

Research Article

Exploring Global South Migration Diplomacy: Migrants Adoption as Coercion, Weapons and Tools

Lawrence Vorvornator* 

Department of Anthropology and Development Studies, University of Zululand, KwaDlangezwa, South Africa

Abstract

The study explores Global South nations migration diplomacy as weapons and tools during sour-relationship. This study is relevant because of current ‘unprecedented’ refugee manipulation in the media ‘gives birth’ to examine the migration diplomacy weapons use by the Global South nations. Moreover, Global South migration research is understudied compared to the Global North migration. The article is built on migration diplomacy theory which explores tools such as coercion, leverage, restriction, repatriation, harassment, and cooperative migration diplomacy. The study draws from the Kenya’s case study, which is not geopolitically relevant or contiguous, or rentier refugee state but weak state employed coercion namely, deportability and harassment to achieve her goals. The study employs a literature review also known as a ‘meta study’. The study’s findings reveal that deportability, remittances sanction, and migrants’ accusation by political parties as cause of unemployment, and low living standards among citizens are adopted. Mostly, the intentions are directed to migrants but indirectly to sending states or international communities. The study further reveals Global South countries engage in migration diplomacy to be recognised and powerful, to improve credentials, moral standing and status. The study identified that the success and failure of migration diplomacy depends on the vulnerability and sensitivity of the country. A vulnerable country might comply and cooperate, whereas invulnerable country may not change policies. The study argues that Global South states may change their migration diplomacy cooperation to coercion and leverage through violence threatening in the unilateral decision to be recognised. Cooperative migration is achieved if the state realizes mutual benefits between countries through border opening for moral standings.

Keywords

Coercion, Deportability, Global South, Migration Diplomacy, Cooperative Migration

1. Introduction

Migration diplomacy is defined as a process of employing political tools, weapons, and processes involve the use of migration flows as means to achieve demands in case of a sour relationship between states [51]. The existing literature indicates that repatriation, deportation, harassment, and amendment of migration laws are usually weapons and tools for

migration politics [51]. These migration diplomacies are employed in both Global North and Global South countries irrespective of whether the country is a democratic or authoritarian state [29, 44]. The paper is grounded in paradigm of migration diplomacy that ensures migration cooperation’s in international relations and state’s coercion in case of conflict

*Corresponding author: vorlaw@gmail.com (Lawrence Vorvornator)

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[49]. Both Global North' and Global South' states execute migration cooperation's and coercion to achieve their demands [28, 49].

Migration forms part of modern economy because of globalization, tourism, and technological advancement [55]. However, international migration theorist is silent in migration literature [55]. And conflicted relationship, cooperation, and conditions that make them fail or succeed. One of the possible reasons could be that the realist and neo-realist traditions might not regard issues of forced displacement, transit, emigration, and immigration seriously as compared to climate change and trade policy [3]. Because migration theorists are 'disjointed' and 'fragmented' across the disciplines of studies such as Geography, Sociology, Development Studies, and Anthropology [56]. Instances where literature is available, scholars concentrate on immigrant nations like the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and the European country's politics rather than the emigration countries [1]. In other words, migration literature skewed to the Global North at the expense of the Global South [58]. Based on that research argues that "to focus on the consequences of immigration in wealthy, migrant-receiving societies, and to ignore the causes and consequences of migration in origin countries", results into biases in the international-relations theory to the highest degree [11].

Worthy to note, migration diplomacy is the asymmetric powers displayed by the Western countries (European nations, the USA and Canada), as the destination states, the authoritarian states such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, geopolitical states (Jordan and Lebanon), and rentier nations (Turkey) [3, 18]. Refugee rentier nation is defined as a nation that share borders with superpower nations such as Turkey. And Jordan and Lebanon are non-refugee rentier states and employ migration diplomacy of back-scratching would not be tackled in this study.

The study aims to explore migration diplomacy weapons used by the Global South nations to coerce and leverage in case of deterioration in bilateral relations. Due to current 'unprecedented' refugee manipulation in the media. Because, it is under research compared to the Global North migration. International-relations politics on migration was given cold shoulders, until recently and even rated 'low' rather than 'high' [21, 25]. Due to that less work is done on Global South migration diplomacy and politics [3, 52].

As a result, the paper identifies the work of [49] migration diplomacy such as coercion and leverage between interstates politics, namely: restriction, repatriation, migration laws amendment and, deportability to achieve their goals. Research identifies: "migration policy can be a tool for states to exercise their national interests" [2]. How do migration diplomacy and politics interplay for the Global South states? And under what conditions does migration diplomacy become successful or failed? The study draws from the Kenya's case study as a weak state employed coercion migration diplomacy such as deportation, deportability and harassment to achieve

her goals.

2. Background of the Study

Kenya's migration diplomacy case study as a weak state started in 1991 through cooperation migration policy such as hospitality and cultural identities. Kenya served as host to the Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan refugees and asylum seekers [42]. In 2015, 2016, and 2019, the government of Kenya (GOK), changed its foreign policy cooperation to coercion repeatedly engaged in threats of en masse deportation against the Somalia refugees due to the terrorist attacks [26]. Which no evidence was found for the first two relating to the asylum seekers and refugees [26]. The Kenya government continued with threats after the attack and received over \$200 million as extra aid from the European Union, the US, and the UK. The Kenya government long labelled the Somali refugees as security threats to the state after the US Commission attack in Nairobi and Mombasa in 1998 and 2002 respectively [4]. This was confirmed by cable which states that: "*the GOK sees Somalia as a security problem not just for Kenya but for the entire region ... The GOK is particularly worried that at least some of those entering Kenya are extremists rather than refugees*" [26]. The Kenya government began the shift in the hospitality to the Somalia refugees and replaced them with restrictive and encampment-forced refugees in 2012. However, the ruling was turned down by the Kenya High Court that it violates the refugee rights [26]. Another threat of expulsion resumed after the attack on the Westgate shopping mall by Al-Shabaab. The attack killed 67 people and it forced a tripartite agreement between the Kenya government, Somalia government, and UNHCR [42]. In 2015, the gruesome killing of 148 Garissa University College students in Kenya by Al-Shabaab triggered another threat. This exerted pressure on the international community resulted to an amount of €94 million raised, due to refugee humanitarian ground from the Ministerial Pledging Conference on Somalia Refugees [36].

In 2016, closure of *Dadaab refugee camps*, were once threatened by the interior minister forced the UK added £20 million. And the US also gave \$20 million from the State Department of Emergency Refugees and Migration Assistant Fund coffers [36]. Yet, while the deadline for the camp's closure approached, the High Court ruled against the decision that it violates the constitution of Kenya [26]. In 2019, *DusitD2 Hotel* attacked by the Al-Shabaab 'resurrected' the threats by the Kenya government. And UNHCR was called upon to relocate the refugees "to expedite the relocation of the refugees and asylum-seekers residing therein" [5]. Meanwhile, police harassment, deportability, deportation threats, and refugees torture continued [7]. While the Dadaab Camp was not closed the conditions become deplorable from 2018 to 2019 due to withdrawal of some basic services.

The Kenya government's support for cooperative foreign policy shifted to coercion, which intensified through depor-

tation threats, expulsion, harassment, and violence (in)directly to the Somali refugees and asylum seekers. But indirectly towards the country of origins (COOs) and the international community. In July 2019, the repeated threats pressurized the EU to donate €13.5 million to the Somalia refugees in Kenya. And subsequently in September 2019, €2,025 million was donated to the UNICEF programs in Dadaab and Kakuma camps [37, 38].

From the foregoing discussion, the paper argues that migration cooperation's policy of hosting Somali refugees in Kenya has given the GOK strategic importance in the international community. The Kenya government employs vulnerable refugees as weapons and received aid. Despite, the GOK will be unable to gain funding through multilateral discussions or petitions, they were able to attain such benchmarks. Why do the South-South states pit against themselves, and under what conditions do they become successful or fail? The paper is structured as follows; theoretical framework employed and how it was applied, the paper's argument, primarily focus on literature and concept definitions, methods, findings, conclusion and recommendations.

3. Theoretical Framework

Migration diplomacy paradigm helps frame the cooperation's and coercion that exist between the COOs, transits and CODs [49, 55]. It assists to address migration politics and mobility globally and builds on the international relationship between the countries [24]. Experts asserted that international mobility and migration impact bilateral relationship between countries, whereas the refugees and migrants become international politics in case of a sour relationship. Study entitled *Weapon of Mass Migration* explain migration diplomacy as a foreign policy tool to coerce and leverage other countries [18, 19]. Research reveals 64 cases of coercion from 1951 [19]. And it explains state's politics adoption to leverage and coerce other nations [18]. Research alluded that authoritarian states coerce more than democratic states. Research further indicates that usually democratic states are vulnerable when such conflicts occur [18]. Because of their reputation on the international stage, and the national interest. Yet, critics of *Weapon of Mass Migration* research pointed out that linking migrants and refugees to the politics of the international state is premature [19, 31, 56].

International politics sociologies revealed that states adopt coercion and leverage such as regulation and border controls, and harassment directed to the migrants [24]. Migration politics could "refers to the analysis of changing border and asylum policies as an indirect form of foreign policy" [24]. This indicates that foreign policies are changed to achieve the goals of coercion perpetrated by the CODs to their benefit. Such coercions are expressed in the form of expulsion threats and deportations, whereas cooperative migration leads to mutual benefits among the members. For such coercion to be successful depends on the sensitivity and vulnerability of

states, internal securities, institutional procedures, national sovereignty and shared values at a particular time [41].

Migration diplomacy focuses on the openness of the transnational relationship that develops into migration politics. It depicts the type of government practices by the state's practice (authoritarian or democratic) [50]. It was acknowledged that the policy-making in foreign policy does not affect domestic interest only but rather international communities and other migration actors. The paper builds on the migration diplomacy establishes the conditions under which, it becomes practical to the Global South states during sour relationships.

4. Literature Review

Tools of migration diplomacy policy manipulation: Repatriation and coercion as negative elements, and cooperative migration as positive for Global South states.

4.1. TransAsia Bilateral Migration Policy Case

Research in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) from 2014 to 2021 reveals that the Philippines employed repatriation and restriction (withdrawal and reduction of the migration respectively) to achieve their demands [32]. The cooperate migration diplomacy and bilateral agreement between the UAE and the Philippines in the 1980s made Filipinos migrated to the Arab nation as household service workers (HSW). The Filipinos created a niche market in the cleaning sector. As a result, the demand for their services increased in the 1990s to the maximum [34]. In 2014, there was diplomatic tension between the two states saw the Philippines applied restrictions on migrants' flow into the UAE. Despite this, replacements were looked at from Ethiopia for the HSW. However, the services could not meet the standard of the Filipinos. During, the restriction processes the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) states that: "*the suspension of the verification of contracts of household service workers by the UAE is unfortunate. In this instance, [the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration—POEA] stopped the processing of HSWs contracts for the UAE... I have directed the POEA to do the same with contracts of HSWs intending to work in the UAE that is not verified. I am concerned that without the requisite verification, HSWs who will travel to UAE will be vulnerable to human trafficking, which we must avoid at all costs*" [38]. The UAE being adamant about the demands of the Philippines government, forced the Philippines authorities to adopt coercion migration policy such as citizen's repatriation. The study argues that it affected the living standard of the migrants and their households. And the UAE citizens sub-standard services received, sparked an outcry for Philippines citizen services [33]. This compelled the UAE authorities to change foreign policies to conditions stipulated by the Philippines government for the HSW in March, 2021.

In another development, during a diplomatic crisis when

countries (the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain) cut ties with Qatar, on the 7th of June 2017; they demanded their respective nationals to return home in a week's time [53]. Qatari firms and companies struggled to get a replacement [53]. The study argues that humankind's reduction to degrade labels such as 'poor' reveals a lack of accountability and policy integrity by government authorities. This makes it nothing more than migrants' employment as a political game among states. On top of that, the paper believes that this exposes refugees' lives in jeopardy and exploitation in host countries through deportation [3].

4.2. Ethnic Migration Flows and Regional Conflict

In 2003 when Hong Kong threatened to impose a monthly tax on the Philippines' HSWs, the Philippines authorities employed a restrictive policy curbed the migration flows to Hong Kong [30]. Being a regional; dominance in a specific skill could let the country restrict labour flow to another country. This was the case between Myanmar and Thailand when Myanmar refused to officially let migrant workers outflow to Thailand around the end of 2010. In response to ethnic armed groups' station on the border between Thai and Myanmar. Such restrictive measures were carried out through an increased in the passports cost and laying of embargo on the countries. In the same vein, the crackdown on Rohingya which the Prime Minister of Malaysia described as 'genocide' did not go well with Myanmar authorities because emigrants' labours from Myanmar seeking employment in Malaysia being restricted [37].

The bilateral agreement signed by the Kuwait and Philippines for sending HDWs to Kuwait also deteriorated just like the UAE relationship. The Philippines government employed restrictive measures to achieve its goals against Kuwait [44]. In 2018, BBC reported the missing Filipino that was found frozen in the employer's house after she was reported missing for over a year [38]. The situation brought a strained relationship and sparked outrage between the two countries. The Philippines Labour Department immediately stopped processing travelling documents for the overseas Filipino workers (OFW). The Philippines President elaborated on the restriction measures maintains that: "we have lost about four Filipino women in the last few months". He continued "it's always in Kuwait. My advice is that we talk to them, state the truth and just tell them that it's not acceptable anymore". Foreign Affairs Secretary Cayetano added: "I'm expecting a good response from the ambassador, but of course we have to see the response translate into action, meaning the protection of our OFWs" [38].

On 13 February 2018, Kuwait responded to the Philippines authorities' restriction policy through the diversification tactics by recruiting migrants from Indonesia, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Vietnam via the state-owned agency known as Al Durra Recruitment Company. In April 2018 an attempt was made to

focus on recruiting domestic workers from Ethiopia. The Head of Kuwait country's General Department of Residency Affairs, General Al-Maarifi, made it public that: "we aim to open the door to the recruitment of Ethiopian workers to fill the deficit of domestic servants and reduce prices" [5]. Kuwait's responses to the crisis made the Philippines government intensified their coercion migration repatriation politics of their citizens on 21 April 2021 [38]. As a result, prompted a diplomatic protest in Kuwait which forced the government delegation to the seat of Manila on 11 May 2018. Afterwards the two parties smoked a peace pipe called "Agreement on the Employment of Domestic Workers between Philippines and Kuwait" [37]. In a media briefing, Philippines Foreign Secretary and Kuwait Foreign Minister admitted that: "a short time ago we signed an agreement between the two countries on the employment of domestic workers". The statement confirmed the new agreement that was reached through the migration diplomacy of restriction and repatriation. Aftermath, the Philippines President on 16 May lifted the ban on the OFWs recruitment. Therefore, the study argues that bilateral agreement signed addressed ethnicity, geopolitics challenges as well as the corporal value of human life. It further addresses migration diplomacy, labourer vulnerabilities between two governments, questions of policy and security.

4.3. Political Schemas in Migration Diplomacy - Xenophobic Earned Votes Through 'Fear Based Othering'

Studies about politicians worldwide, whether democratic or autocratic states, and especially in Global South countries revealed that, migration politics is adopted as weapons to cover up politician's failures for services delivery promised on campaign trails [16]. Politicians usually attack migrants, refugees and asylum seekers as threat to security. They accuse them to be cause of unemployment and low standard of living among citizens. Pressures are exerted by constituent members for migrants' expulsion. However, the politicians usually backtrack on execution of deportation plans once voted into power [16]. Migration diplomacy is employed by those states to be recognised globally. For instance, in Kenya during the election periods, the Somali refugees were used as a 'campaign message' to the voters as posing security threats to the nation. Meanwhile, evidence indicated that they were not a threat [40]. The Refugees Consortium in Kenya 2003 not pleased with the anti-immigration messages responded that: *".....in the run-up to elections many politicians will not hesitate to manipulate the refugee situation as an electioneering gimmick. Members of Parliament have been known to distort facts and stereotypes and vilify refugees as the sole source of increased crime and insecurity, the proliferation of illegal arms and scarcity of resources... Blaming refugees detracts attention from their responsibilities towards their constituents* [38]. Meanwhile,

research indicates that politicians who portray refugees as a threat to the Kenya government were friends of the US who declared “war on terror” [40]. In a surprise move, the refugees in the cities and towns were ordered back into the camps.

4.4. Mass Deportation and Constitutional Rights

State-based repatriation is executed through the laws passed by the national legislature. Mass deportation of migrants is adopted as a result of pressure from the municipal government and constituency members [18]. The success and failure of such decisions of the parliament depend on the states’ institutional functions, whether they uphold rule of law and checks and balances [18]. The authoritarian and military states such as Azerbaijan, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia may be successful in passing mass repatriation laws [21].

However, in countries where democracy prevails and the state institutions are effective such as; Canada, the US and most EU members, the courts may block such acts on humanitarian grounds [25]. In other words, the states with hard-power might be successful with the coercion migration policy compared to the soft-power nations [44].

Studies indicate that migration politics such as pressure groups spring-up and demand governments to repatriate migrants during the recession phase of the economy. Especially, when the unemployment rate is high [21]. However, migrants are welcomed during the prosperity phase of the economy. Because more skilled and unskilled labours are needed to develop the economy [21]. The prosperity phases explain the reason Germany turned to be an immigrant country after World War II to construct the country. Hence, guest workers were allowed into the country [44]. The process termed as an “economic miracle” [45]. Meanwhile, before then Germany was an emigrant state notably to the USA [45].

Negative occurrences in the CODs, migrants are accused as perpetrators of the such crimes [40]. For instance, studies revealed that sporadic religious conflicts that engulfed Nigeria states in the 1980s, migrants were accused of being security threats dubbed in the history as ‘Kano Riots’ [6]. This forced the then president Shagari employed coercion migration politics of expulsion in 1983 against the immigrants [6]. About 1.3 million Ghanaians were deported to Ghana [6]. Migration expulsion is rampant in the Western African region for reasons such as low economic growth and development, and high unemployment rate [6]. Previous deportations that took place in the West African region involved Ghanaians repatriation of Nigerians in 1954 and 1969. Togo also repatriated Ivoirians, Nigerians and Beninese in 1958 [5].

During, Saddam’s regime in Iraq, coercion migration diplomacy was employed against Egypt in 1990, when Saddam realised Egypt was in support of Operation Desert Storm (ODS). Saddam called for massive repatriation of thousands of Egyptian workers in Iraq [52]. Repatriation situation forced Egypt to abandon its foreign policy support for ODS [52]. The

same year saw Saudi Arabia repatriated over 800,000 Yemeni immigrants from her country. Because of Yemenis’ inability to condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait under the United Security Council [51].

Study identified that the tactics of raiding migrants’ communities and money extortion from them are employed. Migrants were regarded as automated teller machines (ATMs) [43]. These findings were perpetrated in Pakistan against the Afghan refugees when the authorities decided to extend the proof of registration (PoR) for a short period of only six months [43]. Research described the Afghan refugees’ harassment as “barbaric” and “unbearable” [43]. Harassment and refugee camp raiding intensified when a massacre occurred which killed several civilians [23]. The Afghan refugees’ harassment rendered them vulnerable from 2012 to 2016, and Pakistan intensified their action attracted their neighbouring states, and the international community [43].

During the same time, the US nearly doubled financial assistance for refugees in Pakistan from \$18 million (2012), to \$37 million (2016), whereas Japan contributed an additional \$7 million in emergency aid for Afghan refugees in Pakistan [39]. Afghan refugees were coerced and repatriated into Afghanistan signified Pakistan’s coercion migration diplomacy goals toward their neighbour was successful. Pakistan also employed mass repatriation, created legal uncertainty and deportability as measures of coercion migration diplomacy against the *non-refoulement principle* by the UN Geneva Convention 1951. Non-refoulement principle indicates that refugees and asylum seekers are not supposed to be repatriated to their COO in which they might be persecuted. However, individuals may be deported based on security and safety issues (UN Convention, 1951).

4.5. Permits and Remittances as Tactical Tools of Manipulation

Global South states adopt short-term renewal of permits, PoR and any legal document that may legalise migrants [48]. As stated earlier, Afghan refugees in Pakistan PoR were renewed for only six months. The Kenya government also adopted the same strategy against the Somali refugees. The current Zimbabwean Exception Permit (ZEP) for an extension of one year in 2022 for the ZEP-holder in South Africa. Later, extended to six months in two consecutive times in 2023 (from January to June and July to December) [57]. Studies revealed that Afghan refugees’ permits were renewed but no evidence was given as proof in Pakistan. This exposed refugees and migrants to harassment by the authorities [48]. In justifying Pakistan’s coercion strategy, the State Minister and Frontier Regions said: “*the international community desires us to review this policy but we are clear on this point. The refugees have become a threat to law and order, security, demography, economy and local culture. Enough is enough. If the international community is so concerned, they should open the doors of their countries to these refugees. Afghans*

will be more than happy to be absorbed by the developed countries, like Western Europe, the USA, Canada, and Australia” [48].

Coercion migration diplomacy of remittance sanctioning is adopted by the CODs, since most of emigrant's countries such as India, Mexico, Philippines, and Egypt depend on them (remittances) for economic growth and development [22]. Research asserts that: “because economic sanctions can impose costs ... without carrying the degree of risk attached to military actions” [35]. It continued that “governments use them (remittance sanctions) to signal resolve and exert pressure for policy changes” [35]. For example, North Korea's ballistic missile testing which Japan was against, forced Japan threatened remittances sanctioning against North Korea, which was estimated between \$600 million to \$1 billion per year [20]. Studies identified that Libya and Jordan leveraged Egypt to change some of her foreign policies through remittances sanctioning [51]. The situation described as “migration interdependence” [52].

4.6. Rentier States as Refugee and Migration Havens

The states that are regional powerhouses for peace and security may become relevant like refugee rentier states due to maintaining of peace and security in the region [13]. This implies such nations become regional powerhouses and are strategically important for peace and security. Because, the international community is interested in peace and security in the regions and continents so that their ideas can be imposed on the people [13]. The regional states become CODs that absorb refugees from neighbouring states to curb violence escalation [12]. South Africa is one of the regional peace and security countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and on the African continent. After the demised of apartheid her hospitality and 'ubuntu', implies 'humanity towards others' is extended to refugees from neighbouring countries and farther afield from Liberia, Somalis, and DRC [33]. Not forgetting the economic migrants from Zimbabwean and political upheavals during 2009 [14]. The migrants perceived South Africa as a 'haven'. As if gold are used to construct the South African pavements [14]. The foregoing explanation makes South Africa strategically significant to the international community.

A nation might also employ coercion migration diplomacy such as deportability. Deportability does not necessarily mean repatriate of migrants but rather “the possibility of deportation” and subject to lawful violence [15]. States target migrant's 'illegality', which makes them vulnerable. And they are exploited for cheap labour. Undocumented migrants live in fear of deportation and are subjected to intimidation and harassment because of their precarious status. Deportability is constructed by passing laws defining illegality and active harassment by the state through roadblocks, workplace raids, and home arrests. Deportability is adopted with few migrants

arrested to send the messages across to the COOs and international community. The CODs know that it is costly to engage in deportation of all migrants. In Kenya's case, when deportability was employed towards the Somalia refugees, the authorities maintained that: “*Dadaab (Daghale, Ifo, Ifo II, Hagdera, Kambios) and Kakuma Refugee Camps should be closed and resident refugees repatriated to their country of origin because of fears that refugee camps were safe havens for terrorist groups*” [26]. Immediately after the deportability threats, UNHCR started to negotiate a tripartite agreement among the UNHCR, the GOK and Somalia government. And additional financial aid was granted [42]. In a media briefing, UNHCR's representative in Kenya posits that: “*it's very important to underline that no one is forcing Somalis to leave Kenya. The government and people of Kenya have tirelessly provided protection and assistance to Somali refugees for two decades. The agreement we signed on Sunday does not mean Kenya is no longer willing to do so*” [42].

4.7. Cooperative Migration Diplomacy as Positive for Global South States

Migration diplomacy of cooperation considered to be positive is practiced by the CODs for migrants' cross-border mobility. This occurs during Gaddafi's regime in Libya when he was pursuing the United Arab World (UAW) dream [54]. Migration cooperation's allow states' frozen visas and free movement of goods. In 1971 both Egypt and Tunisia signed an agreement with Libya for visa-free for their citizens. Gaddafi nurtured the idea of Egyptian President Abdel Nasser to unite the Arab world allowed free movement of Tunisians and Egyptians. Research asserts Gaddafi's action that: “it is the self-appointed guardian of Nasser's legacy nurturing the notion of Arab nationalism and unity” [54]. Gaddafi was vocal against free movement curtailment in the Middle East. He was quoted for promoting “the unification of all Arabic-speaking people” as the only way to achieve economic growth and development [54].

As the relationship turned soured between Egypt and Libya, Gaddafi resorted to deportation, coercion, repatriation and an embargo on Egyptian migration to Libya [21]. The situation forced Egypt withdrew from negotiations of the Federal Arab Republic. Later on, Egypt accused Gaddafi of being “mentally retarded” and “insane” [54]. Egyptian migrants faced barbaric conditions in Libya forced the then-ruling party, Arab Socialist Union parliamentarians passed a law for the repatriation of over 300,000 Egyptians migrants in Libya [54]. Aftermath, Libya adopted mass deportation by the Egyptians irrespective of their status (being unauthorized or authorized migrants). Each day over 10,000 Egyptians are deported and governor of Marsa Matrouh received the migrants into Egypt [54]. In another development when Tunisia President Bourghuiba's visited Washington DC in August 1985, over 5,000 Tunisia workers in Libya's belongings were confiscated to either declare to be 'Arab nationality' or face repatriation to

Tunisia. This development forced the Tunisia diplomats to state that these actions “were intended to put pressure on Tunis to cut ties with the West” [17].

Gaddafi became less interested in the UAW in the 1990s. He extended migration cooperation's to other African states such as Sudan and Chad to achieve his Pan-Africanism agenda, which established the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) [17]. The Schengen visas among European countries apart from Britain, and the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), are migration cooperation's examples.

Cooperation migration diplomacy plays a role between the Middle East and Egypt. This made Egypt to export professionals for the developmental reasons to achieve the UAW under President Nasser [51]. Cuba's migration diplomacy cooperation termed the “Cuban medical internationalism”, extended to the African countries and Latin America as a form of 'hard-power' against the USA in reaction to the engineered refugee crises [9]. Studies revealed migration diplomacy cooperation's is practiced when nations would derive mutual benefits termed a positive-sum-game or win-win [12, 49]. Research indicates that when Thailand assisted Taiwan to become a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), cooperation migration diplomacy developed between the two states in terms of sharing skilled labours. In some instances, the bilateral relations between the interstate's 'fuel' the free labour migration between countries. This was revealed between Thailand and Singapore in signing the international flow of labour between their countries [58].

5. Methodology

The paper draws from the Kenya's case study as an exploratory approach. As stated earlier, Kenya's case study is a specific and extreme case since it does not serve as geopolitical like Turkey or not geographically contiguous like Jordan and Lebanon but rather a weak nation. Out of cooperation migration policy and hospitality, Kenya hosted Somali refugees and becomes a regional powerhouse for peace and security. Later, Kenya government employs coercion strategies. The Kenya case study provides in-depth, significant, and enrich information to the research topic and questions.

A literature review (LR) also known as a meta study was adopted. Google Scholars and Web of Science search engines were identified, selected, and sifted for existing literatures related to the Global South migration diplomacy. The twelve years duration for the literature review was done to get access to the current information about the topic under discussion. Exclusions and inclusions were done for the journal articles related to the topic. Magazines, newspapers, internet information relevant to the study were accessed. In addition, official government documents, reports, and public statements published in news papers were reviewed. Articles selected for review gives in-depth knowledge about the topic

considered significant to answer the research questions. Articles were carefully read, themes formulated and data analysed base on the themes that emerged [59]. Procedures were taken to develop guidelines for integrative and systematic narrative review for the write-up. The theories and LR present broader pictures, baseline information, and understanding of the previous literature on the topic [58, 59]. Further, LR helps to avoid duplication of existing works by the scholars. However, the limitations could be that since not all academic search engines were explored there could be some few existing literatures that the author might not use.

6. Findings

Migration diplomacy such as coercion and leverage execution to be successful is based on the states' position as being transit, immigrant and emigrant nations. Or the type of regime practices namely authoritarian, and power asymmetric [21, 52]. The study's findings reveal Global South states execute coercion in an attempt to be recognised as powerful nations, power-seeking, moral standing, status improvement, reputations and credentials [18]. However, normalcy, cordial relations and cooperation are 'fanned' when relationships are intact. Through migration diplomacy cooperation with migrants, refugees, displaced population, and asylum seekers from COOs [50, 54].

Global South states allocated strategically to host refugees during war outbreaks may coerce COOs or international community to meet their demands [40, 47]. For instance, both Kenya and Pakistan coerced through issuing threats and warning to the closure of the Dabaad (Somalis) and Afghan refugees camp respectively [37, 38]. In other words, weaker states become 'buffer' to absorb and maintain peace, in the region may adopt leverage and threats against the COOs. They adopt coercion measures such as harassment, deportability, threats to expel, and violence towards refugees and migrants to meet their demands [18, 11].

Economic sanctions against COOs as a measure also produces counter results. Therefore, its success or failure depends on the sensitivity and vulnerability of COOs. Economic linkages use against countries enforced them to comply, resist or nationalised. It implies that countries that are sensitive and vulnerable might comply as stated earlier, when Libya and Jordan coerced Egypt [27]. Research attributes Jordanians' expulsion from Kuwait to economic sanction as studies maintain that: “it may make sense to think of ... Jordanian expatriate labour in Kuwait” to be sparked by ‘economic statecraft’, but unfortunately, Brand did not advance the argument [10].

Research explains that the US deportation policy against Chinese migrants during the Cold War, but could not convincible conclude whether the deportation was part of the COD's foreign policy [46].

Therefore, for migration diplomacy coercion to be successful against the COOs depend on the vulnerability and

sensitivity of the state [27]. COOs that may easily improve their ties with other states might not bother about threats and leverage of the CODs. However, COO's vulnerable and does not have any support from other countries may comply with the leverage from CODs [3]. During conflict relationship of Egypt between Libya and Jordan due to harbouring fugitives of Gaddafi, and cutting of power supply to Jordan, deportation sanction was implemented against Egyptian migrants. Morsi complied with both Libya and Jordan's demands [21]. In the GCC states, Filipino HDWs were successful due to their niche market created in the domestic cleaning industry. States' that serve ties with other nations if leverage; they could look elsewhere for alternatives [48]. Ghanaian deportation from Nigeria also comes in mind. The deportees later migrated to Libya and other countries for their greener pastures [5].

Despite, scanty literature on the successful attempts during migration interdependence vulnerability; in May 2015 when two Saudi Arabia domestic workers were executed in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia adopted migrants' restriction to Indonesia [8]. But such leverage did not lead to policy changes [8]. Qatar crisis which resulted in Saudi, the UAE and Bahrain coercion and leverage their migrant workers also failed to produce a shift in foreign migration diplomacy [8, 32].

The paper argues that through foreign migration diplomacy, cooperation is extended as hospitality to other states based on cultural identities, economic ties, and domestic interests to enhance the international relationship to get recognition, moral status, reputation and credentials. Whereas during frosty relationships the migration cooperation is changed to coercion and leverage of migrants (in)directly through harassment, deportation and deportability to COOs or international communities. However, the success and failure of migration diplomacy depends on the vulnerability and sensitivity of nations whether transit, refugee rentier or peace and security maintainers in the sub-region. The Global South nations that are recognised to be relevant for peace and security maintenance in the region case as Kenya, Pakistan and South Africa might be successful to attract more financial aid from the international community. Whereas the countries that are irrelevant in terms of maintaining peace and security may fail. Moreover, COOs might comply if they are sensitive and vulnerable, whereas the states that are invulnerable and have alternatives might not comply with the coercion and leverage.

7. Conclusion

The paper explored migration diplomacy weapons adopted by Global South states to coerce and leverage each other in case of frosty relations. Because, it is under research as compared to the Global North. The article was built on the theoretical framework of migration diplomacies such as migration politics, weapons and tactics such as coercion, leverage, restriction, repatriation or expulsion, harassment, and migrants' raiding and cooperation migration diplomacy. The paper revealed that deportability, remittances sanction, pres-

sure groups formation and accusations of migrants are adopted by political parties. Because they accuse migrants as the causes of unemployment and low standards of living of the citizens. Mostly, the intentions are not directed to the migrants, but rather to the COOs for a shift in policies. Studies identified that the success and failure of such demands depend on the vulnerability and sensitivity of the country. A vulnerable country might comply and cooperate, whereas the invulnerable country may not change its policies. In conclusion, the study argues that states may change cooperation foreign policies to implement coercive migration diplomacy through threatening violence and the use of excessive force in the unilateral decision to achieve their goals. Cooperation migration is achieved if the state's realised the mutual benefits between the two countries in terms of opening the borders for their citizens.

Abbreviations

COO	Country of Origin
COD	Country of Destination
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
GATT	General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
HSW	Household Service Workers
ODS	Oversea Filipino Workers
UAE	United Arab Emirate
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United nations Children's Fund

Author Contributions

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Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

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Research Field

Lawrence Vorvornator: Global South Migration, Immigrants Entrepreneurship, Migration Studies, Tourism, Sustainable Entrepreneurship