

Research Article

Whitehead's Project of Process Philosophy: A Renewed Criterion of Philosophical Approach

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Abstract

Process thinking is a long-standing philosophical tradition that emphasizes becoming and changes over a static being. It traces its origin through an ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus who emphasized the importance of change and flux as the ultimate reality. Process Philosophy really found its most fertile grounds and active development during the 20th Century North America with Whitehead taking the lead, Charles Hartshorne and the others followed and continue this tradition. The aim of this study is to understand Whitehead's process philosophy as a renewed approach of philosophical criterion that have challenged the traditional philosophical approaches. It seeks to know, how can Whitehead's process philosophy offer a renewed criterion for philosophical inquiry, and what implications does it hold for contemporary philosophical debates? In order to attain our objectives, we will give an account of a comparative philosophical analysis. The paper emphasizes that, Whitehead project of process philosophy is a protest against abstractions, bifurcation, dogmatism and philosophical language. Thus, giving philosophical thinking a new orientation and reinterpretation. We think that it is a renewed philosophy because some of his predecessors Emmanuel Kant have attempted it. That is to say, Whitehead's project of process philosophy is to reconcile the conflicting views between the physical and the mental entities or better still, the rationalist and the empiricists which in turn to show that Whitehead's project of process philosophy is the continuation of Kant's own project. Thus, development of a philosophical language. Actual entities or actual occasions, eternal objects and prehensions comes to being. We think that, Whitehead's project of process philosophy as an interactive web of relationships aligns with the posthumanism focus, a current subject of contemporary philosophical debates.

Keywords

Whitehead Project, Process Philosophy, Renewed Philosophy, Philosophy of Organism

1. Introduction

Process philosophy is a long-standing philosophical tradition that emphasizes becoming and changes over a static being. "Process philosophy is based on the premise that being is dynamic and that the dynamic nature of being should be the primary focus of any comprehensive philosophical account of reality and our place within it [1]. Process Philosophy really

found its most fertile grounds and active development during the 20th with Whitehead taking the lead, Charles Hartshorne and the others followed and continue this tradition. This justifies why some studies states that, "process philosophy as originally referred to a small group of philosophers including Henri Bergson, William James and Alfred North Whitehead as

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well as Heraclitus. These thinkers view the world processually, working from within things and reversing the relationship between idea and life [4]. But today, Process philosophy is primarily associated with the work of Alfred North Whitehead.

Alfred North Whitehead appeared not only as a leading and major figure in mathematical logic but also one of the most twentieth century's metaphysicians and a philosopher of science, "never having formally studied philosophy in his life, he agreed to become professor of philosophy at Harvard university, a position he held until retirement in 1937 [2]. Alfred North Whitehead intellectual shift from philosophy of science to metaphysics was a call of concern. What motivated Whitehead to write on Philosophy was his Strong conviction that Scientific knowledge had arrived at a point in History that call for a new scheme of ideas to reflect more adequately the new development in science. Since Scientific thought always relies on some scheme of ideas, he said, the importance of philosophy is to make such Schemes] explicit so that they can be criticize and improved, Whitehead had come to regard philosophy as the critics of abstraction. This notion was employed by Whitehead in *Science and the modern world*(1925) which traced the intertwine emergence of Newtonian Science and it Philosophical presupposition and noted the development of the theory of relativity in the 20th century. The scientific understanding had left behind the Newtonian conceptually that had generated till the dominant philosophical assumption and these philosophical assumptions are inadequate to explicate our full concrete experience [2]. *Science and the Modern World* simply outlines what such a philosophy might be. So, when Whitehead published his Magnum opus titled *Process and Reality* (1929) with a subtitle *An essay in cosmology*. This book explores his metaphysical understanding to his final form. Its task was to chase after the course outline in *science and the modern world*. Thus, *Process and reality* is often regarded as the central document to what became known nowadays as "Process Philosophy".

Process Philosophy, also Known as ontology of becoming or philosophy of organism identifies metaphysical reality with change in opposition to the classical models of change as illusory or accidental. Process philosophy regard change as the corner stone of reality, this cornerstone being understood as process of becoming. In defining the true reality of things, process philosophers see "Process" as the sole means in digging out the reality. In our discussion, it will be generic in considering the meaning of process as articulated by process philosophers and equally affiliating it alongside the various meaning of process. By process "we mean the series of things that are done in order to achieve a particular result or it is a series of events to produce a result especially as contrasted to product or a path of succession of states through which a system possess [3]. This indicates that a process undergoes a numerous stage of development toward a particular reality. "Reality is thus the continuous divisions and suspension of human agency as a series of infinite acts and events. It is in this sense that we have to understand the human agent as a participant observer

of its world where participation also means partial and thus incomplete. the human agent is an intrinsic part of a field which recedes when approached in the continuous work of process Etymologically [4], process comes from the combination of two words "Approach and withdrawal" as "Pro" meaning the making and the appearance of forms and "cess" which means the disappearance and the loss of forms. "Process thus can be understood as a divided states of being in which human agency is for forever suspended between the ceaseless act of making forms presented and their constant recession This implies that process and recess are recursive versions of each other in a world without end. The Handbook also reveals process as reality of creative interaction of wholeness and parts through which human agency create reality as the tokens or expression of a world that is divided from it and which continually recedes from conscious appropriation while playing a kind of hide and seek with itself. Based on this, process portrays attributes of reality and we see in the needs why process philosophers regard process as a cornerstone of reality, for whitehead understood process as:

"The notion of organism is combined with that of process in twofold manner. The community of actual things is an organism but it is not a static organism. It is an incompleteness in process of production. Thus, the expansion of the universe in respect to actual things is the first meaning of process and the universe in any stage of its expansion is the first meaning of organism. In this sense, an organism is a nexus, secondly, each actual entity itself only describable as an organic process; it repeats in microcosm what the universe is in macrocosm. It is a process proceeding from phase to phase, each phase being the real basis from which its successor proceeds towards the completion of the thing in question. Each actual entity bears in its constitution the reasons why its conditions are what they are, these reasons are the other actual entities objectified for it [5].

According to Whitehead the notion of organism is expressed through a process therefore an organism is a process. It has two meanings interconnected but intellectually separable namely the microscopic meaning and the macroscopic meaning all found in an organic process. Thus, Whitehead's development of the philosophy of organism is to express a coherent cosmology based upon the notions of system, process and creative advance into novelty [5].

In the history of philosophy, one of the major debates is focused on regarding the question of the mental and physical entities as a debating opposed reality, truth and many others among philosophers. We observed it as one of the main problems of philosophy. Still at a nursing stage could be traced in the ancient period of the pre-Socratics on the question of the "one and multiple" among the Parmenidean and Heraclitean school of thoughts. It was later inherited by Plato and Aristotle, Plato on his part explain the "visible and invisible worlds or better still the sensible and intelligible worlds" in relation to "one and multiple". Aristotle on the other hand demonstrated

his “immanentism” and in order to explore this, differentiated between “substance and accident” still in relation to “one and multiple”. In the modern period, Plato’s affirmation that “ideas are innate” ingress into the main tenet of rationalism and Aristotelian scientific zealotry in demonstrating knowledge became the main tenet of empiricism as well. Therefore, these led to the development of these two schools of thought, empiricism and rationalism. Kant in the *critique of pure reason* developed a synthetic a priori judgment which attempt to reconcile the conflicting views of the rationalism and empiricism. In effect, we are demonstrating here that Whitehead later continue this Kant’s project of interweaving the physical and the mental entities as body of knowledge in what his contemporaries termed “process philosophy” and in Whitehead’s own words “philosophy of organism”. Whitehead’s initiation of this new philosophy which is a picture of a holistic scheme in an embodiment of all disciplines.

2. Whitehead Project of Process Philosophy

According to our view in this study, is to show that Whitehead’s project of process philosophy is to reconcile the conflicting views between the physical and the mental entities or better still the rationalists and the empiricists which in turn to show that Whitehead’s project of process philosophy is the continuation of Kant’s own project. In effect, showing new criterion of a philosophical approach presented by Whitehead. Before then, we have tried to presents in their thought how they have rejected the rational dogma in the ideas of their predecessors.

2.1. Rejection of Rational Dogmatism in Philosophy

This section centers on rejection of rational dogmatism in philosophy which is often referred to Kant’s philosophy challenging pure reason’s ability to grasp metaphysical truths beyond experience but focus is not limited to Kant alone but Whitehead as well. Its focuses on analyzing the different approaches of tackling dogmatism by the authors, beginning with Kant and end with Whitehead. But then, what is dogmatism? Dogmatism comes from Greek “dogma”, which means belief, or public decree or ordinance. Originally the term

“dogma” is a religious doctrine proclaimed by scripture or the Church, which requires popular acceptance without rational justification [6]. This is so because it is believed coming from a supreme being or a class of authority which is unquestionable, in the Christianity light, it is from God or is God talking via any speaker or preacher, be it the pastor, father, priest or pope. Thus, a dogma is indisputable and unchallengeable. According to skeptical critics, any metaphysical proposition is a dogma because, although there may be a rational argument for it, this argument itself relies on some unproved first principles and is therefore unreliable. Hence, any metaphysical doctrine is allegedly open to the charge of dogmatism. This ancient skepticism charged all non-skeptical philosophies with dogmatism, meaning that they were committed to some doctrines which they believed to be indubitably true. This does not entail that all knowledge is false or skepticism would turn out to be a negative form of dogmatism. For ancient skepticism, we should “suspend our judgment”¹ because knowledge is neither possible nor impossible [6]. According to “Sextus Empiricus”² “some people have claimed to have found the truth ...those who think they have found it are the dogmatists [7]. This means that those who are properly called dogmatists are those who think that they have discovered the truth [6]. This implies that dogmatism is the capacity to establish an unbeatable truth or reality.

In German philosophy, dogmatism is the position that knowledge arises from the effect of independent reality on the mind and contrasts with Kantian transcendental idealism. In modern times, dogmatism is the uncritical, partial, and possibly irrational persistence of some opinion [6]. According to Paul Guyer, “Kant defines the position of critical philosophy in contrast to dogmatism, empiricism, skepticism, and indifference. He seeks to carve out for theoretical philosophy a significant but limited domain, distinct from that of empirical knowledge and the opinions of common sense, but excluding the exaggerated claims that have brought metaphysics into disrepute [8]. And to Alberto Vanzo, “Kant employs the notions of empiricism and rationalism in his sketches of the history of ancient and modern philosophy. Some ancient philosophers, like Socrates, focused only on practical philosophy. Those who had a theoretical philosophy were either dogmatists or skeptics. Unsurprisingly, Kant identifies a central problem of his own philosophy as a main source of disputes between dogmatists: What is the origin of our intellectual concepts? De-

1 The phrase “I suspend judgment” we adopt in place of “I am unable to say which of the objects presented I ought to believe and which I ought to disbelieve,” indicating that the objects appear to us equal as regards credibility and incredibility. As to whether they are equal we make no positive assertion; but what we state is what appears to us in regard to them at the time of observation. And the term “suspension” is derived from the fact of the mind being held up or “suspended” so that it neither affirms nor denies anything owing to the equipollence of the matters in question...(Sextus Empiricus. *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*. Trans. R.G. Bury. London: W. Heinemann, 1933. © Sophia Omni, 2005. p. 10.)

2 “For, as the Dogmatists say, the intellect does not of itself get in contact with external objects and receive phantasies from them, but it does so by means of the senses; and the senses do not apprehend the external objects but only their own

pathé, if anything. And so the phantasia will be of a sensory pathos, which is not the same thing as the external object. For example, the honey is not the same as my experiencing a sweet taste, nor the wormwood the same as my experiencing a bitter taste, but something different. And since this pathos differs from the external object, the phantasia will not be 73 of the external object but of something different. So if the intellect makes determinations in accord with the phantasia, it does so foolishly and not in accord with the external object. Consequently, it is absurd to say that determinations about external matters are made according to phantasies.”(Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, translated with introduction and commentary, by Benson Mates, Oxford University Press, New York Oxford 1996. Book two of three)

pending on how philosophers answered that question, Kant divides them into philosophers “ex principiis sensitivis” and philosophers “ex principiis rationalibus” in his metaphysics notes entitled *Reflexionen* meaning Reflections, that is, empiricists and noologists or rationalists respectively. Interestingly, some lecture transcripts differentiate not two, but three positions: mysticism, empiricism, and rationalism [9]. Kant argued the rationalists made claims about reality without examining cognition’s limits, we can’t know “things in themselves” we know how things appear to us, phenomena. Kant equally describes the dogmatism of the empiricists as “principle of pure empiricism” and the rationalists as “dogmatism of pure reason”³. To this effect, “Kant held dogmatism to be capricious, opinionated, faction ridden and consequently unstable and open to the contempt of rational observers. Yet Kant wanted to distinguish his own critical stance toward dogmatism from several other ways of rejecting it, which he regarded as themselves equally dangerous to the cause of reason [8]. Thus “dogmatism”⁴ to Kant is “the presumption of being able to acquire metaphysical knowledge by means of a priori reasoning, without a prior inquiry into whether metaphysical knowledge lies within human grasp [9].

Kant qualifies the empiricism of the antinomies as dogmatic (A471/B499). As is well known, Kant rejects this dogmatic form of empiricism. In his view, empiricists should not claim that the world is eternal, that it is infinitely extended, and that all bodies are divisible. They should only claim that we can continue indefinitely in discovering new regions of the world, identifying earlier causes of past events, and dividing each body into increasingly smaller parts. Empiricists should endorse a modest form of empiricism [9]. Kant suggest that “in this empirical regress there can be encountered no experience of an absolute boundary, and hence no experience of a condition as one that is absolutely unconditioned empirically”. This empiricism is modest because it warrants claims on only what

we can experience, not on what exists or does not exist beyond the bounds of experience. Modest empiricism is as consistent with dogmatism and the positive claims of the theses as it is with immodest empiricism and the negative claims of the antitheses [9].

Kant also recommended that “empiricists “take all concepts of the understanding from experience”. As for judgments, empiricists claim that no synthetic judgments can have an a priori justification. Kant’s proof that such judgments exist makes empiricism “completely untenable. Empiricists, too, distinguish concepts from intuitions. They claim that all concepts are acquired a posteriori on the basis of sensations [9]. Kant answers the empiricists by placing “his argument on the premise that our experience can be ascribed to a single identical subject, via what he calls the “transcendental unity of apperception,”⁵ only if the elements of experience given in intuition are synthetically combined so as to present us with objects that are thought through the categories. The categories are held to apply to objects, therefore, not because these objects make the categories possible, but rather because the categories themselves constitute necessary conditions for the representation of all possible objects of experience” [8].

“Rationalism” is the term that Kant uses from the late 1780s onward to designate noologism, that is, the admission of nonempirical concepts and a priori principles [9] According to Kant, “the antinomy of pure reason in its cosmological ideas is removed by showing that it is merely dialectical and a conflict due to an illusion arising from the fact that one has applied the idea of absolute totality, which is valid only as a condition of things in themselves, to appearances that exist only in representation [8] To paul Guyer, Kant’s “Transcendental Dialectic,” however, is dedicated to arguing that the other three parts of the rationalist system are pseudo-sciences founded on inevitable illusions of human reason attempting to extend itself beyond the limits of sensibility. Kant does not

3 In the assertions of the antithesis, a one notes a perfect uniformity in their manner of thought and complete unity in A466/B494 their maxims, namely a principle of pure empiricism, not only in the explanation of appearances in the world, but also in the dissolution of the transcendental ideas of the world-whole itself. Against this the assertions of the thesis are grounded not only on empiricism within the series of appearances but also on intellectualistic starting points,^c and their maxim is to that extent not simple. On the basis of their essential distinguishing mark, however, I will call them the dogmatism of pure reason. (Immanuel Kant, Critique of pure reason Translated and edited by paul Guyer, University of Pennsylvania, ALLEN W. WOOD Yale University Cambridge, University Press, 1998. P. 498. (A466/B494)

4 “I believe I can further it in the following way. All objections can be divided into dogmatic, critical and skeptical ones. A dogmatic objection is one that is directed against a proposition, but a critical one is directed against its proof. The former requires an insight into the constitution of the nature of the object, in order to be able to assert the opposite of what the proposition claims about the object; it is itself dogmatic, therefore, and claims to have better acquaintance with the constitution of the object being talked about than its opposite has. The critical objection, because it leaves the proposition untouched in its worth or worthlessness, and impugns only the proof, does not at all need to have better acquaintance with the object or to pretend to better acquaintance with it; it shows only that the assertion is groundless, not that it is incorrect. The skeptical objection puts the proposition and its opposite over against one another, as objections of equal weight, each alternatively a dogma with the other as an objection A 389 to it; thus on both opposed sides it is dogmatic in appearance,^a in order to annihilate entirely every judgment about the object. Thus both, the dogmatic as well as the skeptical objection, must

claim as much insight into its object as is necessary to assert something about it either affirmatively or negatively. The critical objection alone is of such a kind that it overturns a theory merely by showing that one assumes on behalf of its assertion something that is nugatory and merely imagined, thereby withdrawing from it the presumed foundation without otherwise wanting to decide anything about the constitution of the object. Now according to the common concepts of our reason in regard to the community in which our thinking subject stands to things outside us we are dogmatic, and regard these things as objects truly subsisting independently of us, according to a certain transcendental dualism that does not count those outer appearances as representations of the subject but rather displaces them, as the sensible intuition that provides them to us, outside us as objects,^b separating them entirely from the thinking subject”. (Immanuel Kant, Critique of pure reason Translated and edited by paul Guyer, University of Pennsylvania, ALLEN W. WOOD Yale University Cambridge, University Press, 1998. Pp. 435-436. (A388/A389)

5 Apperception is itself the ground of the possibility of the categories, which for their part represent nothing other than the synthesis of the manifold of intuition, insofar as that manifold has unity in apperception. Self-consciousness in general is therefore the representation of that which is the condition of all unity, and yet is itself unconditioned. Hence of the thinking I (the soul), which A402 [thus represents] itself as substance, simple, numerically identical in all time, and the correlate of all existence from which all other existence must be inferred, one can say not so much that it cognizes itself through the categories, but that it cognizes the categories, and through them all objects, in the absolute unity of apperception, and hence cognizes them through itself. (Immanuel Kant, Critique of pure reason Translated and edited by paul Guyer, University of Pennsylvania, ALLEN W. WOOD Yale University Cambridge, University Press, 1998. Pp. 442-443. (A401/A402)

present the three rationalistic pseudo-sciences as mere historical artifacts, but attempts to display them as inevitable products of human reason by associating them with the unconditioned use of the three traditional forms of syllogism: categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive [8]. "Kant's overall argument is that although these rationalist doctrines are inevitable illusions they are still pseudo-sciences, and must give way to doctrines remaining within the limits of sensibility: rational psychology gives way to empirical psychology, which Kant expounded in his lectures in the form of "anthropology"; rational cosmology gives way to the metaphysical foundations of natural science, which Kant derives by adding the sole empirical concept of motion to the principles of judgment; and rational theology gives way to what Kant will call moral theology, the doctrine that God and immortality are postulated, along with freedom of the will, solely as conditions of the possibility of human morality [8].

Kant had been concerned to resolve a number of the most fundamental scientific controversies of his epoch and to establish once and for all the basic principles of scientific knowledge of the world [8]. The nature of knowledge and the nature of morality were two main concerns of Kant's philosophical thinking. In his masterpiece, *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781; 2nd edn. 1787), examined the cognitive powers of the mind in order to answer the question of how experience is possible [6]. Theoretical knowledge must involve both sensibility and understanding and is possible solely through a fundamental role for synthetic a priori judgments. To explain how synthetic a priori knowledge is possible, Kant argued for the existence of a priori intuitions (space and time) in sensibility and a priori concepts (categories) in understanding. These intuitions and concepts, rather than being empirically discovered, constitute the basic forms necessary for having any experience. This account sought to reconcile and overcome the limited doctrines of Leibniz's or Wolff's rationalism and Hume's empiricism. Kant argued that the conflicting views of traditional metaphysics were inevitably generated by the tendency of pure reason to go beyond the limits of sensory experience, where it cannot provide knowledge [6].

Kant sought to replace traditional metaphysics by a transcendental metaphysics based on the justification of the categories. Although this metaphysics denied traditional knowledge claims, it allowed for faith in the existence of God and room for human freedom. The *Prolegomena to Every Future Metaphysics* (1783) outlines the main argument of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The "Transcendental Logic" turns to the main destructive task of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and that which gives it its name, the task of discrediting dogmatism and displaying the limits of metaphysics. The "Transcendental Analytic" has prepared the way for this critique of traditional metaphysics and its foundations by its argument that synthetic a priori principles can be established only within the limited domain of sensible experience. But Kant's aim in the "Dialectic" is not only to show the failure of a metaphysics that transcends the boundaries of possible experience. At the

same time, he also wants to demonstrate that the questions that preoccupy metaphysics are inevitable, and that the arguments of metaphysics, although deceptive, should not be dismissed without sympathetic comprehension [8]. Kant really did not escape dogmatism because of the noumena categories, Kant's thing in itself is itself a dogmatic assumption.

According to Whitehead, "Philosophy has been haunted by the unfortunate notion that its method is dogmatically to indicate premises which are severally clear, distinct, and certain; and to erect upon those premises a deductive system of thought [5]. So dogmatism to Whitehead is the adoption of this particular philosophical method in the history of thought. He believes that "the rise of European philosophy was largely promoted by the development of mathematics into a science of abstract generality. But in its subsequent development the method of philosophy has also been vitiated by the example of mathematics [5]. Thus to Whitehead, "Philosophy has been misled by the example of mathematics; and even in mathematics the statement of the ultimate logical principles is beset with difficulties, as yet insuperable [5]. In this sense philosophy has advanced from Plato onwards. According to this account of the achievement of rationalism, the chief error in philosophy is overstatement. The aim at generalization is sound, but the estimate of success is exaggerated. There are two main forms of such overstatement. One form is what I have termed, elsewhere the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness.' This fallacy consists in neglecting the degree of abstraction involved when an actual entity is considered merely so far as it exemplifies certain categories of thought. European thought is represented as littered with metaphysical systems, abandoned and unrecouped. Such an assertion tacitly fastens upon philosophy the old dogmatic test [5].

Descartes and Locke maintained a two-substance ontology—Descartes explicitly, Locke by implication. Therefore, Whitehead's aim was to reconcile the two-substance ontological dogmatism presented by Descartes and Locke, in order to do this, he sorts to reframe a new philosophical method which differed from that of his predecessors by questioning their positions and where possibly err. This underlining philosophy he called the "philosophy of organism". This will be the focus of subsequent study.

2.2. Renewed Criterion of Philosophical Approach

After the rejection of rational dogmatism,

We begin this section with the close examination of this Whitehead's affirmation, that launches his problematic and summarizes his thesis, he writes:

In its turn every philosophy will suffer a deposition. But the bundle of philosophic systems expresses a variety of general truths about the universe, awaiting coordination and assignment of their various spheres of validity. Such progress in coordination is provided by the advance of philosophy; and in this sense philosophy has advanced from Plato on-

wards. According to this account of the achievement of rationalism, the chief error in philosophy is overstatement. The aim at generalization is sound, but the estimate of success is exaggerated. There are two main forms of such overstatement. One form is what I have termed, elsewhere, the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness.' This fallacy consists in neglecting the degree of abstraction involved when an actual entity is considered merely, so far as it exemplifies certain categories of thought. There are aspects of actualities which are simply ignored so long as we restrict thought to these categories. Thus the success of a philosophy is to be measured by its comparative avoidance of this fallacy, when thought is restricted within its categories. The other form of overstatement consists in a false estimate of logical procedure in respect to certainty, and in respect to premises. Philosophy has been haunted by the unfortunate notion that its method is dogmatically to indicate premises which are severally clear, distinct, and certain; and to erect upon those premises a deductive system of thought" [5].

Whitehead acknowledges the fact that the disposition in the philosophical thought has led to the advancement of philosophy but the major error in this advancement is what he called "overstatement" termed in *science and modern world* as "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" which means taking an abstract for a concrete. This problematic arises by Whitehead here is recurrent throughout his intellectual work. It is a position taken by him to embark on his philosophical journey. According to Whitehead philosophy has fallen into the mess of mathematics or better still philosophers have been misled by mathematics because mathematics has brought abstractions into philosophy. Whitehead presupposes that, "If we may trust the Pythagorean tradition, the rise of European philosophy was largely promoted by the development of mathematics into a science of abstract generality. But in its subsequent development the method of philosophy has also been vitiated by the example of mathematics" [5]. "Under the influence of mathematics, deduction has been foisted onto philosophy as its standard method, instead of taking its true place as an essential auxiliary mode of verification whereby to test the scope of generalities. This misapprehension of philosophic method has veiled the very considerable success of philosophy in providing generic notions which add lucidity to our apprehension of the facts of experience" [5]. Not only abstractions that mathematics has brought into philosophy but as well change the method of philosophy. Therefore, Whitehead looks into the necessity to reconstruct philosophy. To him, one aim of philosophy is to challenge the half-truths constituting the scientific first principles [5]. Consequently, Whitehead insisted that "philosophy will not regain its proper status until the gradual elaboration of categorical schemes, definitely stated at each stage of progress, is recognized as its proper objective" "The primary method of mathematics is deduction and the primary method of philosophy is descriptive generalization" [5]. So as each study requires a method and objective, Whitehead suggests the method of philosophy as descriptive generalization

that will enable him to reconstruct philosophy.

He began this new philosophical approach by introducing a new language. He affirms that "a new idea introduces a new alternative; and we are not less indebted to a thinker when we adopt the alternative which he discarded. Philosophy never reverts to its old position after the shock of a great philosopher" [5]. Thus "the movement of historical, and philosophical, criticism of detached questions, which on the whole has dominated the last two centuries, has done its work, and requires to be supplemented by a more sustained effort of constructive thought" [5]. Based on this Whitehead's constructive thought John B. Cobb explains that "Whitehead did not follow that procedure in the Western tradition philosophers had frequently expressed new insights partly in existing language and partly by creating new terms. The new terms appeal for new insights on the part of readers, but the philosopher discusses them extensively in more familiar language in order to aid in the attainment of the new insight. Whitehead continued that tradition. It may be, however, that the novelty of his vision is greater than that of his predecessors or, at least, is more sharply at odds with the inherited language. His task is to use one language to point to insights that are quite different from those that language normally conveys. He introduces new terms and concepts to give expression to these insights, in some sense, to fix them" [10]. Accordingly, Whitehead affirms that so as "every science must devise its own instruments. The tool required for philosophy is language. Thus philosophy redesigns language in the same way that, in a physical science, pre-existing appliances are redesigned. It is exactly at this point that the appeal to facts is a difficult operation. This appeal is not solely to the expression of the facts in current verbal statements" [5]. "For Whitehead, nothing in science is beyond the possible need of revision. Certainly this is true of philosophy as well" [10]. Whitehead concluded that, the tool required by philosophy is language.

The renewal criterion for the philosophical approach requires a language which is different from that of his predecessors. This is because, new language leads a different way of observing and interpreting the world. He affirms thus, "No deeply original thinking can be expressed adequately in existing language. That language operates among people who see the world in a particular way. The deeply original thought leads to a different way of seeing the world. It has to work against the implications of the existing language. It has to draw the readers or the hearers into noticing features of experience that have heretofore eluded them. It has to evoke to consciousness dim intuitions that have been suppressed by the existing conceptuality and socialization. One cannot translate the new vision into the vocabulary of the old. In Jesus' words, this would be to pour new wine into old wineskins" [10]. This assertion from Cobb is indeed true Whitehead declares that "I use the phrase 'eternal object' for what in the preceding paragraph of this section I have termed a 'Platonic form'" [5]. So Whitehead substituted Plato's form with "eternal object" and in the same light, he said, "for Descartes the word 'substance' is the equivalent

of my phrase 'actual occasion.' I refrain from the term 'substance,' for one reason because it suggests the subject-predicate notion; and for another reason because Descartes and Locke permit their substances to undergo adventures of changing qualifications, and thereby create difficulties [5]. Thus, an introduction of new terminologies in philosophy. Whitehead further explains that his reasons for not using the same language in his scientific metaphysics are, as thus:

An old established metaphysical system gains a false air of adequate precision from the fact that its words and phrases have passed into current literature. Thus propositions expressed in its language are more easily correlated to our flitting intuitions into metaphysical truth. When we trust these verbal statements and argue as though they adequately analyzed meaning, we are led into difficulties which take the shape of negations of what in practice is presupposed. But when they are proposed as first principles they assume an unmerited air of sober obviousness. Their defect is that the true propositions which they do express lose their fundamental character when subjected to adequate expression. For example consider the type of propositions such as 'The grass is green,' and 'The whale is big.' This subject-predicate form of statement seems so simple, leading straight to a metaphysical first principle; and yet in these examples it conceals such complex, diverse meanings [5].

Whitehead explains that "the true method of philosophical construction is to frame a scheme of ideas, the best that one can, and unflinchingly to explore the interpretation of experience in terms of that scheme. And, that all constructive thought, on the various special topics of scientific interest, is dominated by some such scheme, unacknowledged, but no less influential in guiding the imagination. The importance of philosophy lies in its sustained effort to make such schemes explicit and thereby capable of criticism and improvement [5]. In order to go about with this new philosophical approach, he calls for a "frame of a scheme of ideas" and this "scheme of ideas" is what called "speculative philosophy" Speculative Philosophy is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted [5]. From this speculative philosophy, whitehead justifies his position that we have earlier mentioned at the beginning of this section of study. He explains that "it is the ideal of speculative philosophy that its fundamental notions shall not seem capable of abstraction from each other. In other words, it is presupposed that no entity can be conceived in complete abstraction from the system of the universe, and that it is the business of speculative philosophy to exhibit this truth. This character is its coherence [5] whitehead concluded the new philosophy is not foisted with abstractions but rather it is a critique of abstractions.

Unlike Kant, whitehead explains that, the ideal of speculative philosophy has its rational side and its empirical side. The rational side is expressed by the terms 'coherent' and 'logical.' The empirical side is expressed by the terms 'applicable' and 'adequate.' But the two sides are bound together by clearing

away an ambiguity which remains in the previous explanation of the term 'adequate' [5] Whitehead's point is that the philosophical method must operate in a manner that all related experience must exhibit the same texture which is different from Kant's synthetic a priori judgment where sensibility and understanding are congruent. "Thus the philosophic scheme should be 'necessary,' in the sense of bearing in itself its own warrant of universality throughout an experience, provided that we confine ourselves to that which communicates with immediate matter of fact [5]. This doctrine of necessity in universality means that there is an essence to the universe which forbids relationships beyond itself, as a violation of its rationality. Speculative philosophy seeks that essence [5]. Whitehead therefore reveals his plans in exhibiting his speculative philosophy via his philosophy of organism.

Since his aim is to render everything in the scheme of thought explicit. Whitehead comes to real terms the language required for this new philosophical thought. Whitehead wants to show that "the primary notions which constitute the philosophy of organism... embodies generic notions inevitably presupposed in our reflective experience-presupposed, but rarely expressed in explicit distinction... These notions are, that of an 'actual entity,' that of a 'prehension,' that of a 'nexus,' and that of the 'ontological principle.' [5]. Whitehead explains that his usage of this new terminology is divorce from the previous philosophical approach and the new "philosophical thought has made for itself difficulties by dealing exclusively in very abstract notions, such as those of mere awareness, mere private sensation, mere emotion, mere purpose, mere appearance, mere causation. These are the ghosts of the old 'faculties,' banished from psychology, but still haunting metaphysics. There can be no 'mere' togetherness of such abstractions. The result is that philosophical discussion is enmeshed in the fallacy of 'misplaced concreteness.' In the three notions-actual entity, prehension, nexus-an endeavour has been made to base philosophical thought upon the most concrete elements in our experience [5] "Actual entities" -also termed 'actual occasions' - are the final real things--, of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real... The final facts are, all alike, actual entities; and these actual entities are drops of experience, complex and interdependent". Whitehead makes us to understand that, the reality of the world are actual entities, they are the real things that made up the world.

In order to go against the bifurcation of abstractions, whitehead introduces prehensions, actual entities or occasions and eternal objects to explain the nexus of the world. Since the old philosophical thought was abstracted from experience or was dealing with abstractions, whitehead affirms that "the true philosophic question is, how can concrete fact exhibit entities abstract from it and yet participated in by its own nature? he answers that the new philosophical thought has "its business is to explain the emergence of the more abstract things from the more concrete things. Thus, philosophy is explanatory of abstraction, and not of concreteness [5] And in the *science and*

the modern, he writes, "I hold that philosophy is the critic of abstractions. Its function is the double one, first of harmonizing them by assigning to them their right relative status as abstractions, and secondly of completing them by direct comparison with more concrete intuitions of the universe, and thereby promoting the formation of more complete schemes of thought [11].

2.3. The Necessity to Continue with Kant's Project

The questions that preoccupy here is, what were Kant's project? Or what constitute Kant's project? And how did whitehead continue this project? we will begin with Kant's project, later whitehead's project as a continuity of Kant's project and subsequently, the comparative analysis on the objectives of the different projects.

Kant's project was an "attempted to criticize and limit the scope of traditional metaphysics, Kant also sought to defend against empiricists its underlying claim of the possibility of universal and necessary knowledge -what Kant called a priori knowledge, knowledge originating independently of experience, because no knowledge derived from any particular experience, or a posteriori knowledge, could justify a claim to universal and necessary validity [8].

'Kant's position thus required him not only to undermine the arguments of traditional metaphysics but also to put in their place a scientific metaphysics of his own, which establishes what can be known a priori but also limits it to that which is required for ordinary experience and its extension into natural science. Kant therefore had to find a way to limit the pretensions of the dogmatists while still defending metaphysics as a science which is both possible (as was denied by the skeptics) and necessary (as was denied by the indifferentists). Thus Kant had to fight a war on several different fronts [8].

Kant intentions while placing the limits of both rational dogmatists and the empiricists has a real project which was to demonstrate the possibility and the important of a "science of metaphysics" or a scientific metaphysics. "This new science, which Kant calls "transcendental" does not deal directly with objects of empirical cognition, but investigates the conditions of the possibility of our experience of them by examining the mental capacities that are required for us to have any cognition of objects at all. Kant agrees with Locke that we have no innate knowledge, that is, no knowledge of any particular propositions implanted in us by God or nature prior to the commencement of our individual experience. But experience is the product both of external objects affecting our sensibility and of the operation of our cognitive faculties in response to this effect, and Kant's claim is that we can have "pure" or a priori cognition of the contributions to experience made by the operation of these faculties themselves, rather than of the effect of external objects on us in experience. Kant divides our cognitive capacities into our receptivity to the effects of external

objects acting on us and giving us sensations, through which these objects are given to us in empirical intuition, and our active faculty for relating the data of intuition by thinking them under concepts, which is called understanding (A 191 B 33), and forming judgments about them. As already suggested, this division is the basis for Kant's division of the "Transcendental Doctrine of Elements" into the "Transcendental Aesthetic," which deals with sensibility and its pure form, and the "Transcendental Logic," which deals with the operations of the understanding and judgment as well as both the spurious and the legitimate activities of theoretical reason [8].

The "Transcendental Logic" turns to the main destructive task of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and that which gives it its name, the task of discrediting dogmatism and displaying the limits of metaphysics. The "Transcendental Analytic" has prepared the way for this critique of traditional metaphysics and its foundations by its argument that synthetic a priori principles can be established only within the limited domain of sensible experience. But Kant's aim in the "Dialectic" is not only to show the failure of a metaphysics that transcends the boundaries of possible experience. At the same time, he also wants to demonstrate that the questions that preoccupy metaphysics are inevitable, and that the arguments of metaphysics, although deceptive, should not be dismissed without sympathetic comprehension [8].

Whitehead's own project was what he called the "philosophy of organism". Therefore, to him, the philosophy of organism aspires to construct a critique of pure feeling, in the philosophical position in which Kant put his *Critique of Pure Reason* [5]. The critique of pure reasons asks a main question, how is synthetic a priori knowledge possible? Kant answer that knowledge comes from sensory input plus mind categories, that is space, time and causality. Whitehead continued that the philosophy of organism would also supersede the remaining Critiques required in the Kantian philosophy. Thus, in the organic philosophy Kant's 'Transcendental Aesthetic' becomes a distorted fragment of what should have been his main topic" [5]. This argument of whitehead exposed the critics and the limits of Kant. This new philosophy starts its discussion from the predecessors of Kant to whom Kant's project was on the subject matter of his predecessors. For he admits in the *process and reality* that "these lectures are based upon a recurrence to that phase of philosophic thought which began with Descartes and ended with Hume. The philosophic scheme which they endeavour to explain is termed the 'Philosophy of Organism' [5] Whitehead still in the preface of *process and reality* affirms that "The philosophy of organism is a recurrence to pre-Kantian modes of thought. These philosophers were perplexed by the inconsistent presuppositions underlying their inherited modes of expression. In so far as they, or their successors, have endeavoured to be rigidly systematic, the tendency has been to abandon just those elements in their thought upon which the philosophy of organism bases itself. An endeavor has been made to point out the exact points of agreement and of disagreement [5]. so whitehead admits that from

Descartes to Hume, they have attempted to explain the philosophy of organism but has miss out something and therefore his mission and vision is to realized or complete what they left out. Consequently, Whitehead explains that “in modern philosophy Descartes' two kinds of substance, corporeal and mental, illustrate incoherence. There is, in Descartes' philosophy, no reason why there should not be a one-substance world, only corporeal, or a one-substance world, only mental. According to Descartes, a substantial individual 'requires nothing but itself in order to exist.' Thus this system makes a virtue of its incoherence. But, on the other hand, the facts seem connected, while Descartes' system does not; for example, in the treatment of the body-mind problem. The Cartesian system obviously says something that is true. But its notions are too abstract to penetrate into the nature of things” [5].

Whitehead equally agrees that “The fundamental notion of the philosophy of organism is expressed in Locke's phrase, “it is past doubt there must be some real constitution, on which any collection of simple ideas co-existing must depend.” Locke makes it plain (d. II, II, 1) that by a 'simple idea' he means the ingression in the actual entity (illustrated by 'a piece of wax,' 'a piece of ice,' 'a rose') of some abstract quality which is not complex (illustrated by 'softness,' 'warmth,' 'whiteness'). For Locke such simple ideas, coexistingt in an actual entity, require a real constitution for that entity. Now in the philosophy of organism, passing beyond Locke's explicit statement, the notion of a real constitution is taken to mean that the eternal objects function by introducing the multiplicity of actual entities as constitutive of the actual entity in question. Thus, the constitution is 'real' because it assigns its status in the real world to the actual entity. In other words, the actual entity, in virtue of being what it is, is also where it is. It is somewhere because it is some actual thing with its correlated actual world. This is the direct denial of the Cartesian doctrine, “... an existent thing which requires nothing but itself in order to exist.” [5].

If Descartes and Locke haven't used abstract notions as described by whitehead in the above affirmations, they would have realized the philosophy of organism, thus a quasi-realization of the philosophy of organism. Whitehead suggests that “the aim of the philosophy of organism is to express a coherent cosmology based upon the notions of 'system,' 'process,' 'creative advance into novelty,’” [5] Since his aim was to obtain a one-substance cosmology, he said “‘prehensions' are a generalization from Descartes' mental 'cogitations,' and from Locke's 'ideas,' to express the most concrete mode of analysis applicable to every grade of individual actuality. Descartes and Locke maintained a two-substance ontology-Descartes explicitly, Locke by implication” [5]. Just like Kant, whitehead seeks to reconcile the reconciled the two-substance ontology put forth by locke's empiricists nature and Descartes's rationalists' nature. Based on this, we seek to demonstrate in

this study here that both Kant and whitehead had as plan to synthesize the “two-substance ontology” put forward by Descartes and Locke. Consequently, whitehead's “prehension” is kant's “synthetic a priori judgment.” Whitehead derived the word “prehension” from “apprehension” and connotatively used it as “uncognitive apprehension” which therefore means that a prehension is an embodiment of the “mental and physical capacity”⁶. In the analysis of prehensions in *process and reality*, whitehead stated that, “prehensions whose data involve actual entities-are termed 'physical prehensions'; and prehensions of eternal objects are termed 'conceptual prehensions. [5]. “Any instance of our experience is dipolar meaning its involves both the “Physical” and the “mental poles” [5]. Thus to whitehead, “a prehension is a process of unifying” [11], it is a “Concrete Facts of Relatedness” [5]. Because whitehead believes that, “nature is a process of expansive development, necessarily transitional from prehension to prehension... Thus nature is a structure of evolving processes. The reality is the process... The realities of nature are the prehensions in nature, that is to say, the events in nature” [11] Thus, prehension was introduced to mean the essential unity of events. whitehead process nature wiped out the two-substance ontology while Kant's necessary and universal bridge the two-substance ontology. Kant's synthetic as priori judgement makes our understanding of the world through mind categories whereas whitehead's prehensions makes our understanding of the world through concrete relational participation. Base on the view of reality Kant affirms that, we know phenomena which are the appearances and unknowable noumena which are things in themselves and whitehead on the other hand, reality is process and relations which are the experience of actual entities to whitehead. To whitehead, space and time emerge from relations while to Kant they are categories of mind in structure experience.

In order to justify the unity of prehensions whitehead admits that “The theory of prehension” embodies a protest against the bifurcation of nature. it embodies even more than that: Its protest is against the bifurcation of actualities. In the analysis of actuality the antithesis between publicity and privacy obtrudes itself at every stage [5] In a further explanation Whitehead tells us that “the theory of prehensions is founded upon the doctrine that there are no concrete facts which are merely public or merely private, the distinction between publicity and privacy is a distinction of reason and is not a distinction between mutually exclusive concrete facts. The sole concrete facts in terms of which actualities can be analyzed are prehensions and every prehensions has its public side and its private side [5]. Since every prehension has its public and private side or the physical and mental side respectively. The basic operations of mentality are 'conceptual prehensions.' These are the only operations of 'pure' mentality. All other mental operations are 'impure,' in the sense that they involve

6 The word perceive is, in our common usage, shot through and through with the, notion of cognitive apprehension. So is the word apprehension, even with the ad-

jective cognitive omitted. I will use the word prehension for uncognitive apprehension: by this I mean apprehension which may or may not be cognitive.(A N Whitehead, science and the modern world. p. 70)

integrations of conceptual prehensions with the physical prehensions of the physical pole. Since 'impurity' in prehension refers to the prehension arising out of the integration of 'pure' physical prehensions with 'pure' mental prehensions, it follows that an 'impure' mental prehension is also an 'impure' physical prehension and conversely [5]. These analysis on prehensions by whitehead help to wipe out the division between Descartes and Locke by focusing on, what reality is, Kant failed to realize it by focusing on how we know.

Just like Kant who endeavor to demonstrate a scientific metaphysics, whitehead "intended to state a condensed scheme of cosmological ideas, to develop their meaning by confrontation with the various topics of experience, and finally to elaborate an adequate cosmology in terms of which all particular topics find their interconnections [5]. Since "all modern philosophy hinges round the difficulty of describing the world in terms of subject and predicate, substance and quality, particular and universal. The result always does violence to that immediate experience which we express in our actions, our hopes, our sympathies, our purposes, and which we enjoy in spite of our lack of phrases for its verbal analysis [5]. To this effect, whitehead stipulates that "The philosophy of organism is the inversion of Kant's philosophy. The Critique of Pure Reason describes the process by which subjective data pass into the appearance of an objective world. The philosophy of organism seeks to describe how objective data pass into subjective satisfaction, and how order in the objective data provides intensity in the subjective satisfaction. For Kant, the world emerges from the subject; for the philosophy of organism, the subject emerges from the world-a (superject' rather than a 'subject.' The word (object' thus means an entity which is a potentiality for being a component in feeling; and the word (subject' means the entity constituted by the process of feeling, and including this process [5]. Whitehead's problem with Kant is that, he adopted a subjective position and this reverses his philosophy to the position of predecessors"⁷.

Despite whitehead's inversion or disagrees with Kant's proposed philosophy of organism but to an extent agreed with him but for a different reason. It is agreed that the functioning of concepts is an essential factor in knowledge, so that 'intuitions without concepts are blind.' But for Kant, apart from concepts there is nothing to know; since objects related in a knowable world are the product of conceptual functioning whereby categoreal form is introduced into the sense datum, which otherwise is intuited in the form of a mere spatio-temporal flux of sensations. Knowledge requires that this mere flux be par-

ticularized by conceptual functioning, whereby the flux is understood as a nexus of 'objects.' Thus, for Kant the process whereby there is experience is a process from subjectivity to apparent objectivity. The philosophy of organism inverts this analysis, and explains the process as proceeding from objectivity to subjectivity, namely, from the objectivity, whereby the external world is a datum, to the subjectivity, whereby there is one individual experience. Thus, according to the philosophy of organism, in every act of experience there are objects for knowledge; but, apart from the inclusion of intellectual functioning in that act of experience, there is no knowledge [5]. This is how whitehead reconciled the fight between rationalism and empiricism. From here we proceed by proposing that, the manner in which whitehead tackled his process philosophy suggest a posthumanism perspective.

A viewpoint known as posthumanism seeks to dismantle the borders and hierarchies that separate humans from other beings by highlighting the interdependence of organisms and complex systems. Broadly speaking, "posthumanist" theories aim to take into account the new ways that power is exercised in societies with more than humans as well as the indisputable involvement of non-human actors like nature and technology. Rosi Braidotti, one of the prominent scholars of posthumanism, says that we are now witnessing a convergence of two major movements—posthumanism, which rejects "the humanist ideal of 'Man' as the allegedly universal measure of all things," and post-anthropocentrism, "which rejects species hierarchy and human exceptionalism" (Braidotti, 2019) [12]. philosophically, Posthumanism encounters the idea of mankind as distinct and grander to the natural world, is gradually perceived as a critical lens for speaking environmental sustainability concerns by decentring the human being and recognizing the interconnectedness of all living existences inside an ecosystem, by this means encouraging a further principled and universal approach to environmental care.

Since Posthumanism challenges the anthropocentric view that places humans at the ego-centered of creation and argues for a more inclusive and interconnected understanding of life and whitehead of process philosophy challenges static being as the reality centered and call for a dynamic being which takes processes, relational and interconnectedness of reality. Thus, whitehead process philosophy aligns with the posthumanism focus. That why we think that, whitehead's project of process philosophy aligns with posthumanism focus. The interactive web of relationships is non-anthropocentric because the interconnectedness of relations includes humans and non-

7 "This difficulty is the point of Kant's 'transcendental' criticism. He adopted a subjectivist position, so that the temporal world was merely experienced. But according to his form of the subjectivist doctrine, in the Critique of Pure Reason, no element in the temporal world could itself be an experient. His temporal world, as in that Critique, was in its essence dead, phantasmal, phenomenal. Kant was a mathematical physicist, and his cosmological solution was sufficient for the abstractions to which mathematical physics is confined. The difficulties of the subjectivist doctrine arise when it is combined with the 'sensationalist' doctrine concerning the analysis of the components which are together in experience. According to that analysis in such a component the only elements not stamped with the

particularity of that individual 'occasion' -or 'stream' -of experience are universals such as 'redness' or 'shape.' With the sensationalist assumption, or with any generalization of that doctrine, so long as the elements in question are universals, the only alternatives are, either Bradley's doctrine of a single experient, the absolute, or Leibniz's doctrine of many windowless monads. Kant, in his final metaphysics, must either retreat to Leibniz, or advance to Bradley. Either alternative stamps experience with a certain air of illusoriness". (A N whitehead, process and reality, p. 190)

humans, that is nature and objects. The relations prioritize interaction over human centrality. Since process philosophy prioritize becoming over being, it therefore aligns with posthuman focus on processes and not fixed entities. There are no fixed entities because whitehead actual entities by reason of being is a network of nexus of relationship. They are the final facts all alike, whitehead describe them as drops of experience, complex and interdependent. [5]. By decentering the human, posthumanism encourages a shift in perspective that recognizes the intrinsic value of all beings and the interconnectedness of all lives, whitehead process philosophy seeks this essence. Just like posthumanism, whitehead process philosophy acknowledges the agency of non-human entities, such as animals, plants, and ecosystems. To him, nature is a structure of revolving processes and reality is a process, the realities of nature are the prehensions in nature, that is to say the events in nature, the term prehension signify the essential unity of an event [11].

3. Conclusions

Since Whitehead emphasized that reality is the process since nature is a structure of evolving processes therefore the realities are the prehensions in nature, process philosophy is not just an approach but a way of understanding the structure and the interconnectedness of reality. One of the outstanding significances of whitehead's process philosophy is the creation of new language in philosophy. In the history of philosophy concepts like prehensions, actual entities and eternal objects are useable into days philosophy only in connotations of whitehead, it teaches us new thoughts can necessarily require new language for the purpose of comprehensive meaning within a contextual atmosphere. This new initiative has caught the attention of the contemporary world and it has greatly influence, reshape, restructure the ideas of his readers as each and every individual thinker interprets and commented on his works. Due to his philosophy of organism, the pre-existing language of philosophy "static being", alternatively change to "organic being" or dynamic being". Through whitehead's project of process philosophy which is his philosophy of organism, make us to understand nature as an interconnectedness of entities in complex systems. whitehead's emphasis on the interconnectedness and creative advance into novelty has an implication on our understanding of this natural world and our place within it. Society wise, it promotes a more relational ethical values in a contextual approach in decision making with focus being on change, growth and development.

Abbreviations

A N Alfred North

Author Contributions

Ndam Jonas Ketum is the sole author. The author read and approved the final manuscript.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

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Biography

Ndam Jonas Ketum'S Academic journey began with his GCE Advanced level at government bilingual high school (GBHS) SANTA in 2014. He then pursued a bachelor degree in philosophy at the university of DSCHANG (UDS), which he completed in 2017. His academic excellence led him to further his studies, earning a master's degree in philosophy in 2019 from the same university, specializing in the history of philosophy and metaphysics. KETUM's Academic prowess didn't stop there. He went on to earn a Doctorate degree in 2025 from the university of Yaoundé 1, specializing in Logic and Epistemology. currently, he serves as the HND General Coordinator at the institute of Higher Education FOYAGUEM in Dschang.

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