self as "a changing sphere of opinions and moods" (*wandelnde Sphäre der Meinungen und Stimmungen*) [27].²² Breaking

with this tradition means that the late Nietzsche replaces *Stimmung* with *Affekt*, and essentially allows the intimate, functional and structural interrelationship between body, place and environment to emerge, while maintaining the exceptional variability and instability of this relationship as a deep, fundamental property. Nietzsche's philosophy is not static: it follows the fluctuations of the organic, *the evolution of life*, its rhythm/metabolism. In his crystal-like and systematic study titled *Schopenhauer and Nietzsche*, Georg Simmel evaluates the importance of Darwinian theory to Nietzsche's philosophical interpretation of the concept of life. He writes: "*Nietzsche takes a totally new concept of life from the idea of evolution: life is in itself, in its intimate and innermost essence, an increase, maximisation, and growing concentration of the surrounding power of the universe in the subject. Through this innate urge and the essential affirmation of increase, enrichment, and value perfection, life can become the goal of life. This image of life is a poetical-philosophical absolutisation of the Darwinian idea of evolution*" [32].

So let us try to schematise what we have said so far in a conceptual structure of fundamental indicators and their architectural properties, which summarise Nietzsche's radical conception of place. German thinker-poet's relationship with the concept of place is ambiguous, vacillating, uncertain and precarious: it is governed by the oscillation that characterises the dialectical conflict between the body and its material environment, the self and place, the I and its locality, as described and reconstructed in *Ecce Homo*. It is a dynamic, kinetic, ever-changing dialectic of *attraction/repulsion, fusion/distance, identification/alienation*. If the metabolic rhythm of the body is coordinated and attuned with the style and rhythm of a place, then the two poles are observed to enter a process of convergence, which enhances the inspiration and generates, triggers positive, happy, ecstatic affects and moods. The ego opens to the outside, is left to an attractive force, and surrenders to the charm of the place, the Dionysian impulse, the attraction of illusion, of wandering. There is a strong body/place interaction, a real intersection between them: the boundaries are porous, soft. The ego dissolves. It is a condition of the body's complete openness to the stimuli of the environment, to the extent that it loses the freedom and will to choose.

If there is disharmony, repulsive force, and a disjunction of body rhythm and place structure, then we can observe a process of deviation, a separation of the two poles: the ego withdraws to itself, is cut off, detached, seeks control of the harmful environment, aims for a process of 'closure' away from the threatening outside, and longs for protection: it raises 'walls'. The moods (*Stimmungen*) here are defensive and melancholic, activating the Apollonian impulse for absolute supervision, for a total intuition. The boundaries are impenetrable, the distance is unbridgeable. It is a condition of complete closure of the body to the stimuli that surround it, and of inclusion, to the extent that it controls the stimuli satisfactorily through the intellect. It is the recovery of the ego. This ambiguous dialectic (diffusion/excision) shows that

20 Dawn: D: Nietzsche Source — Digitale Kritische Gesamtausgabe Werke und Briefe (eKGWB), M-28 [accessed: 15.8.2021]. Here *Stimmung* is interpreted as "prejudice" and "superstition" stemming from a false belief in God.

21 For Nietzsche's indebtedness to Schiller, see the well-known reference to *Stimmung* in §5 of BT: Nietzsche Source — Digitale Kritische Gesamtausgabe Werke und Briefe (eKGWB), GT-5 [accessed 15.8.2021].

22 HH: <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/MA-376> [accessed: 23.4.2020].

for Nietzsche place is not something static (nor is the body/ego). The body/ego relationship with place shows a dynamic, conflicting, agonistic character, sometimes more peaceful, sometimes more pugnacious, expressed as strife between opposing forces: that is, as a struggle between control and determinism, freedom of choice and necessity.

In his early work *On Moods (Über Stimmungen, 1864)*, Nietzsche formulated a war (or war-like) model (*Streit, Kampf*)²³ of the interrelationship between the individual human psyche and the material/atmospheric environment [24]. According to my own reading of this remarkable literary text, 'mood' is a battle between memory (thought) and desire (lust-for-life), in which inner affective feelings and external experiences merge. The 'soul' here is already of the same substantial order (*Stoff*) as the event (*Ereignis*), leading to the collapse of the Cartesian dualism between mind and thing (extension). The body and the mind converge on things of the outside place, to the point that the interrelationship between internal and external reactions disintegrates. This is perhaps what Graham Parks called 'radical hylozoism', or 'panpsychism', namely the idea of a continuum between human and organic spheres, in Nietzsche [38, 29]. The concept of 'rhythm' appeared here (*Rhythmen*), related to affect, twenty-four years before *Ecce Homo!* [25] We are presented with a radical, materialistic epistemological model defined not by logic or knowledge, nor by faith, but by intuition, temperament, affect and will.

Nietzsche came into contact with materialism through Albert Lange's book entitled *Geschichte des Materialismus*, in the summer of 1866. He also read the second edition carefully, in 1887. His intensive reading of science books [34] (chemistry, thermodynamics) continued in 1873 (Kopp, Ladenburg, Mohr). In 1881 he read a book by J. R. Mayer about heat engineering.²⁴ Arthur Schopenhauer, in a 'realistic' critique of German Idealism, beautifully mapped by Günter Zöller, had already made this epistemological shift: from *Reason* to *Will (Wille)*. In fact, he has identified the will with the organic body (*organischer Leib*) [40]. Nietzsche extends the same research program (Lakatos): he seems to want to take advantage of the whole lexical range that is opposed to reason, logic and spirit. It is no coincidence that there is not even one mention of the term *Übereinstimmung*, which characterises Goethe's worldview, in Nietzsche's corpus. For Nietzsche, and in the agonistic model he proposes, a universal, spiritual-mental harmonisation with the environment is something forbidden. The architectural 'spatiality' of this model refers to a *correlation of forces*, not entities, things (objects) or distinct, structured, constituted individualities (subjects). Intensity, attraction/repulsion, the tendency of 'forces': should we look

for Nietzsche's epistemological model in engineering, chemistry or thermodynamics? Nietzsche's materialistic rupture with the idealistic/Kantian tradition of the rational/psychic subject is already evident in the book *Human, All Too Human*, when he speaks of the 'chemistry of ideas and sensations' (§1) [27]. It is interesting to note that this rupture is introduced, in the *Case of Wagner*, through a meteorological/geographical prism: the transition from the cloudy, 'grey', gruesome, ugly, cold, heavy north weather to the halcyon, dancing, graceful, bright 'shiver' of southern light and weather, and the lightness of the smooth sea [26]. *Human, All Too Human* develops a psycho-analytical/psycho-dynamic of moods as units, streams and complexes of tendencies and forces [27].

Nietzsche's materialism is dynamic: he follows the 'common Leibnicians' of his day, such as Johann Gustav Vogt, who opposed the English version of empiricism, and emphasised 'inner forces' within matter. Nietzsche goes one step further. He denies the things-that-last: for the German thinker there are forces-that-act, unstable, non-permanent, which fill the space everywhere. The centres of force and power have replaced the solid atoms of classical materialism [34]. What is worth bearing in mind is how, for Nietzsche, as shown in paragraphs 1064 and 1067 of the *Will to Power*, the essence of power is fluid and constantly changing, but nevertheless, the world is placed in a *definite space*, as *defined force* [23].²⁵ What does this mean? It means simply that there is an internal, organic correlation between power and the meaning of place in Nietzsche. Designated, definite, determinate space means place. This connection is clearly demonstrated in one of the surviving fragments from 1877, where Nietzsche writes: "*Power (force) resides in a certain object, is tied to a locality (Die Kraft wohnt in einem bestimmten Gegenstand, ist an eine Lokalität gebunden)*".²⁶ Is every living body (*Leib*) such a definite centre of power? The answers to the questions we asked at the beginning of the section are directly related to the crucial issue of the *body-power relationship*: if this relationship is ontologically and epistemologically necessary, then place is the set of complex temporal, functional correspondences and changing structural interrelationships between these multiple forces, namely the bodies that occupy it, filling the space. We instead have to look for the Nietzschean model of the above intensive, wavy, energy body-place function in chemistry and thermodynamics: it is like watching gas or fluid dynamics, where the boundaries between them sometimes harden, and sometimes become porous. In conclusion, creative inspiration is organically dependent on fluid, changing

23 As to the meaning of 'struggle' or 'contest' in early Nietzsche see the text *Homer's Wettkampf* in: Nietzsche Source — Digitale Kritische Gesamtausgabe Werke und Briefe (eKGWB), CV-CV5 [accessed: 15.8.2021].

24 *Nietzsche Chronicle*, available at: <https://www.dartmouth.edu/~fnchron/> [accessed: 23.4.2020]. For more information on this fascinating subject see the excellent book: Robin Small, *Nietzsche in Context*, Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot 2001, 147-150.

25 Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values*, Translated by A. M. Ludovici, Vol. II, Books III and IV, T.N. Foulis, Edinburgh and London 1910, 427-432, available at: The complete works of Friedrich Nietzsche. The first complete and authorized English translation: Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900: Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming: Internet Archive [accessed: 15.8.2021].

26 [http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/NF-1877,22\[117\]](http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/NF-1877,22[117]) [accessed: 28.4.2020]. My translation.

boundaries and interrelationships between bodies, *Stimmungen* and places.

4. Spatial Metaphors and Nietzschean Architectures: Future Perspectives

What are the consequences of the above philosophy of place and locality for contemporary architectural theory and practice? Can the idea of place in Nietzsche open up new horizons of meaning for architectural poetry? In the fourth and final section of this text I will attempt to answer these two questions by examining the spatial and architectural metaphors found in Nietzsche's texts. We have seen that for Nietzsche place is part of a dynamic, dialectical function and structural interrelationship with the body and its moods (*Stimmungen*) as an affective totality. This movement of the pendulum is captured by Nietzsche in a series of architectural/spatial metaphors, which seem to crystallise the polemics of forces into image-thoughts. At the same time, they shift the corporeal boundary, the body/place interface zone, to an architectural correspondence forming a 'shell', where this area acquires materiality: body and 'building' exchange properties. 'Architecture' is understood here as a mood of the body which has acquired a material expression in the place and the nature of the boundary between the ego and the world.

The tendency of the body to distance itself from the environment for defence, protection, isolation and absolute control of the outside, thus corresponds to the architectural metaphors of the tower,²⁷ the pyramid, the fortress, the *palazzo*, or the obelisk: a closed structure which is self-sufficient, defensive, and concentrated, with minimal permeability in relation to the place of the outside. It protects the body from the threats of this outside. The architectural and spatial metaphors of the labyrinth,²⁸ the cave,²⁹ the conduit or the stoa³⁰ correspond to the opposite tendency of the body merging with the place, creating proximity, diffusion and wandering, and the loss of the ego. The first three metaphors symbolise the loss of control, the fatalistic submission of the ego to a continuous, holistic, materialistic, deterministic rhythm, the loss of orientation and the inability to escape, to exit: a *confinement structure*, where the ego loses control and completely yields to the complex organization of this place. In the labyrinth, cave and burrow it is dark and you are 'blind': you coercively follow the unfolding of the corridors or the burrows. Place and the body are deterministically completely indissoluble, identified, and melted together. The second architectural metaphor, the stoa, describes a partially controlled, protected opening and freer

route and passage in public space: the filter between the private and the public. These architectural forms/types, which constitute *spatial archetypes*, should not be seen as Nietzsche's realistic or literal proposals for real environments: this would be a positivist fallacy, a simplistic epistemological realism and reductionism, to which most of the scholars of the collective volume "*Nietzsche and An Architecture of our Minds*" have fallen. At the end of this book, various and random quotes on architecture from Nietzsche's corpus are piled up by chance and do not make any sense at all [15]. The archetypes we have mentioned codify *metaphorically* the affective moods and the opposing tendencies of the dual, polemical, body/place relationship in architectural image-thoughts or, better, in architectural archetypes. Architectural spatial archetypes act here as metonyms or metaphors of a corporeal and gestural involvement with the place, the environment (*milieu*).³¹ I argue that they are allegorical crystallisations of the issue of *space control*. Only in this way, I believe, are we presented with a *genetic-structural explanation* of the *two families of spatial archetypes* in Nietzsche's thinking.

Otherwise, there is an immediate risk of plunging research into 'anecdotes of excerpts'. For example, this is what Sarah Kofman suffers from in her important study titled *Nietzsche and Metaphor*. According to her working hypothesis, Nietzsche's imaginary architectural metaphors are used to describe 'hierarchised systems of concepts' "*as symptoms of the health or sickness of their constructors: every construction is actually the expression of an internal architecture [...] of a certain hierarchisation of the drives*" [12]. So far so good. Unfortunately, however, the analysis and mapping of the 'beehive', the 'tower', the 'bastion', the 'stronghold', the 'pyramid', the 'tomb', and the 'spider's web' that follows, is timid, descriptive and inadequate: Kofman does not take full advantage of the dynamics of her original working hypothesis [12]. Moreover, I do not believe that Nietzsche ever decided in favour of one or the other spatial model. The oscillation between a *hiding place-tower*³² (cut from the local surroundings/ *vertical structure*) and a *prison-trap* [27]³³ (identification with the local surroundings/ *horizontal structure*) shows the limits of his thinking. Nevertheless, it is striking (and absolutely confirmatory of the previous analysis) how Nietzsche, before his spiritual collapse in Turin in 1889, identified himself existentially with the *Mole Antonelliana* tower, designed by the architect Alessandro Antonelli (1798-1888), who, coincidentally, died in October of that year. This tower was 165 meters high [3]. Let us see what Nietzsche wrote about him in one of his last letters, to Heinrich Köselitz, on 30.12.1888:³⁴

Earlier I passed the Mole Antonelliana, the most ingenious building that may have been built - strange, it still has no name - based on an absolute drive from the heights -

27 <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/JGB-26> [accessed: 22.8.2021].

28 <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/JGB-29>;

<http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/M-169> [accessed: 22.8.2021].

29 <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/JGB-289>;

<http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/SE-3> [accessed: 22.8.2021].

30 <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/GM-III-8>;

<http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/FW-280> [accessed: 22.8.2021].

31 <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/JGB-242> [accessed: 22.8.2021].

32 <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/FW-291> [accessed: 22.8.2021].

33 <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/M-117> [accessed: 26.1.2022].

34 Nietzsche Source — Digitale Kritische Gesamtausgabe Werke und Briefe (eKGWB), BVN-1888, 1227 [accessed 16.8.2021]. My translation.

reminds of nothing except my Zarathustra. I christened it Ecce homo and in my mind I put a tremendous amount of space around it [...] I was still present at the funeral of the ancient Antonelli that November. - He lived just as long until Ecce homo, the book, was finished. - The book and the person to go with it...

Architecture and place acquire here symbolic, metaphorical properties, in addition to their material texture. A building corresponds to a book. *Ecce Homo*, from this perspective, is a tower of language made up of concepts and words, and *Mole Antonelliana* an autobiographical thought made of stone. Both artifices communicate; they are public speeches. Maybe this is the architecture that is missing from big modern cities: a talking architecture. From this perspective, Nietzsche's call in *Joyful Science* (§ 280) for the creation of *places of thought*, mentioned in the introduction to this essay, is essentially an exhortation to establish an architecture that will be *expressive, rhetorical and able to cultivate public debate, or dialogue*, either with oneself or with others. For those seeking knowledge, or the knowers (*Architektur der Erkennenden*), architecture should be dialogical, like a book read aloud: a public speech. What should the structure of this textual/architectural 'environment' be? I argue that it should be a material, social, architectural environment and an atmospheric condition, at the same time. We are talking about a *total design of a situation, of an event*. In this way, the coordination, the rhythmic union, the proximity of the architectural, and eloquent 'place of thought' with the human body will be achieved. The architecture of the place of thought must be anchored and attuned to the body, and vice versa.

We must point out how, in Nietzsche's thought, place was thematised through the body,³⁵ in an attempt to implement the plan to 're-evaluate all values' [13]: a reversal of Platonism. Nietzsche wants to strengthen the meaning of the body and earthly existence, by devaluing the soul, the spirit and abstract ideas. In this pedagogical design for a new modern culture, the place, as a material index of the anchoring of the body in the here-and-now, is a natural ally. The 'place of thought', as a material-tangible reality, for Nietzsche, is organically related to his general research project: the restoration of idealism back down to earth. Nietzsche develops a neuro-physiological-chemical model of the organism's relationship with its environment. A phrase from the early text *On Truth and Lie in an Extra-moral Sense* is typical: "What is a word? The representation of a nerve stimulus in sound" [*Was ist ein Wort? Die Abbildung eines Nervenreizes in Lauten*].³⁶ This is Nietzsche's famous 'naturalism'.

'Re-evaluating all values' means that Nietzsche's research

plan, which begins after the rupture with romantic Wagnerism and the knightly medievalism of myth,³⁷ after the work *Human, All Too Human*, essentially proposes the reversal of idealism: the inverse world should touch bottom ground again, and tread on it. We should stop giving value to a hereafter, and focus on the here-and-now: not on heaven, but on *the Earth as a place*. The best development of this argument is found in paragraph 24 of the third treatise of the *Genealogy of Morality*, with the distinction between 'a different world from that of life' (*andre Welt*) and 'this world, our world' (*diese Welt, unsre Welt*).³⁸ In essence, this is a re-evaluation, not just of the here-and-now (immanence) versus the hereafter (transcendence), or of the importance of the sensible world, but of *an upgrade of the notion of place as a material and sensual, affective experience*. According to Andreas Urs Sommer, Nietzsche is an 'immanentist'. Influenced by Otto Liebmann's essay *Ueber den Instinct*, published in 1880, he is preaching a way of life (*Lebensform*) based on the *life of drives (Triebleben)* that must remain 'true to the Earth' [35]. I claim that the Earth is the place of the body. Moreover, I could argue that within Nietzsche's radical immanence, *the place is considered as a body*. The here-now is the body. The living body took the place of the Hegelian absolute spirit. Nietzsche's vitalism is a radicalised enlightenment, a local, regional, nomadic [27], bodily enlightenment.

The above materialist and sensationalist philosophical epistemology means that Nietzsche's dispositions (*Stimmungen*) in his conversation and contact with place (either natural or urban) are extremely changeable. Why? Because 'God is dead'.³⁹ The psychic moods and inclinations of the modern materialistic subject thus no longer have a fixed point of belief around which to orient themselves: they have become anxious, kinetic, and nomadic. There is no longer a high anchor point. They alternate violently in the most extreme registers of emotions. Contemporary architecture could perhaps play the role of a 'regulator' here: directing and orientating these dissipated, homeless dispositions to worldly ends.

I will try to touch upon the other serious questions: What is the relationship between architecture and *Stimmungen* in general, in light of the above remarks? What kind of architecture does Nietzsche want? What does he suggest as the 'style of the future'? This cannot be safely extracted from the information we have at our disposal. His aphorisms about architecture are scattered, vague and do not constitute a coherent whole. There is insufficient indication of preference for a particular 'style' or an established system of forms. Only principles of space organisation and modalities of place attachment can be extracted: gestural, affective, bodily archetypes. One thing is certain, however, if his work and correspondence is all carefully examined: Nietzsche is against the stylistic eclecticism of the late 19th century,⁴⁰

35 This shift towards the body, and the related physiological/medical approach to culture, which opens up the later themes of the place in *Ecce Homo*, can already be observed with great precision in the preface to the second edition of *The Joyful Science*, written in Ruta, near Genoa, in the autumn of 1886: <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/FW-Vorrede-2> [accessed: 22.8.2021].

36 TL: Nietzsche Source — Digitale Kritische Gesamtausgabe Werke und Briefe (eKGWB), WL [accessed 19.8.2021]. My translation.

37 <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/M-191> [accessed: 22.8.2021].

38 <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/GM-III-24> [accessed: 22.8.2021].

39 <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/FW-125> [accessed: 22.8.2021].

40

<http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/JGB-223>;

against historicism and exaggerated decoration, against 'modernism' as an internationalist tendency towards standardisation and uniformity [15], wary of baroque (because of the counter-reformation and the restoration of Catholicism it involves) [27], and has a rather positive attitude towards classicism [27]⁴¹ and its aristocratic 'morality of nobility' [32].

I think that we can move one step further. Nietzsche's critique of the religious sphere of culture and the related sentiments, the pious moods (*Stimmungen*) of the believers who invest in the hereafter, sweep along the shells where they are aroused and stimulated [27]: the German pagan is against the monumental, religious architecture of church-building ('tombs, mausoleums of God'),⁴² in a secularised age, because they preserve the illusion of a mythological invention, 'God'. Nietzsche believes that this architecture is no longer understood, it has become meaningless, a 'kind of mask' [27]. This does not mean that he has completely given up his hopes for a worldly, earthly, profane architecture *that will arouse pagan, life-friendly sentiments, dispositions and moods towards Dasein as mundane existence*, as a will to power [26] (like the *palazzi* of the mighty patrons of art in the Renaissance).⁴³ In other words, Nietzsche is not a priori against an *architecture parlante*, as long as it does not refer to God. This kind of Nietzschean architecture should take advantage of the fact that *Stimmung*, in its innermost conceptual core, is both internal and external, creating a psychological emotional climate and a public atmosphere, at the same time [38]. It is worth stopping here for a moment. Through the influence of Jacob Burckhardt and his work titled *Der Cicerone* (1855), Nietzsche discovered the secularised architecture of Italian Renaissance palaces, which reinforced his dislike of ecclesiastical architecture. In fact, he supported the reuse of the latter for more cosmic functions [3]. Nietzsche wanted architecture to emphasise and enhance the vital instincts of the body, an ethic of physiology, we could say, not the soul [26]. It was not to give birth to the illusion of an 'other world' of the spirit, of the beyond. It is only this *structural conceptual index*, which is consistent with Nietzsche's late philosophical-educational program, after its rupture with romanticism-idealism, that can illuminate the passages where he refers to architecture. Nietzsche is looking for an architecture closer to the living body.

In the above context, Jörg Gleiter, in his articles and texts about Nietzsche as a 'philosophical flaneur' of the modern metropolis [7], points out a fourfold conceptual shift in his thinking, due to his experience of life in Turin during 1888: from *nature* to the *city*, as the pre-eminent environment of philosophical enquiry, from *music* to *architecture*, as the most appropriate art of exploring a 'modernist' *corporeal*

symbolism, from 'will to power' to 'decadence' as a research focus, and from *intellectualist semiotics* to *bodily phenomenology*, as the most appropriate method for an epistemology of the future. This turn expresses Nietzsche's desire to influence the direct web of life, through a new, *applied physiology of art*. Turin as an overall urban environment had a positive influence on Nietzsche, fulfilling his vision of a labyrinthine 'place for thinking', as proclaimed in the *Joyful Science*. From the mental contemplation of nature, Nietzsche shifts to the will, the senses and the body within the city: he returns to the *arts of the everyday*. This explosive transposition involves the new idea of overcoming the decline of 19th century styles: their deconstruction through corporeal experience, from the inside out, from the detail of the interior to the whole fabric of urban places. In this light, Nietzsche's change of interest in architecture can be understood as a gesture of deconstruction of established styles, rules and systems, that is, as a 're-evaluation of all values', from below: the body [8]. As proof of this working hypotheses, it suffices to recall Nietzsche's passionate attack, at the beginning of the first of his *Untimely Meditations*, against the eclecticism of style and the inconsiderate imitation of the late 19th century. He writes:

*Above all, culture is the unity of artistic style in all expressions of life of a people (Einheit des künstlerischen Stiles) [...] the contrasts of culture: barbarism, that is, the lack of style or the chaotic confusion of all styles. The German of our day lives in this chaotic jumble of all styles [...] Everything should teach him: every glance at his clothes, his room, his house, every walk through the streets of his cities, every stop in the magazines of the art fashion dealers; he should be aware of the grotesque coexistence and overlap of all possible styles. The German piles up the shapes, colours, products and curiosities of all times and all zones and thereby brings out that modern fairy-tale colourfulness; he himself remains quietly seated in this tumult of all styles.*⁴⁴

Nietzsche seeks to transcend precisely this *Tumult aller Stile*,⁴⁵ and the related concept of barren, sterile imitation, seeking a unity of artistic style in all expressions of life.

5. Conclusion

Let us attempt a final formulation of the concept of place in Nietzsche: a comprehensive environment of realities (*realitäten*),⁴⁶ an architectural, climatic, atmospheric entourage that directly affects the moods, the bodily condition and physiology, the metabolism, energy and vigour of the subject, positively or negatively. Place in Nietzsche seems to possess, nevertheless, a *moral effect*, if morality is organically connected to a direct influence over the body, health, habits, and the inspiration for creativity, in order to produce a 'great style'. Indeed, we have seen that place is not

<http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/JGB-224> [accessed: 22.8.2021].

41 <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/FW-370> [accessed: 22.8.2021].

42 <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/FW-125>;

<http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/FW-280> [accessed: 22.8.2021]

43 <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/BVN-1886,688> [accessed: 24.4.2020].

44 UM_DS: Nietzsche Source — Digitale Kritische Gesamtausgabe Werke und Briefe (eKGWB), DS-1 [accessed 19.8.2021].

45 <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/DS-1> [accessed: 5.6.2020].

46 <http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/EH-Klug-1> [accessed: 22.4.2020].

the indifferent background or setting of creation. It is an active factor in the creative process. In the conceptual/theoretical reconstruction of Nietzsche's thought, as proposed in the present study, ego (body) and place are not two external entities that are listed geometrically, or metrically. They do not add up spatially, as modes of extension. The fundamental finding is that, on the contrary, each of the two has developed the idea (meaning, concept) of the other *as its inner moment*. We are dealing here with an intensive interpenetration. The place becomes meaningful having assimilated the body as its internal organ, and the body of the ego becomes creative, healthy, inspired and organic *having established the place within it*, as a constitutive, expressive structure of its lived experience. Peter Sloterdijk reached similar conclusions in his book *Nietzsche Apostle*, claiming that subjectivity in Nietzsche becomes a "resonance-body" that drifts towards an 'inexorable exteriority', abolishing the borders between the ego and the world [33]. This 'gesture of pure self-expenditure' inaugurates an intimate relationship between the I and place or space. Sloterdijk writes: "*Nietzsche could be described as the discoverer of hetero-narcissism: what he ultimately affirms in himself are the othernesses which gather in him and make him up like a composition, which penetrate him, delight him, torture him and surprise him*" [33]. This deep interdependence and intersection between the self and the other, body and environment, in order to gain life and expression, needs a *eurythmic architecture*, which, *as a third element of the function*, will be able to coordinate the body and the place as the spatial/topological organisation of a coherent sequence and dynamic narration of meaningful events.

We immediately understand the enormous consequences that this view has for architecture, and especially for the doctrine of the 'international style' of the modern movement, which often treated place as a simple, neutral, indifferent, static, uniform spatial background for the elevation of the architectural work as a building-object. Dorita Hannah, in her search for a *Nietzschean architecture*, opts for a dynamic, participatory, 'performative spatiality', where *event, act and becoming* transcend object, work and being, creating a dancing place of sensorial immersion of the audience [10]. Another possible version of a 'Nietzschean architecture', according to my interpretation, *would do just the opposite* of the international style: the building-object would recede, 'open' towards the urban or natural landscape, to allow the place to play a leading role as a foundation and grounding, to emerge as a myth, a character and a personhood. I would like to call this Nietzsche-inspired architecture, an attuned, eurythmic architecture of the *stimmungen*: affective, regional, empathetic, and *synaesthetic*. Diana Behler has convincingly argued in favour of the motif of 'synaesthesia' being present in Nietzsche's early work, especially *The Birth of Tragedy*. According to her interpretation, the senses mix and elevate one another during this process, intensifying the effect of an artistic work. Synaesthesia in Dionysian rapture favours the movement of the 'metonymic cross-connections' that found a 'bodily symbolism' [2]. A Nietzschean architecture should

work in a similar way, instituting a radical, bodily, atmospheric environment that triggers thinking, a system for ecstasy. Good and successful future architectural environments should assume the role of 'cultural attunements' [38] to the natural and human-made world. "Place" in Nietzsche's thought is therefore a chain, a series of harmonious sites, attuned locations and therapeutic spaces that acquire a surplus of meaning from the will, movement and action of a living body, a nomadic network that constructs itself. The place is a reflection of the construction of the self, a conscious and affective articulation and sequence of choices, and the self is also a reflection of the construction of the place. The two constructions must be completely interdependent. Place and life must become one necessary totality: a corporeal-emotional-atmospheric regionalism -- a topo-rhythmy.

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