

Research Article

A Pirate, a Broker, and a Sentry Between the Emperor Wan Li and King Felipe II --- Based on *Du Fu Shu Yi* and *Dong Xi Yang Kao*

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Abstracts

When Portugal and Spain embarked on global colonial expansion, on the same timeline in Asia, the Ming Dynasty still utilized the feudal tributary system to define the “small, poor, and weak” Fans. Through the Philippines as a transit port: a belligerent pirate, Limajon, a cunning broker with some knowledge of Portuguese and Spanish, Cincay, a self-aggrandizing sentry, Omocon, with the Emperor Wan Li and King Felipe II, they together recounted the early history between China and Spain. In academic achievements surrounding this profitable global, except for Martin de Rada, Juan Gonzalez de Mendoza, Miguel de Loarca and their representative works, records, perspectives, and commentaries and dairies from Ming Dynasty officials and scholars are lacking. Liu Yaohui, the governor of Fu Jian, Du Fu Shu Yi and Zhang Bian wrote Dong Xi Yang Kao, which recorded the same historical facts, this article’s core is to demonstrate their records and their minds of ancient Fu Jian and Guang Dong’s residents, furthermore, through Fo Lang Ji, these residents had developed a negative impression of the so-called West and continued until the second globalization, this reflects the mentality behind China’s Ming and Qing dynasties’ 220-year maritime ban policy, this comprehensive ocean and maritime trade blockade that caused China to continuously fall into a quagmire of backwardness, China developed a severe phobia in the mid-19th century.

Keywords

Ming Dynasty, Felipe II, Indirect, Negative, Fo Lang Ji

1. Introduction

After the Treaty de Tordesillas signed the treaty, it couldn't stop the Portuguese and Spanish from exploring and allocating their territory, the former arrived first along the southeastern coast of China in the early 16th century, after more than 40 years, they finally settled in Macau and began trading in 1557. The Spanish followed closely behind,

crossing the Pacific Ocean and arriving in the Philippine archipelago, across the sea from China, in 1565, and occupying Cebu. In April 1571, Miguel lopes de Legazpi encountered a conflict between Chinese merchants and local people while leading his army to Manila. He resolved the situation of the besieged Chinese merchants. To establish

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Received: 21 November 2025; Accepted: 4 December 2025; Published: 29 December 2025



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trade relations with China, Legazpi warmly welcomed them to trade in the Philippines and fully expressed his desire to send envoys to China and establish official contacts [11]. The Chinese merchants who had been rescued frankly told Legazpi that “foreigners cannot enter the country without official permission or approval” [7], but they promised to continue to mediate [7]. In 1572, these rescued merchants returned to Manila to resume trade between China and the Philippines, this meant that from the late 1570s, trade was initially an informal, private, personal relationship between China, Spain, and the Philippines, was considered a prelude to the Manila galleons (early globalization).

In the early Ming Dynasty, Zhu Yuan Zhang, Zhu Di, Zhu Gao Zhi, and the Wan li, Zhu Yijun continued the tributary system, which had existed since the Han Dynasty (202 BC to 220 AD), for receiving foreign delegations. With declining economic conditions and a depleted treasury, the traditional tributary system became unsustainable starting with the Wan Li Emperor, however, the actual demand for Chinese goods did not decrease, when official resources could not meet the demand, private trade, primarily conducted by coastal regions such as Zhe Jiang, Fu Jian, and Guang Dong, flourished overseas, even leading to a situation of “the state-owned deteriorating with the private-owned advancing” [16].

A related phenomenon emerged: due to the strain on national finances and a severe shortage of personnel within local governments to handle tribute matters, in the mid-to-late Ming Dynasty, it became apparent that the highly active and renowned maritime merchants in China's numerous interactions with various Western countries became intermediaries between nations, was named Tong Shi, “they were a gray group operating in the absence of officials” [15]. They were merchants, officials, and yet, they could be neither officials nor merchants. Gradually, they played an indispensable and crucial role in China's extensive coastal regions, facilitating contact with other civilizations.

A pirate was a captivating figure in Sino-Spain exchanges. However, when placed within the context of Chinese pirate history, he represented only a minor figure among numerous pirate groups [1], in the context of global history, it just so happened that he launched a surprise attack on Manila. This paper focuses on “a broker”, Cin, who was both a maritime merchant and a Tong Shi [7]. Because he had some knowledge of Portuguese and Spanish, seemed to have some leverage to maneuver between Chinese officials and Spaniards and was even suspected of “tampering with legal documents” [5]. It is based on Liu Yaohui's *Du Fu Shu Yi*, combined with Zhang Bian's *Dong Xi Yang Kao*, Martin de Rada's *Record of My Mission to Fu Jian*, Juan Gonzalez de Mendoza's *History of the Great Chinese Empire*, and Miguel de Loarca's *Relacion de la Tierra de China*. Following the principle of mutual corroboration, the author presents a more comprehensive and accurate picture of the first Sino-Spain exchanges, depicting a tangible historical panorama.

2. A Figure from the Golden Age of Chinese Piracy: Limahong (Lin)

Lin was one of the pirates in the South China Sea during the early Wan Li Emperor's reign, he was an important figure in initiating exchanges between China and Spain. Some records are preserved in ancient documents such as the *Guang Dong Tong Zhi*, *Fu Jian Tong Zhi*, *Qiong Zhou Fu Zhi*, *Chao Zhou Fu Zhi*, *Chao Yang Xian Zhi*, *Cheng Hai Xian Zhi*, *Hui Lai Xian Zhi* and *Wan Li Wu Gong Lu*, in Archives General de Indias de Sevilla, information is concentrated in vol. 39 and 42.

Compared to these frequently cited academic materials, Liu Yaohui's handwritten copy, *Du Fu Shu Yi*, is the more detailed Chinese document, as the Fu Jian Provincial Governor during the early years of the Wan Li Emperor's reign, and one of his duties was to be the highest-ranking local official responsible for “pursuing Lin” [7].

There are four reasons why Lin attacked Manila: (1) During Liu Yaohui's tenure, Guang Dong and Fu Jian formed a joint force to arrest him. He and his pirate group had been drifting at sea for a long time and had no way to obtain supplies [20]. (2) Lin, drifting at sea for a long time, intercepted two Chinese ships returning from Manila. The bottom of the ship's hold contained a large amount of gold and silver. The captured Chinese crew members confessed that the Spanish only had 70 men in Manila and had no ability to defend themselves [9]. (3) According to the record in *Yu Yi Jiao Zei Jie Yin Shu*, a person, named Yan Youqian in Lin's company, his family had entered and exited Lu Zon many times, mainly to transport Chinese goods for trade. He was familiar with the situation on Lu Zon. When Lin had difficulty with daily supplies, he decided to “end his drifting at sea and go south to Luzon” [20].

On November 23, 1574, when Lin's fleet reached the waters near Lu Zon Island, they encountered a large Spanish wooden ship carrying 22 Spanish soldiers and a small bronze cannon. Under the siege of his forces, the wooden ship was burned, and all the Spaniards on board were killed, the bronze cannon became the first spoils. The Spanish officer, Juan de Salcedo immediately sent a messenger to Manila to report to Guido de Lavezares (GL). On the night of November 29th, Lin's fleet arrived at Manila Bay, and he led 400 soldiers onto small boats to prepare for an attack on Manila. At 8:00 AM on the 30th, his troops abandoned their boats and landed, with 200 musketeers in the lead and 200 elite soldiers following, the first to be killed was the Spanish commander, Martin de Goyti [5].

Due to the fierce resistance of the Spanish army, Lin's forces were forced to retreat, GL, heeding the advice of Cin-cay (Cin), a Chinese resident of Manila, immediately ordered the construction of defensive fences and fortifications, and the mounting of four cannons on small batteries, preparing to repel Lin's next attack. On December 2nd, Lin personally led his entire fleet to Manila Harbor, consisting of approximately 1000-1500 soldiers, divided into three groups, attacking the

city from three directions, but the second offensive against Manila also ended in failure. In this battle, the Spanish army suffered 13 dead, while Lin's army lost over 200 men. After the two failed offensives, he abandoned the idea of capturing Manila and retreat to Pangasinan, 40 nautical miles from Manila, where he established a base and built fortifications, preparing to repel any potential Spanish counterattacks.

The historical events were only briefly mentioned in *Yu Yi Jiao Zei Jie Yin Shu*:

“舊歲十一月間，林鳳復回新港，態度澎湖入廣，此時，新港夷人報知，八月內福建總兵關胡守仁領兵親到港中駐扎數日，鳳等驚懼，駕船出港，因伙廩顏祐謙熟知呂宋藩情，故駕往彼國。

連日攻打不下，呂宋酋長被賊殺死，各賊中中藩人烏銃兒死者四五百人。

隱居玳瑁城，駐城二座，與藩拒守，方慾修洗船隻，整屬兵器，待南訊復回廣中”。 [2]

Governor GL considered him a major threat and eliminated him. On March 23, 1575, Juan de Salcedo led 250 Spanish troops and 2,500 local soldiers in 59 ships from Manila, arriving at Pangasinan on March 30. At 10:00 AM, the Spanish army launched an attack on his stronghold, killing over 100 of his soldiers and capturing over 70 women and children. The following day, the army launched another full-scale attack on Lin's fortress, adding three large cannons and many smaller ones to the fortress, but both sides maintained a defensive situation [14].

As an agent of the Wan Li Emperor, Omocon (Omo), and as an agent of Felipe II, GL, used Lin as a chessman in their negotiations: GL wanted to assist the Wan Li Emperor in capturing and eliminating Lin and his pirate group in exchange for the right to enter China for missionary and trade. In contrast, Omo sought to utilize the strength and weaponry of the Spanish expeditionary force, to annihilate the Lin's pirate group and thus secure his own promotion and fame.

Facing a double attack from the Spanish and the Ming dynasty, Lin, taking advantage of the geographical advantage of the numerous small islands and after several maneuvers, finally established his capital in Lingayen Bay with his remaining troops. He built residences, fortresses, and pagodas, and proclaimed himself king, he taught the local inhabitants' Chinese agricultural techniques and Ming dynasty handicrafts, and the local people provided him with food, timber, and other necessities [16]. This document was corroborated in the records of Juan Gonzalez de Mendoza: “[...] established himself on this Pangasinan River, and the people acknowledge him as their sovereign” [6], and “built fortresses for permanent residence” [20].

3. A Broker Who Combined Business and Official Factors: Cincay (Cin)

This figure stemmed from Conquista de las Islas Philip-

pinas [4] briefly described a detail: in the trade between China and the Philippines in 1572, there were three Chinese merchants, one of whom “had some linguistic talent” [4] and “this Chinese merchant had traded with the Portuguese residing in Macau” and “he could speak some Portuguese” [7]. Due to the similarities between Portuguese and Spanish, this merchant had fewer obstacles in communicating with the Spanish, compared to the others.

Before the advent of the Manila galleon, Cin was a prominent Chinese merchant in Sino-Philippine trade, and he likely resided in Manila for an extended period. When Lin attacked Manila with his troops, Cin should stay in the city. After the initial attack failed and retreated, Cin actively visited the Governor GL, Lin would attack Manila again within three days and strongly suggested removing all the straw from the roofs of Manila buildings to prevent fire attacks [14].

The Spanish troops stationed in Manila adopted this advice. When Lin attacked again, he was defeated once more due to the Spanish's thorough preparation and turned his attention to Pangasinan, from then on, the balance of power shifted between the Spanish army and Lin's forces. Because of Cin's advice, the Spanish recalled their troops from other cities and islands, gathering all their forces in Manila. On March 22, 1575, the Spanish army took the initiative to go to Pangasinan to subdue Lin. During this process, Cin and GL and Juan de Salcedo formed an initial trust [20].

Based on Miguel de Loarca's *Relacion de la Tierra de China*, Cin was involved in the Spanish invasion of Pangasinan, possibly acting as an intermediary, Cin conveyed Juan de Salcedo's intention to persuade them to surrender, promising to treat their troops well, return prisoners, and even using the overwhelming number of Spanish soldiers and artillery as leverage to suggest they accept his proposal. Lin replied that they would only surrender after the Spanish army withdrew to Manila [3]. These conditions were rejected by Juan de Salcedo. Thus, the negotiations between the Governor-General of the Philippines, represented by Juan de Salcedo, and Lin, with Cin acting as a middleman, came to an end [7].

Chinese historical records about Cin, did not connect him with Lin, but rather with Omo (Wang Wanggao). In fact, after Lin his pirate group fled to the Philippines, the Fu Jian governor, Liu Yaohui, never gave up the pursuit. According to *Du Fu Shu Yi*, after Lin fled to Lu Zon, the leader of the Fu Jian army dispatched a sentinel officer, Wang Wanggao, to sea for reconnaissance. This was the Chinese sentry, Omo, recorded by the Governor, Fransico de Sande.

On April 22, 1575, Lin was besieged in Pangasinan, Omo, the sudden appearance of the Chinese ships was initially mistaken by Juan de Salcedo, as Chinese reinforcements. After Cin made some communication, a military conflict was avoided. Juan de Salcedo realized that Omo's intentions were aligned with his own, they went to Manila to meet with the Governor, and through Cin's translation and explanation,

both sides reached an agreement: Omo would lead the Spanish delegation to China, thus beginning the official exchanges between China and the Spanish-occupied Philippines.

In May 1575, Omo, accompanied by Cin, Spanish missionaries Martin de Rada and Geronimo Martin, Pedro Sarmiento, and Miguel de Loarca, departed from Manila for China. Upon arriving in Fu Jian, he reported on the battles fought in Pangasinan.

“把總王望高等以呂宋夷兵賊林鳳與海，焚舟鑿級”。[18]

“王望高，周英等網上諭呂宋，詔藩兵伍仟人，襲擊港內，焚燒舟幾儘”。[18]

One detail cannot be overlooked: before the departure, GL wrote two important documents. The first, dated June 2, 1575, was addressed to Martin de Rada, primarily clarifying the Spanish mission's purpose: “his Majesty the King is eager to spread Catholicism and hopes that the whole world will draw near to the one true God, to spread and obey His teachings” [17], “to learn all information and secrets concerning China” [17], and “to request the Chinese to provide a port, as they have treated the Portuguese” [18]. The second document was GL's first diplomatic letter to the Wan Li Emperor of the Ming Dynasty, written on behalf of the Spanish Philippine authorities, and then, Guido de Lavezares personally requested Cin to translate this document into Chinese.

It must be acknowledged that in 1570s, those fluent in ancient classical Chinese and with a little understanding of Spanish were far from few, Cin's multilingualism was a unique advantage. Under Omo's instigation, it's questionable whether the Chinese version of the first letter from the Governor-General of the Philippines to the Wan Li Emperor was consistent with the original. They colluded, exploiting the limited vocabulary and ambiguity of classical Chinese, to exaggerate or distort their activities in Manila, or to reverse the order of historical events, artificially highlighting their respective roles in this historical process for personal gain, such motives were suspected. “[...] the logical relationships between different texts need to be re-examined, and the authenticity of some diplomatic documents is questionable” [7].

4. A Self-Aggrandizing Sentinel Who Altered the Timeline: Omocon (Omo)

A sentry was dispatched to sea to scout Lin's position. Wang Wanggao, recorded by the third Governor-General, was the first Chinese official he could contact; however, Omo was not actually an official, he was unaware that Lin was in Pangasinan. When Omo and his fleet approached Pangasinan, they were mistaken for his reinforcements. Omo showed the Spanish officials and priests an imperial edict from the Chinese Emperor. The document essentially stated that: any of Lin subordinates who abandoned him or defected to the Chinese army would be pardoned; it also promised a substantial reward for anyone who captured or killed him

[14].

Cin briefed on Lin's entire campaign in Luzon, his attack on Manila, and his arrival in Pangasinan. Lin was trapped in Pangasinan and unable to escape. At that moment, Juan de Salcedo, the commander of the Spanish army in Pangasinan, politely saw the documents he presented, and told Omo that Lin was in dire straits and would soon be annihilated, and advised to go to Manila, stating that he did not need the cooperation of Chinese ships and personnel, as his military strength was sufficient to deal with him. He dispatched a small boat to take Omo and his entourage to Manila, guaranteeing that Lin would be delivered within a few days, dead or alive.

They were warmly entertained by Governor GL, he and his entourage spent several days in Manila, but the Lin's fate remained uncertain, and the Chinese side had no information about them. Omo thought that, as the Spanish had confidently assured him, Lin was already besieged, and the Spanish governor had assured him that they would hand him over, dead or alive, to him, thus providing an explanation to their Fu Jian's governor-general. Based on this analysis, Omo informed that they decided to return to China, and to keep them informed of any further news, they would return to Manila.

In May 1575, with the Governor GL's support, Omo, along with Cin, Martin de Rada, Geronimo Martin, Pedro Sarmiento, and Miguel de Loarca, departed from Manila for China. In July 1575, the first Spanish mission arrived on the Fu Jian coast, subsequently passing through Zhong Zuo Suo and Quan Zhou before reaching Fu Zhou. Omo gave a detailed report to the Fu Jian governor on his and his entourage's landing of overseas campaigns, and on the entire process of “his personal command of the Spanish forces in suppressing Lin” [14].

One detail must be noted, when Cin translated the second letter from the Governor-General, he altered Omo's activities and sequence of events. The letter stated, “Wang Wang Gao first arrived in Manila to contact the Governor-General and then went north with the Spanish to launch a campaign to encircle and annihilate Lin. We sent troops to attack Lin, and upon arrival, destroyed all his ships and captured the first fortress. Many enemies were annihilated, and 70 old and young people were captured” [7]. In other words, through Cin's translation and modification, the fierce battle destroyed by the Spanish under Juan de Salcedo's leadership, was successfully attributed to Omo, becoming his achievement. They conspired, transforming Omo from a participant in the war into a dominant force and commander.

“探聽林鳳間玳瑁港，眾尚三千餘人，因出願給印信札負極軍令牌，以示藩酋，即廳藩僧與同王望高，林必秀等分投遍諭土藩，前後共德藩兵伍仟餘人，賊眾死傷者無數也”。[18]

Following the practice of tributary states, Fu Jian officials hosted banquets along the way. Unfortunately, the Spanish, landing in China for the first time, found this rather unset-

ting. Martin de Rada complained, “this hospitality was unbearable, because it continues unabated along the way” [6]. Amidst this repeated hospitality, the Spanish had virtually no opportunity to express their demands in their first letter to Martin de Rada, and no official even inquired about their requests.

During their month-long stay in Fu Zhou, although the Spanish had several brief meetings with Liu Yaohui, they “almost never had the chance to mention their mission in China” [6]. What caused this inability to express their demands? As Liu Yaohui himself explained:

“呂宋，一小國藩人耳，偶因遷兵哨探鋪寇林鳳，便論之殺賊，因而有功而已”。[2]

“即當遷官頒給，以示天朝念功柔遠之圖”。[18]

From the moment the Spanish delegation arrived and landed in Fu Jian, the exchanges between the two sides seemed to have deviated from the original intentions set forth in Manila. Mutual trade or missionary had long been put aside. Omocon and Cincay, along with local Fu Jian officials, were deeply embroiled in a power struggle over military achievements.

5. Felipe II's Letter of Credence Failed to Reach Wan Li Emperor

In August 1576, Rada's letters recounting his visit to China were sent across the ocean to Madrid. On April 18, 1578, Felipe II replied, “I have received your letter from last year, and I am very pleased to know of your good intentions and zeal for Christ—not only in guiding the faith of the indigenous people on those islands, but also in your visit to Chincheo” [11].

On March 5, 1580, the Indian Council submitted a proposal to Felipe II, “information on China and (whether) to send the Augustinian missionary Mendoza with His Majesty's letters and gifts to China” [11]. This document focused on Rada's many observations, summarizing three main benefits: first, it could aid Spanish missionary work in China, “the Chinese people do not deny the immortality of the soul; they believe in the principle of karmic retribution” [11]; second, although sending envoys to China was costly, the Spanish could acquire enormous wealth if they could use the opportunity to trade in China [4]; and finally, establishing friendly relations with China could safeguard the security of the Philippines, a border region of the Spanish Empire.

On June 3, 1580, the Indian Council issued royal decrees to New Spain and the Philippines, clearly assigning ambassadors to the Ming Dynasty. Considering that the Augustinian Order members were among the first to propose a visit to China and possessed experience in doing so, three missionaries—Mendoza, Ortega, and Marin—were appointed as the ambassadors to China. On June 11, 1580, a letter to the Wan Li Emperor was completed in Badajoz. “To the mighty and highly respected Emperor of China, we wish you perfect

health and ever-increasing prosperity” [10], reviewed the history and achievements of Sino-Spain exchanges. Felipe II explained that he relied on two sources of information to understand China—the colonial rulers of the Philippine Islands and Spanish missionaries and expressed his admiration for the Chinese emperor's prudent and nice governance and thanked the Chinese officials and people for their warm hospitality and assistance to the Spanish who were traveling from the Philippines to Fu Jian.

Judging from the letter's contents, Felipe II humbly expressed his desire for friendly relations with China. Starting with faith and gifts, he gradually presented the benefits of establishing a formal and lasting relationship with the unfamiliar Eastern monarch to China, adhering to the principle of reciprocity. On June 1, 1581, Mendoza and his entourage arrived in Mexico with their plans, the letter, and gifts for China. The mission rested in Mexico before continuing to the Philippines, ultimately reaching China.

Lorenzo Suarez de Mendoza, the Viceroy of New Spain, immediately sought opinions from Spaniards who had served or lived in the Philippines and convened a special discussion. Francisco de Sande was the first to submit his feedback and listed four reasons in writing against sending a mission to China and advocated for a military conquest. Another Philippine official, Gabriel de Rivera, disagreed with the plan for a direct visit to China, his suggestion was that Felipe II consider using Macau, where the Portuguese population was concentrated, as a base to seek opportunities to visit mainland China and developed relations with China.

In response to growing opposition, Ortega wrote to Felipe II, vulted to return to Spain to personally recount the situation [10]. On April 28, 1582, the Indian Council advised the King to cancel the mission. However, Felipe II still preferred to proceed with this meticulously planned diplomatic mission, explicitly approving the proposal: “however, the Augustinian missionary, Ortega, has now returned from New Spain and will arrive soon. After Ortega returned to Spain, he submitted a detailed report on the mission to China to the Indian Council and the King. On May 19, 1582, the Indian Council again petitioned Felipe II and strongly requesting the King to issue a royal decree canceling the planned visit to China as soon as possible, and “to prevent damage to the goods, the gifts already shipped to New Spain should be sold as soon as possible” [20]. Felipe II could not refuse and agreed to the committee's decision. It is particularly worth mentioning that the clocks originally intended for the Chinese Emperor were difficult to sell due to their high price and were eventually taken to the Philippines, one of which eventually ended up in the hands of Jesuits in Macau, China.

Thus, the highest-level diplomatic effort between Spain and China prepared eight years, ultimately failed to be executed. The lavish gifts meticulously prepared for the Ming Emperor were auctioned off and scattered throughout Spanish colonies in the Americas and the Philippines. Felipe II never left Europe during his reign, but through correspond-

ence sent back to Spain from its overseas colonies, especially the Philippine Islands which are closest to China, this monarch, of paramount importance in human history, possessed a profound and unique understanding of China, and adopted a positive and proactive attitude. Based on this foundation, the Spanish monarchy's policy towards China in the 16th century was to proactively and peacefully approach China, maintaining and consolidating the fruitful results already achieved in trade, culture, religion, and personnel exchanges.

6. The Essence of the Maritime Ban Policy: Negative Impressions of the West

Impressions, in essence, are views people form about “the other” based on existing information, in the realm of international relations, an impression of a foreign country is a selective, generalized, but fixed view of other countries or regions, formed by a nation or region based on its own values, knowledge, belief systems, historical experience, and the desire to maintain a stable self-image, it is an expression of identity bestowed upon a nation through interaction and exchange. With the opening of new sea routes, before world maps arrived in China, the Chinese people's understanding of the world and the earth was limited. Tian Xia, packaged by Confucianism, dominated the minds of emperors, officials, and common people. Portugal, known as Fo Lang Ji by the Chinese, was the first European country to directly engage with Ming Dynasty China, Spain, another powerful European nation that colonized Lu Zon and actively developed relations with China from Manila, was also called Fo Lang Ji, a term that persisted until the mid-Qing Dynasty.

Undeniably, during the Ming and Qing dynasties, the Chinese people's understanding of Europe mostly came through Fo Lang Ji. Their impression of the Portuguese and the Spanish, to a certain extent, represented or reflected the Chinese people's perception of the West, and it is worth noting that the negative impression, after some social dissemination and diffusion, seemed to gradually form a negative impression of all the West as a whole.

Based on ancient Chinese documents and descriptions, the general impression of the Fo Lang Ji among Chinese officials and ordinary citizens during the Ming and Qing dynasties can be summarized in the following aspects:

First, the strangely shaped *Bai Fan* [2].

Physical appearance and physique were the most obvious differences. “They all had high noses and deep-set eyes, just like Hui” [18], “deep-set eyes and prominent noses, bald heads and bushy beards”, “eyes like a cat, beak like an eagle, face ashen white”, “tall, high nose, cat-like eyes and eagle beak, curly hair and red beard” [2], and so on. In the minds of ancient Chinese, these descriptions were characteristic of the northwestern nomadic peoples. When the Portuguese arrived in Macau, they were called “Tai Xi Jia Hu” [18]. Tai

Xi indicated that they came from afar to China. Jia indicated their purpose in coming, to do business. Hu indicated that their external characteristics were the same as those of the nomadic peoples of northwest China. Because their physical appearance differed significantly from that of Asians, especially those from Southeast Asia, the term “Fan Gui” was used to describe the Portuguese in Guang Dong's local chronicles. It is natural to find that when Chinese people encounter people from distant Europe, they were particularly good at using animals to express their feelings, “using animals to convey their direct feelings about foreigners” [12], which contains a somewhat derogatory connotation.

The core is Fan. In the elaborately crafted Confucian worldview of Tian Xia, the world was a square, with China at its center, all others not in this central position were called Fan, signifying that China was a great power, the center of the world, while other places were small and incomparable. Because these people occupied the Fan position, their status was low. When they came to Ming Dynasty, they were subject to the tributary system, bringing tribute to visit the emperors. This concept was naturally applied to the early relations between China and Lu Zon, and between China and Manila. This tributary system, an unequal diplomatic relationship, was not the relationship between two nations or states. This perception did not change with the arrival of Spain in the Philippines. The relationship that originally applied to Ming Dynasty and Lu Zon was directly grafted onto the relationship between China and Spain.

This made it easier to understand why, in the documents of Liu Yao Hui and Zhang Bian, Portugal and Spain were always referred to as Fan, small Fan or vassal states. This is not an equal diplomatic relationship, but a relationship between China and its vassal states, as the author described earlier, the missionaries who landed in Fu Jian with Omo and the gifts they brought were considered part of the tribute.

The interactions between China and Spain, which arose through Lin, and the understanding of these interactions differed between the Wan Li and Felipe II. This difference was perceived by the Governor-General of the Philippines and the Spanish who had previously been in the Philippines. When Felipe II's letter of credence arrived in New Spain, Francisco de Sande was the first to voice his opposition and consistently advocated for a military offensive. The Ming Dynasty's attitude towards the first delegation and its subsequent reports upon returning to the Philippines, combined with these factors, gave Francisco de Sande this impression.

Second, there were the warlike and powerful Fan from the sea.

“傑悍狡詐，習於戰爭，戈矛劍姬，銃鉋彈射，精爾貝備……當時同事如暹羅等國諸彝，簡之垂首喪氣，莫敢誰何”[18].

“Colluding with Japanese pirates to aid their ferocity” [12], “entering port, they feign trade; landing, they kill and kidnap men and women; expelling, they openly resist the enemy; going overseas, they plunder merchants' wealth”, “they were

simply a group of openly thuggish bandits” [14]. The above descriptions repeatedly appeared in Ming and Qing dynasty documents, such as in Cai Ru Xian's representative work *Dong Yi Tu Shuo*, Mao Ruizheng's representative work *Huang Ming Xiang Xu Lu*, and Chen Renxi's representative work *Huang Ming Shi Fa Lu*, etc. Correspondingly, ancient Ming and Qing dynasty documents contain records and descriptions of the Spanish massacring Chinese in Lu Zon and Manila, “[...] Javanese killed our people, and Fo Lang Ji hunted down our Chinese” [19], and “they were like vicious dogs, far more terrifying than Yi and Fan” [18]. “When the Portuguese envoys came to China to visit Guang Dong officials, they refused to kneel and bow as barbarians” [15]. “The distant barbarians came out of admiration for the righteousness of the Celestial Empire, but they were unaware of the etiquette of the Celestial Empire. I ordered them to go to Guang Xiao Temple to learn etiquette for three days before they could meet me. On the first day, they knelt on their left knee, on the second day on their right knee, and only on the third day did they kowtow” [19]. The above records and legends continued, and gradually, the Western impression, as arrogant and domineering became widespread in ancient Chinese society.

The term Bai Fan primarily described the outward characteristics of the Fo Lang Ji, with “powerful” and “warlike” emphasized in their characters, whether Portuguese or Spanish, Fo Lang Ji as a general term was always associated with ships, cannons, and armies.

“長四五尺，其腹部稍大，開一面，以小銃裝鐵彈子放入銃腹內，藥發，則子從管中出，甚迅。

每一大銃用小銃四五個，以便輪放，其船內兩旁各置於大銃四五個，在艙內暗放，敵船不敢進，顧得橫行海上”。 [18]

The impression of Fo Lang Ji as powerful and warlike among Chinese officials and ordinary people was felt by the newly arrived missionaries. “The Chinese were very afraid of Christians; they saw either Portuguese or Spanish, and they regarded these nations as warmongers” [20]. Matteo Ricci, he once expressed that the size of Portuguese and Spanish ships, their extraordinary equipment, and the roar of their cannons instilled great fear in the Chinese: “they believed these Fo Lang Ji were strong warriors and conquerors of various countries; the Fo Lang Ji’s empire had no borders, except to the ends of the earth” [19].

Third, Fo Lang Ji was religiously devout invaders.

In 1511, the Portuguese occupied Malacca. When Ming Dynasty officials learned that Malacca had fallen to the Portuguese, they were quite shocked. Liu Yaohui put forward the idea that since the Portuguese were invaders, we should refuse their demands for tribute.

“滿辭加朝貢詔奉之國，而佛朗機並之，且談我以利，邀求封賞，與義絕不可聽，請確其貢獻，明示順逆，使歸還滿刺加疆土之後，方許朝貢。

脫或執迷不悔，雖外夷不煩兵力，亦必繳械詔諸夷，聲

罪於討”。 [2]

After the Spanish occupied Luzon, their image as aggressors was largely established. “Fo Lang Ji was cunning barbarians... They travel everywhere as merchants, and where they go, they plot to attack their own people”, [2] “relying on their strength, they bully and oppress other countries, going everywhere they go” [2]. When the Portuguese were allowed to reside in Macau, and when the Ming emperor agreed to allow Southeast Asian merchants to trade with the Spanish in the Philippines, many Ming officials at that time opposed this, generally believing that there was an intention to “premeditatedly invade China” [12].

“嘉靖年鑒澳門諸夷，不過漸漸運木石駕屋，若聚落爾，久之獨衛舶幣。

今且高鑄城垣，以為三窟，且分織間諜峨關博帶，闖入各省直地方，互相鉸接，即中國之積紳章縫，折節相從，數千裡外，問候不絕，得起餽遺者甚多，頻年結連呂宋和日本，以為應援。

凡我山川額賽去處，靡不圖之于室，居恆指畫某地兵民強弱多寡，洞如觀火。

實隱有覬覦之心，實時練兵器，積火藥，適且鑄大銃無虛日，意欲何為？

此豈非窺嗣中國之狀耶”。 [18]

Because of the negative impacts, when Omo arrived in Fu Jian with the first Spanish delegation, their actions were strictly controlled, their intentions could not be fully expressed, and important officials deliberately avoided them. Unfortunately, to capture Lin, these Ming Dynasty officials had to rely on the Spanish army in the South China Sea for cooperation. In this dilemma, when Martin de Rada landed in China with the first delegation, they could only operate within a fixed route, “everything had to be within regulations” and they had to “quickly leave China” [8].

The negative impressions were most directly and obviously reflected in Matteo Ricci. When he entered China via Macau, he was regarded as a “spy plotting against China by the Portuguese” [20]. During his stay in Macau, Ricci did his utmost to “conceal his close relationship with the Portuguese in Macau” [13] and “avoid direct contact with them as much as possible” [16]. As Matteo Ricci traveled north from Macao, these negative impressions brought many inconveniences to his activities. He had to wear the clothing of ordinary Chinese people and take off his traditional missionary attire. Now, when we mention this history again, he is seen as an “integrator” of Confucian culture. When we could enter that period of history, it is natural that Matteo Ricci faced unspeakable difficulties. Changing clothes and accessories became a protective shell for his activities in Zhong Yuan.

During the Ming and Qing dynasties in China, through the relationship between Fo Lang Ji and missionaries, Fo Lang Ji and Catholicism, and even Fo Lang Ji and the Atlantic Ocean, Chinese literature used Fo Lang Ji to closely link China with the West. “Through a series of logical substitutions and role reversals” [12], taking the specific countries of Portugal and

Spain as cases, it was transformed into the entire Western world. Fo Lang Ji, as a word, became a word connecting China and the West. It seems that a transformation channel” was found all at once from the individual to the general situation. Thus, the negative impression of Fo Lang Ji among Chinese officials and ordinary people in the late Ming and early Qing dynasties seemed to naturally transition into the overall impression of the West.

Abbreviations

Lin	Limahong
GL	Guido de Lavezares
Cin	Cincay
Omo	Omocon

Author Contributions

Yang Yang is the sole author. The author read and approved the final manuscript.

Funding

This article is part of the research project Museos, Misiones y Miradas: Interacciones Spain-China, 1815-1949 with reference PID2023-149140NB-I00, funded by the Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities - State Research Agency (Spain) and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF, European Union).

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

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